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A

PHILOSOPHICAL TREATISE

ON THE

PASSIONS.

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A

PHILOSOPHICAL TREATISE

ON THE

PASSIONS.

BY

T. COGAN, M. D.

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Fortunarum habitum. ———

HORATII DE ARTE POETICA.

BATH

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PREFACE.

AMIDST the numerous Branches of Knowledge which claim the attention of the human mind, no one can be more important than that which conſtitutes the ſubject of the following Treatiſe. Whatever moſt intimately concerns ourſelves muſt be of the firſt moment: the principle of ſelf-love which is inherent in our natures, immediately ſuggeſts that no other ſpecies of knowledge can ſtand in competition with it. Every thing is juſtly deemed intereſting that has any relation to ourſelves; and the degrees of its importance are meaſured by the degrees of its influence upon our *well-being*. An attention therefore to the work-

ings of our own minds; tracing the power which external objects have over us; diſcovering the nature of our emotions and affections; and comprehending the reaſon of our being affected in a particular manner, muſt have a direct influence upon our purſuits, our characters, and our happineſs.

It may with juſtice be advanced, that the hiſtory of ourſelves in this department, is of much greater utility than abſtruſer ſpeculations concerning the metaphyſical nature of the human ſoul, or even the moſt accurate knowledge of its intellectual powers. For it is according as the paſſions and affections are excited and directed towards the objects inveſtigated by our intellectual natures, that we become uſeful to ourſelves or others; that we riſe into reſpectability or ſink into contempt, that we diffuſe or enjoy happineſs, diffuſe or ſuffer miſery.

An accurate Analyſis of theſe paſſions and affections therefore is to the Moraliſt, what the ſcience of Anatomy is to the Surgeon. It conſtitutes the firſt principles of rational practice. It is in a *moral* ſenſe, the anatomy of the *heart*. It diſcovers *why* it beats, and *how* it beats, indicates appearances in a ſound

a ſound and healthy ſtate, detects diſeaſes with their cauſe, and it is infinitely more fortunate in the power it communicates of applying ſuitable remedies.

Yet, notwithſtanding the ſuperior importance of this Science, it has not engaged the attention of philoſophers to an equal degree with the intellectual powers of man. Thoſe who are conſcious of the acuteneſs of their own intellectual powers, have loved to employ them upon ſubjects the moſt difficult and abſtruſe. Their chief delight has been in the ſtudy of natures and eſſences; and their ambition, to ſolve difficulties which have repeatedly occupied and embarraſſed the ſtrongeſt minds. Patient attention to facts appeared to them an employment beſt adapted to plain and common underſtandings; it is the province of Genius to ſoar above the common level, and penetrate the miſts which ſurround the regions of intellect.

When it is aſſerted that the paſſions of the mind have not employed the attention of the philoſophic world equally with the other branches which relate to Man, the aſſertion implies that they have not

been totally neglected. Philoſophers in their ſtudy of human nature have not paſſed them over in ſilence. They have treated them occaſionally, but generally ſpeaking ſuperficially, chiefly as appendages to their other philoſophical purſuits. This circumſtance, it is acknowledged, has been productive of a train of thought peculiar to each ſpeculator; and thus has each been able to throw ſome light upon a ſubject, which it was not his ſole or primary object to inveſtigate.

Among the Authors who have paid the moſt attention to the ſubject, Profeſſor *Hutcheſon*, Dr. *Watts*, Mr. *Grove*, and the Writer of the Article on the Paſſions of Men in the Britiſh Encyclopædia, may juſtly be placed in the firſt rank. The obſervations of Mr. Hutcheſon chiefly reſpect the moral uſes of the Paſſions, which it is not the profeſſed object of the preſent Treatiſe to inveſtigate. Objections to ſome of the principles advanced by Dr. *Watts* and Mr. *Grove*, as well as other Writers of eminence, are ſtated in the Introductory Chapter, and will occaſionally appear in different parts of this Work. It will therefore be ſufficient to remark

mark at preſent, that the very ſmall degree of information obtained reſpecting many eſſential points; the imperfection of every arrangement hitherto made,—which may be aſcribed to the ſubject's being entered upon without the eſtabliſhment of firſt and indiſputable principles,—the almoſt univerſal diſagreement among philoſophers in their ideas concerning the preciſe nature of a Paſſion, Emotion, and Affection; or in what reſpect they ſpecifically differed from each other, &c. were the principal inducements to the Author of the following Treatiſe, to pay much greater attention to the workings of the human mind, than he would have done had their remarks been more ſatisfactory. In order to find his way through perplexing labyrinths, he was determined to extend the analytic method much farther than it has hitherto been purſued; from a full conviction that, although it is not in general the moſt popular and acceptable mode, it is much the ſecureſt, and beſt adapted to procure a ſtrength of evidence in philoſophical and moral ſubjects which approaches to the nature of demonſtration.

The Treatiſe now ſubmitted to public candour

contains the hiſtory and the reſult of this proceſs; in which, however ſlow and tedious the ſteps, the Author has been frequently relieved, and ſometimes amply rewarded by diſcoveries which appeared to him equally new and important. If they ſhould appear ſo to others, he will feel himſelf completely recompenſed for his labour.

As he is not without apprehenſions that the analytical part will appear much too tedious and prolix, thus he fears that the philoſophical obſervations and inquiries will appear much too ſuperficial; but he would remind the Reader that his ſole object was to give an epitome of general and influential principles, and not to purſue the development of any to the extent of which it is ſuſceptible. The impoſſibility of this muſt be ſelf-apparent.

The natural conſequences of this immediate application to the genuine ſources of knowledge, without either prejudice or predilection, are, that in ſome inſtances he has traced a perfect coincidence of opinion with preceding Writers on the Paſſions; in many he has corrected his own previous ideas; and in others, he thinks that he has not only

diſcovered

diſcovered errors, but alſo the cauſes of them. Wherever the ſubject has appeared peculiarly important, the diſcrepancy great, and the Authorities oppoſed, reſpectable, he has ſtated the ſubject, and his reaſons in the adjoined Notes; that the concatenation of ideas ſo neceſſary in the analytical method might not ſuffer interruption.

Notwithſtanding his utmoſt care, the Analyzer cannot flatter himſelf that nothing of importance has eſcaped his attention. Both the extent and intricacy of the ſubject will it is hoped furniſh an apology for many defects. Nor can he expect that of the numerous explanations and definitions propoſed, they will all be equally acceptable and convincing. Some of them will probably be erroneous. But it may not be improper to remark, that the extraordinary verſatility of language renders it extremely difficult to ſeize the preciſe ſignification of terms in every connection; and will ſometimes occaſion a diverſity of opinion, in caſes where a criterion cannot always be found to which our judgments will uniformly ſubmit. If the Reader ſhould not agree with him in the preciſe ſignification of particular terms,

terms, the utmoſt care has been taken that the ſenſe in which the Author has uſed them ſhall not be miſunderſtood: ſo that the principles he advances muſt either enforce conviction, or lay themſelves fully open to confutation.

The copiouſneſs of the ſubject has confined the Work before us to a *philoſophical* inveſtigation of the Paſſions. The ſcience of *Morals*, ſo intimately connected with it, opens a field for contemplation ſtill more extenſive; which although it has ſo frequently engaged the attention of Moraliſts, appears to be inexhauſtible; nor ought we to deſpair of perpetual additions being made to our ſtock of knowledge.

Notwithſtanding the different points of view in which this ſubject has been contemplated, the reſult of every inquiry terminates in a conviction of the abſolute neceſſity of morals to perſonal and ſocial happineſs. So many evidences of this truth will preſent themſelves to the attentive Reader, that the Treatiſe before him will appear rather as an *Epitome of moral duties*,

duties, than as the *Rudiments of Self-knowledge*, according to the primary design of the Author.

Several speculative subjects have also an intimate connection with the doctrine of the Passions; such as *the nature and the power of motives; the doctrine of the moral sense; the disinterestedness of benevolence; &c. &c.* and these may in his opinion derive no inconsiderable elucidation from the principles established.

Whether these topics shall become the subject of future consideration depends upon many contingencies; of which scarcely any can be more influential than the degree of acceptance the present publication may receive from the moral and philosophic World. As Authors are so prone on the one hand to place too high a value upon their own performances, thus are Readers on the other, too apt to expect a much greater conformity to their taste, than it is either in the power or inclination of the Writer to comply with; and that man must be sanguine indeed, who never despairs of success. By presenting the following specimen to the Public, the Author

thor will either be encouraged to proceed, or be enabled to ſpare himſelf that trouble which in the iſſue might appear to have been totally unneceſſary.

BATH:

May 15, 1800.

CONTENTS.

CONTENTS.

PART I.

ANALYSIS OF THE PASSIONS.

CHAP. I.

General View of the Subject.

		Page.
Sect. I.	On Paſſions, Emotions, and Affections; the ſpecific difference between them	1
II.	Plans of Arrangement examined	16
III.	Love and Hatred; their Nature	23
IV.	Deſire and Averſion	33
V.	Objects of Love and Hatred; their Characteriſtics	38
VI.	New Arrangements propoſed	42
VII.	Introductory Emotions particularly conſidered	47

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

Page.

CLASS I. Paſſions and Affections, which owe their Origin to the Principle of SELF-LOVE 61

ORDER I. Paſſions and Affections, &c. excited by the Idea of GOOD 62
Joy, Gladneſs, &c. *ibid*
Contentment 65
Satisfaction 66
Complacency *ibid*
Pride, &c. 71
Deſire 73
Hope 86

ORDER II. Paſſions and Affections excited by the Idea of EVIL 90
1. SORROW. 91
Grief, Melancholy, &c. 92
Patience, Reſignation, Humility 95
2. FEAR. 97
Conſternation, Terror, Dread, Deſpair, &c. &c.
3. ANGER. 107
Wrath, Reſentment, Indignation, &c. &c.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Page

CLASS II. Paſſions and Affections derived from the SOCIAL PRINCIPLE 116

ORDER I. Paſſions and Affections, in which GOOD is the predominant Idea 125

I. Benevolent *Deſires* and *Diſpoſitions* *ibid*

1. Social Affections 126

2. Sympathetic Affections 131

II. Affections derived from *Good Opinion* 142

Gratitude 144

Admiration 145

Eſteem, Reſpect 151

Veneration, &c. 152

Fondneſs, &c. 154

ORDER II. Paſſions and Affections in which EVIL is the predominant Idea 156

I. Malevolent *Deſires* and *Diſpoſitions* 157

Malignancy, Envy, Rancour, Cruelty, &c. 166

Rage, Revenge, &c. Suſpicion, Jealouſy 168

Page.

II. Diſplacency indicated by *unfavourable opinions* 170
Horror, Indignation, Contempt, &c.

PART II.

Philosophical Observations and Inquiries.

CHAP. I.

Obſervations reſpecting the Laws of Excitement 181

OBSERV. I. Surpriſe, the efficient Cauſe of *Paſſion* *ibid*
II. *Affections* alone permanent 185
III. Relation of Paſſions and Affections to each other 190
IV. Seat of the Paſſions 204

CHAP. II.

Cauſes which create a diverſity in our Affections, enumerated 220

§ 1. Experience 220
§ 2. Difference of Sex 221
§ 3. Diverſity of Temperament 227

Page.

§ 4. Progreſs from Infancy to Age 229
§ 5. National Cuſtoms 232
§ 6. Force of Habit. 235
§ 7. Self-Love. 237
§ 8. Education 239
§ 9. Novelty. 242
§ 10. Faſhion. 244
§ 11. Love of Singularity 247
§ 12. Popular Prejudices 249
§ 13. Aſſociated Ideas 252
§ 14. Manner in which Information is conveyed 258
§ 15. Imitative Tones and Repreſentations 261
§ 16. Rhetoric, Oratory, Eloquence 264
§ 17. The Drama 268
§ 18. Pre-diſpoſing Cauſes 270

CHAP. III.

Influence of the Paſſions.

SECT. I. *Medical* Influence 278
II. Influence on *Thought* and *Language* 298
III. Influence on *Character* 308
IV. Influence on *Happineſs* 317

PART I.

PART I.

ANALYSIS OF THE PASSIONS.

CHAP. I.

General View of the Subject.

SECT. I.

On Paſſions, Emotions, and Affections; the ſpecific difference between them.

BY Paſſions, emotions, and affections, we underſtand thoſe ſtronger or weaker feelings, with their correſpondent effects upon the Syſtem, which are excited within us by the perception or contemplation of certain qualities, which belong, or are ſuppoſed to belong to the objects of our attention; and which in ſome reſpect or other, appear intereſting to us. In all caſes, when the violence of the emotion is not too powerful for the animal œconomy, the feelings or ſenſations excited

are pleaſant or unpleaſant, according to the nature of the exciting cauſe, the ideas entertained of it, or the intenſeneſs with which the mind is ſtruck by it. Theſe feelings differ in degrees of ſtrength, according to the apparent importance of their cauſe; according to certain peculiarities of temperament; and alſo according to the manner in which the influential qualities are preſented to the mind.

One or other of the three terms, Paſſion, Emotion, Affection, is always employed to expreſs the ſenſible effects which objects, or ideas concerning them, have upon the mind; but they are ſo frequently employed in a vague and indeterminate manner, that ſome difficulty attends the attempt to reſtore them to their preciſe and diſcriminating ſignifications.

The word *Paſſion*, is thus rendered ſubject to ſeveral peculiarities in the application of it. Sometimes it is uſed in a generic ſenſe, as expreſſive of every impreſſion made upon the mind. When we ſpeak of the paſſions in general, or of a treatiſe on the paſſions, we mean not to expreſs the ſtronger impreſſions alone; the mildeſt affections are alſo included: and if we denominate any one to be a perſon of ſtrong paſſions, we mean that he is ſubject to violent tranſports of joy, or grief, or anger, &c. indiſcri-

indiſcriminately. In one inſtance the word is emphatically employed to expreſs *ſuffering;* as *our Saviour's paſſion:* in another it indicates *anger* excluſively: thus when it is ſaid of any one that he is in a paſſion, it is univerſally underſtood that he is very angry. The term paſſion, and its adverb paſſionately, often expreſs a very ſtrong predilection for any purſuit, or object of taſte; a kind of enthuſiaſtic fondneſs for any thing. Thus we remark of one perſon that he has a paſſion for muſick, or that he is paſſionately fond of muſick; of another that he is paſſionately fond of painting, &c. &c. In a ſenſe ſimilar to this is the word alſo applied to every propenſity which operates ſtrongly and permanently upon the mind; as the *ſelfiſh* paſſions, the *generous* paſſions. Yet when we mean to particularize any of theſe, a different law of phraſeology is obſerved. The word *paſſion* is appropriated by the *evil* propenſities which are uniformly operative. Thus we do not ſay the *affection* of pride, or of avarice, but the *paſſion.* The term *affection* on the other hand is appropriated by the *virtuous* propenſities; as the *ſocial, friendly, parental, filial,* affections, &c. though philoſophically conſidered, the relation they bear to the ſtate and workings of the mind is perfectly analogous.

Nor is this capricious latitude of expreſſion confined to common language, where accura-

cy is not always to be expected. It is alſo obvious among philoſophers themſelves: ſo that ſcarcely two authors, who have written upon the ſubject of the paſſions, are agreed in their ideas of the terms they employ. One, for example, aſſerts that the emotions are in their own nature *quieſcent;* * while another conſiders them as highly turbulent. One confines the idea of paſſions, to the deſires which *follow* an emotion, another conſiders them as conſtituting the ſtrength of an emotion: a third repreſents paſſions as the calmeſt things in nature, as ſteady uniform principles of action, to which reaſon itſelf is always ſubſervient. † Hence it becomes highly neceſſary to ſeek after ſome rules which ſhall render our ideas more conſiſtent and uniform.

In moſt of theſe applications no attention has been paid to the primitive ſignification of the word paſſion; although this appears to be the ſafeſt method to recall us from thoſe aberrations to which we are perpetually expoſed. Few expreſſions wander ſo far from their original import, as to convey a ſenſe which is totally foreign. The primary idea annexed to the word is that of *paſſiveneſs*, or being impulſively acted upon. In this ſenſe the term properly ſignifies the ſenſible effect, the feeling to which

* Lord Kaims. † Mr. Hume.

the

the mind is become ſubjected, when an object of importance ſuddenly and imperiouſly demands its attention. If our imaginations be lively, our temperaments ſuſceptible, the object intereſting to us, we cannot avoid being affected, or ſuffering ſome powerful change on our diſpoſitions, by its recent appearance, or by the ſuggeſtion of a ſomething we deem of importance. In all ſuch caſes we are obviouſly paſſive; we are acted upon without any previous determination of the will, or without any conſent of our own.

As ſeveral of our paſſions are of a diſagreeable and painful nature, and as this paſſive or helpleſs ſtate is ſo frequently connected with *ſuffering*, the tranſition from one ſignification to the other is not only natural but almoſt inevitable: a paſſion will often be conſidered as ſynonimous with ſuffering. In medical language a perſon oppreſſed with diſeaſe is called a patient, an involuntary ſufferer, and the calmneſs with which he ſubmits is termed patience; that is, the mind yields with tranquillity to the pains and indiſpoſitions of the body. The word pathology, has alſo the ſame derivation: it is the hiſtory of the ſufferings incident to the human frame. The Greeks expreſſed paſſions in general by παθος, which ſignifies ſuffering; and the Latin word *Paſſio*, from which we have adopted the term *paſſion* has the ſame ſignification. The Stoics alſo gave the

name of παθη to all extraordinary emotions of the ſoul, becauſe they conſidered them as mental diſeaſes, by which the ſoul while under their influence, was reduced to a ſtate of ſuffering. But this ſecondary ſenſe, as far as it conveys the idea of an unpleaſant or painful ſenſation, is alone applicable to the effects produced by paſſions of a certain claſs; for others are in their own nature pleaſing; as joy and hope; whereas the primitive import of the word, that of *paſſiveneſs*, equally belongs to them all. The mind is equally paſſive in every effect ſuddenly and unexpectedly produced upon it, whether its influence be of a pleaſant, or unpleaſant nature. (See Note *A*.)

The term paſſion therefore, may with ſtrict propriety, be uſed, and uſed excluſively, to repreſent the *firſt feeling*, the *percuſſion* as it were, of which the mind is conſcious from ſome impulſive cauſe; by which it is wholly acted upon without any efforts of its own, either to ſolicit or eſcape the impreſſion.

Probably it is in alluſion to this paſſive ſtate of the mind, that the terms *paſſion* and *paſſionately* are employed to expreſs the powerful attachment to particular objects mentioned above. They inſinuate that the influence of theſe beloved objects, is irreſiſtible; and that the mind is completely under their dominion.

The

The ſtate of abſolute paſſiveneſs, in conſequence of any ſudden percuſſion of mind, is of ſhort duration. The ſtrong impreſſion or vivid ſenſation immediately produces a reaction, correſpondent to its nature; either to appropriate and enjoy, or to avoid and repel the exciting cauſe. This reaction is very properly diſtinguiſhed by the term *emotion*. The ſenſible effect produced at the firſt inſtant, by the cauſe of the paſſion, greatly agitates the frame; its influence is immediately communicated to the whole nervous ſyſtem, and the commotions excited in that, indicate themſelves both by attitudes and motions of the body, and particular expreſſions of countenance. Theſe effects are ſuch univerſal concomitants that no very important change in the ſtate of the mind can take place, without ſome viſible change of a correſpondent nature in the animal œconomy.

Emotions therefore, according to the genuine ſignification of the word, are principally and primitively applicable to the ſenſible changes and viſible effects which particular paſſions produce upon the frame, in conſequence of this reaction, or particular agitation of mind. It is alone by theſe viſible effects, that the ſubject is diſcovered to be under the influence of any paſſion; and it is alone by the particular changes produced, or kind of emotion, that we are enabled to judge of the nature of the paſſion. Thus, although the paſſion exiſts prior to

the emotions, yet as theſe are its external ſigns, they muſt indicate its continued influence as long as they continue to agitate the ſyſtem. In conſequence of this immediate connection, the words *paſſions* and *emotions*, are, in familiar diſcourſe, where no philoſophical preciſion is requiſite, uſed ſynonimouſly; though in reality the latter are uniformly the effects of the former. Here, as in innumerable other inſtances, figurative modes of expreſſion are adopted. The *Synecdoche* is perpetually employed, by which, cauſe and effect are confounded, or ſubſtituted the one for the other. Since emotions are faithful indications of their correſpondent paſſions, and ſtrong paſſions are always productive of emotions, we ſhould deem it a pedantic preciſion to ſelect, at all times, the appropriate word, when we mean ſimply to expreſs the general effect.

However the term Emotion is ſometimes expreſſive of lively ſenſations which do not produce viſible effects in any degree proportionate to their feelings. In emotions the mind is not ſo completely, or neceſſarily paſſive. In general it poſſeſſes ſome power over the external ſigns; and in many caſes where the feelings would be too ſtrong to remain concealed, were they totally uncontrouled, ſome other influential affection either of fear, reſpect, humanity,

humanity, &c. may ſerve to repreſs or moderate their effects, and confine them to *inward* emotions.

Again the term is frequently employed to mark the firſt impreſſion which particular objects make upon ſuſceptible minds whether they remain concealed or not. Thus in the fine Arts, the charms of muſical compoſitions which are novel to us; the firſt view of a gallery of paintings poſſeſſing diſtinguiſhed merit; the ſurpriſe of a beautiful or elevated ſentiment, or poetic deſcription, will generally make a more vivid impreſſion upon us, than that which is felt, in a continued, or renewed contemplation of the ſame ſubjects; and yet theſe impreſſions may not be ſo forcible as to produce the tranſports accompanying emotions from other cauſes. Yet this difference is ſimply in *degree*, not in *kind*. This ſpecies of enjoyment is peculiar to minds highly cultivated, whoſe repeated enjoyments of a ſimilar nature have gradually moderated tranſports; and whoſe emotions, have gradually ſubſided into gentler undulations, if I may thus expreſs myſelf, in place of thoſe agitations which the inexperienced would inevitably betray upon ſimilar occaſions.

The third term *Affection*, has in itſelf a different ſignification from either of the above. It always repreſents a leſs violent, and generally a more durable

ble influence, which things have upon the mind. It is applicable to the manner in which we are *affected* by them for a continuance. It ſuppoſes a more deliberate predilection and averſion, in conſequence of the continued influence of ſome prevailing quality. This diſtinguiſhes it from the tranſient impulſe of *Paſſion*. Nor is it ſo intimately connected with any external ſigns; which diſtinguiſhes it from *Emotions*. The affections ſometimes ſucceed to paſſions and emotions; becauſe theſe may have been excited by ſomething that become permanently intereſting; or they may be gradually inſpired, by a deliberate attention to the good or bad qualities of their objects.

In this philoſophic ſenſe of the word, Affection is applicable to an unpleaſant as well as pleaſant ſtate of the mind, when impreſſed by any object or quality: it may be produced by whatever torments or corrodes the heart as well as that which charms and delights it. Uſage however chiefly applies the word to the kindly and beneficent affections. When we remark that a perſon has an affectionate heart, we mean to applaud his being under the influence of the beſt affections, of a ſocial and relative nature.

With other Writers on the paſſions we ſhall always uſe the term in the philoſophical ſenſe; and apply it equally to whatever produces more permanent feelings

ings in the mind, whether they be pleaſing or painful, of a benevolent or malevolent character.

As in Paſſions and Emotions thus in the *Affections* ſeveral gradations of influence are obſervable. Some affections indicate themſelves ſo ſtrongly, that they approach to emotions: ſome may require a penetrating eye to diſcover them: ſome may be powerfully indulged with ſuch ſelf command, that they ſhall elude the moſt critical obſervation; and ſome have ſuch an equal and uniform influence, as to blend, as it were, with the temper, and almoſt loſe the name of affection; as generoſity, fortitude, humility, patience, reſignation.

When there is a propenſity to indulge one particular affection or claſs of affections more than another, ariſing from peculiarity of temperament, education, connections, habits, &c. we conſider this propenſity as an indication of temper or habitual diſpoſition. Thus we ſpeak of a benevolent, grateful, cheerful, timorous, revengeful temper. Theſe characters do not imply that the ſubject is perpetually under the influence of the particular affection, but they mark his propenſity towards it. The affections therefore refer to the actual impreſſion made upon the mind by certain qualities real or ſuppoſed; and the temper or diſpoſition is that particular caſt of mind which renders the perception of certain qualities capable of making a more prompt,

or

or a more durable impreſſion upon one perſon than another. We deem that man to be iraſcible who is diſpoſed to be angry at trifles; and him we praiſe as humane who is always diſpoſed to commiſerate ſufferings.

It is hoped that the above explanations of the terms, Paſſions, Emotions, and Affections, will obtain the approbation of my philoſophic Readers, ſince they were ſuggeſted to the Author by an attention to the workings of the human mind. If approved, they cannot appear unimportant, as they may ſerve to indicate both mutual relations and characteriſtic differences in the impreſſions which ſurrounding objects, or ideas concerning them, make upon us; and although an attention to theſe minute diſtinctions, may not always be neceſſary in common language, and would ſometimes be abſurd, yet the want of this preciſion has been ſeverely felt in philoſophical inveſtigations, and is a principal cauſe of the obſcurities in which they are too frequently involved. It will be allowed by every attentive obſerver, that the proceſs which we have characterized by the above terms, *does* take place in the human mind, when expoſed to the ſudden and powerful influence of particularly intereſting objects. Such objects are irreſiſtibly forced upon his attention, independent of a will or determination

tion of his own: they often produce great agitations both of mind and body: and when theſe agitations have ſubſided, the mind retains ſome degree of predeliction or averſion for them. As theſe diſtinctions are clearly and ſatisfactorily expreſſed by the particular terms we have given to each, this is a full indication that they are the moſt appropriate. (See Note *B*.)

The above obſervations are not confined to a ſimple proceſs, which takes place from more ſimple cauſes. After we have ſuppoſed a paſſion indicated by an emotion to be ſucceeded, by ſome correſpondent affection, we may yet conſider this affection as the parent of new paſſions, emotions, and affections, according to the variety of circumſtances connected with it. It may inſpire fear, as when the object of our affection is in a perilous ſtate, or earneſt deſire, or ſanguine hope. Some of theſe new paſſions and affections will arouſe to action, as when the ſtrong ſenſe of an injury excites to revenge; others chill and depreſs the ſpirits, as ſorrow and deſpair. Yet in the midſt of all theſe diverſities, the characteriſtic differences between Paſſions, Emotions, and Affections, are equally obvious.

Confining ourſelves therefore to what we deem the genuine import of the words, in oppoſition to the irregularities of cuſtom, we ſhall as often as it may

may be neceſſary to obſerve diſtinctions, uniformly apply the term *paſſion*, to the violent impreſſion made upon our minds by the perception of ſomething very ſtriking and apparently intereſting; *emotion*, to the external marks, or viſible changes produced by the impetus of the paſſion upon the corporeal ſyſtem: and *affections*, to the leſs violent, more deliberate, and more permanent impreſſions, by cauſes which appear ſufficiently intereſting. The range of affection, may be from thoſe ſtronger feelings which are proximate to emotions, to the mildeſt ſenſations of pleaſure or diſpleaſure we can poſſibly perceive.

Moſt Writers, on the Pathology of the Mind, agree to diſtinguiſh between Appetites and Paſſions. The former they refer to corporeal wants, each of which creates its correſpondent deſire; and the indulgence of this deſire is termed gratification. The latter they aſcribe immediately to the mind. In this the Moderns differ from the Ancients. The word *Appetitus*, from which that of *Appetite* is derived, is applied by the Romans and Latiniſts to deſires in general, whether they primarily related to the body or not; and with obvious propriety; for the primitive ſignification, is the ſeeking after whatever may conduce either to gratification or happineſs. Thus Cicero obſerves, "motus animorum

"dupli-

" duplices ſunt; alteri, cogitationis; alteri Appe-
" titus, Cogitatio in vero exquirendo maxime ver-
" ſatur; Appetitus impellit ad agendum." By two powers of action being thus placed in contraſt to each other, and the one applied to thought ſimply, it is obvious that the other comprehends every ſpecies of deſire, whether of a mental or corporeal nature. Modern Metaphyſicians alſo, who have written in the Latin language, uſe the word *Appetitus* in the ſame latitude.

But the modern diſtinction has the advantage of immediately pointing out a difference in the nature and character of the objects which intereſt us, according as they relate to the body or to the mind. Conſidering appetites therefore, as confined to corporeal wants and cravings, we muſt ſtill obſerve that they are as frequently the occaſions of paſſions and emotions as other objects which are peculiarly adapted to the mind. Eager hope, joy, fear, anger, are daily manifeſted by the infant, whoſe deſires are wholly confined to animal wants: and the keeneſt ſenſations of anger, jealouſy, envy, &c. are intimately connected with the carnal appetites of maturer age. Whatever is therefore, beyond the mere inſtinctive appetite, becomes the province of the mind; and the influence which various cravings of nature have upon its ideas and conceptions, give riſe to mental affections and paſſions. The ſubject of

of the preſent diſcuſſion obviouſly relates to theſe, without requiring particular attention to the exiſting cauſe.

SECTION II.

Plans of Arrangement examined.

SO numerous and multifarious are the Paſſions, Affections, and Emotions, in their connections and ramifications, that it is difficult to propoſe a plan of Arrangement, that ſhall be in every reſpect unexceptionable. By preferring one method, we may be deprived of ſome advantages attending another; and in all it may be neceſſary to anticipate many things, which a rigid attention to order could not poſſibly permit. Some Writers on the Paſſions, have placed them in contraſt to each other, as *hope* and *fear*, *joy* and *ſorrow*; ſome have conſidered them as they are perſonal, relative, ſocial; ſome according to their influence at different periods of life;

life; others according as they relate to paſt, preſent, or future time: as ſorrow principally refers to things paſt; joy and anger to preſent ſcenes; hope and fear reſpect futurity.

The Academicians advanced that the principal paſſions were *fear*, *hope*, *joy*, and *grief*. Thus Virgil:

Hinc metuunt, cupiunt, gaudentque, dolentque.

They included averſion and deſpair under the fourth; and hope, fortitude, and anger under deſire. But not to obſerve that this arrangement is much too general in ſome reſpects, and defective in others; that the characters of hope, and of anger are too oppoſite to each other, to be placed under the ſame head; that anger has no particular claim to be claſſed with deſire, excepting when it excites a deſire of revenge, which is not alway the caſe; and that deſire is ſo comprehenſive a term as to embrace numberleſs other affections; not to inſiſt upon theſe objections, it is obvious that the paſſions enumerated cannot be primitive or cardinal, ſince ſome other affections or paſſions muſt be prior to them: We muſt *love*, or *hate*, before we can either deſire, rejoice, or fear, or grieve.

Dr. Hartly has arranged the Paſſions under five grateful and five ungrateful ones. The grateful ones, are *love*, *deſire*, *hope*, *joy*, and *pleaſing recol-*

lection; the ungrateful are *hatred, averſion, fear, grief, diſpleaſing recollection.* The objections to this order are, that all theſe cannot be conſidered as cardinal paſſions; nor do the diſtinctions themſelves appear ſufficiently accurate. Hope is certainly a ſpecies of deſire; pleaſing recollection, is a modification of love; averſion is only a particular manner of teſtifying hatred; and diſpleaſing recollections are ſometimes the renewal of grief, ſometimes of anger.

Dr. Watts divides the Paſſions into primitive and derivative. The primitive he ſubdivides into two ranks: 1. Admiration, love, and hatred; 2. The diverſe kinds of love and hatred, as eſteem, contempt, benevolence, malevolence, complacency, diſplacency. The derivatives are deſire, averſion, hope, fear, gratitude, anger, &c.

But the title of admiration to be conſidered as a primitive paſſion, does not appear to be ſo valid as that of the other two aſſociated with it. Love and hatred are in univerſal exerciſe; admiration is merely occaſional. The former indicate themſelves from the inſtant we have any powers of diſcernment, or the ſmalleſt degree of experience reſpecting the nature of objects: The latter is the reſult of ſome degree of knowledge; it implies a ſpirit of inquiry and demands ſome portion of taſte for particular qualities adapted to excite this emotion. Minds the moſt

infantile,

infantile, and uncultivated, will manifeſt that they love and hate. long before they have an opportunity of teſtifying their admiration. We might alſo obſerve that a ſubdiviſion of the primitive paſſions into two ranks creates a ſuſpicion, if it do not fully indicate, that they cannot all be equally primitive; and the inſtances given under the ſecond rank may juſtly be conſidered as different modifications of the two grand prineiples, and not as primitives of a diſtinct character. It is farther obvious that the Doctor's plan, makes no diſtinction between the Paſſions and Affections; which the nature of the ſubject not only admits, but requires.

Mr. Grove, adopting in part, the arrangement of Dr. Watts, reduces all the Paſſions to the three heads of admiration, love, and hatred; which he ſtyles accordingly, the primitive paſſions. The others he denominates mixed paſſions; which he deſcribes to be thoſe which have admiration blended with them, and thoſe compounded of the paſſions that fall under love and hatred. As the above remarks are no leſs applicable to this arrangement, I ſhall only obſerve that ſince Mr. Grove has defined admiration to be "that ſudden ſurpriſe at the novelty of an object, by which the ſoul is faſtened down to the contemplation of it;" there ſeems to be a peculiar impropriety in *his* placing it among the primitive paſſions; and this impropriety is increaſed

by another obſervation, viz. that "Admiration ſeems to be a more ſpeculative paſſion, as being employed chiefly about the novelty or grandeur of objects;" for which reaſon he places the chief energy of this paſſion "in the *brain*," which he denominates "the grand inſtrument, or condition rather of thought and contemplation." He adds, "In the other paſſions, which reſpecting the good or evil of objects, proceed from a principle of ſelf-preſervation, the ſpirits agitated are in the *heart*, the fountain of life, and fitteſt reſidence of thoſe motions of the animal ſpirits, which are intended for the benefit and preſervation of life." *

Theſe obſervations certainly increaſe the difficulty of admitting admiration among the primitive paſſions. It may alſo be juſtly doubted whether the author's ideas of the nature of admiration be admiſſible. But this is not the place to diſcuſs that point.

The above comments upon the moſt material arrangements which have hitherto been followed, render ſome other claſſification deſirable, which may be exempt from ſimilar objections. Perhaps the ſecureſt method to obtain this end, will be previouſly to recollect, what is the firſt and leading principle of

* See Syſtem of Moral Philoſophy; Chap. VII of the Paſſions.

our

our natures; and then inquire what are the neceſſary conſequences of this principle in beings formed as we are, placed in various ſituations, and ſurrounded by an infinite variety of circumſtances. By thus attending to the hiſtory of the human mind, and tracing the manner in which it is affected by various cauſes, a proper arrangement may perhaps, preſent itſelf: We ſhall at leaſt avoid thoſe miſtakes and embarraſſments into which men of eminence have been betrayed by purſuing other methods.

It will be univerſally acknowledged, that it is eſſential to the nature of every ſenſitive and intelligent being, to be gratified with, or delight in *well-being*. This is ſo evident a principle, that the contrary cannot be ſuppoſed for a moment. Both reaſon and feeling unite to eſtabliſh this axiom. We all feel the ineſtimable value of happineſs, and we all know that to delight in miſery, is a contradiction. It would be to annihilate miſery. (See Note *C.*)

This well-being, or grateful ſtate of exiſtence, we unite to denominate an eſſential good; and its oppoſite an eſſential evil. Whatever promotes this ſtate, we deem to be productive of good; whatever is an impediment to it, or occaſions a ſtate of uneaſy ſenſation, we conſider as productive of evil.

Theſe ideas naturally lead us to eſteem that as a

good alſo, which is productive of this deſirable ſtate, and to characterize as an evil whatever is inimical to it. Cauſe and effect are ſo intimately connected in our imagination, that we not only ſubſtitute the one for the other, by a figurative mode of ſpeaking, but we quickly learn to conſider that as a *good in itſelf*, which appears uniformly to be the means or inſtrument of good; and to contemplate as an evil, whatever we ſuſpect to have a pernicious tendency. Under the impreſſion of this ſentiment, we indulge a *predilection* for the one, and feel an *abhorrence* of the other.

It is impoſſible for the attentive and conſiderate mind, to view or contemplate objects ſo diametrically oppoſite as apparent good, or apparent evil either with total indifference, or with the ſame kind of ſenſation. We inevitably look upon what we deem to be a good, or conducive to happineſs, with a *pleaſant* ſenſation. We deem it deſirable; and it inſpires the affection of LOVE. Whatever occaſions or threatens a privation of happineſs, or inflicts poſitive miſery, we view with diſpleaſure, we conſider it as injurious, or as an abſolute evil, and it inſpires the affection of HATRED: that is, we feel a ſtrong attachment of the *heart* to whatever may contribute to *well-being*, and we contemplate the reverſe with feelings of diſpleaſure, deteſtation, and abhorrence.

Although,

Although it may be ſaid, without impropriety, that we all love to be happy, and hate to be miſerable; yet this is ſuch a ſelf-evident truth, that it is very ſeldom uttered. The two expreſſions therefore, *Love* and *Hatred*, are almoſt entirely applied to the cauſe, means, or inſtruments of well-being or wretchedneſs; and we are habituated to love whatever is inſtrumental to our exiſting in a deſirable ſtate, and to hate its oppoſite.

SECTION III.

Love and Hatred; their Nature.

THESE two affections ariſe immediately and inevitably from our perpetual ſolicitude to *enjoy* the exiſtence we poſſeſs. They are coeval with our ideas of good and evil. They are experienced by every one, in every ſituation, and in every period of life. They are inſpired by every object which poſſeſſes ſome peculiarity, or is apparently endowed with ſome quality of a beneficial or a pernicious

nicious tendency: That is, by whatever is able, according to our conceptions, to promote or impede enjoyment or happineſs, from the ſmalleſt gratification up to the moſt exalted felicity; from the ſmalleſt diſcomfiture, to the depth of miſery. They are alſo the parents of every other paſſion and affection; and the hiſtory of the human mind is no other than a developement of their operations in the infinitude of ſituations and circumſtances in which it may be occaſionally placed. Theſe characters will undoubtedly entitle them to the denomination of *primary* or *cardinal* affections. As no others are in the ſame predicament, they cannot deſerve the ſame appellations; they can only be conſidered as derived from theſe.

We cannot therefore commence our minute inquiry into the paſſions with greater probability of ſucceſs, than by paying previous attention to theſe two affections.

I. LOVE.

Love may be conſidered either as a principle or as an affection. As a principle, it may be defined "an invariable predilection for good; an univerſal and permanent attachment to well-being or happineſs." In this point of view it has already been conſidered;

conſidered: it has alſo been remarked, that the love of good, and ſolicitude to procure it, is not only the ruling principle of every *ſentient* being; but it meets with the full approbation of every *rational* being. For nothing can excel that which is good, and nothing can be valuable, but as it has a tendency to promote it. Hence when we ſpeak of love abſtractedly, we call it the *principle* of love; ſince it is the principle by which the whole tenour of our conduct is directed; and it retains that appellation, as long as we ſpeak of it as a general principle of action.

When this principle is directed towards any particular object it becomes an *affection;* that is, the mind becomes well diſpoſed or pleaſingly affected towards that object: and in caſes, when this love is more violent in its effects upon the ſyſtem, it is even deemed a *paſſion.*

The affection will be diverſified, and acquire various characters, according to the nature of the object, its relations to us, or the peculiar qualities it may ſeem to poſſeſs. It may relate to ourſelves; to thoſe with whom we are connected, by the cloſeſt bonds of nature or intimacy; to the whole of our ſpecies; to thoſe beings of inferior order in the creation, which are rendered capable of poſſeſſing any portion of enjoyment; and even to things inanimate.

When

When the affection of Love immediately relates to *ourſelves* perſonally, it is called *Self-love:* it marks the peculiar concern and ſolicitude we entertain for our own intereſt, proſperity, or enjoyment. This principle of ſelf-love generally operates with the greateſt force upon the mind; and every circumſtance which affects our own happineſs makes the moſt vivid impreſſions. This is naturally the ſource of many abuſes, which have brought the term itſelf into diſrepute. But this ſelf-affection, when it does not interfere with the claims of others, is not only an innocent affection, but it manifeſts the wiſdom and benevolence of the great Source of good. By rendering every being active in the purſuit of his own happineſs, the greateſt *quantum* of general good is moſt effectually ſecured. As the largeſt communities conſiſt of individuals, were each individual to ſeek his own welfare, without prejudice to his neighbour, the individual ſtock of each would render happineſs univerſal. (See Note *D.*)

When our love or deſire of good, goes forth to others, it is termed *Good-will*, or *Benevolence.* This operates with various degrees of force, according to our various connections and degrees of intimacy. It may poſſibly render the intereſts and happineſs of thoſe with whom we are more immediately connected, by the bonds of nature or friendſhip, equally dear

dear to us as our own. It has in ſome inſtances been known to exert a more powerful influence. Of this truth, the love of parents towards their own offspring frequently preſents us with ſtriking inſtances. Admiration of perſonal excellencies, habits of intimacy, gratitude for benefits received, &c. may alſo increaſe our attachment to individuals, until it rival the natural influence of ſelf-love.

All theſe powerful ties are uſually characterized by the term *affection;* as the conjugal, parental, filial affections, and thoſe who poſſeſs theſe attachments in an exemplary degree are termed *affectionate* parents, children, relatives, friends.

When love extends to the whole human race, it is termed *Philanthropy;* a principle which comprehends the whole circle of ſocial and moral virtues. Conſidering every man as his neighbour, and loving his neighbour as truely and invariably as he loves himſelf, the philanthropiſt can neither be unjuſt nor ungenerous.

In its utmoſt extent the love of benevolence embraces all beings capable of enjoying any portion of good; and thus it becomes *univerſal* benevolence: which manifeſts itſelf by being pleaſed with the ſhare of good every creature enjoys; in a diſpoſition to increaſe it; in feeling an uneaſineſs at their ſufferings; and in the abhorrence of cruelty, under every diſguiſe, or pretext.

When

When theſe diſpoſitions are acting powerfully towards every being capable of enjoyment, they are called the *benevolent affections;* and as theſe become in thoſe who indulge them, operative rules of conduct, or principles of action, we ſpeak of the *benevolent principle.*

It has been remarked that predilection for good, as the *end*, enſtamps a value upon the *means* productive of this end. This creates an affection for various qualities and propenſities, which we pronounce to be good, when they poſſeſs the power, or indicate the diſpoſition to promote happineſs or enjoyment. If theſe be eminently good qualities, we call them *excellencies;* and if they be connected with the characters and conduct of moral agents, they are *moral excellencies.*

From the habitual pleaſure which the contemplation of excellence inſpires, without our adverting perpetually to the benefits which may accrue from it; we may be induced to imagine that we love things deemed excellent for their own ſakes, abſtracted from their power of becoming uſeful. But this is impoſſible. Every excellence contains a capability to poſſeſs or to communicate good. Nothing which deſerves the name, can be in its own nature *inert.* An *uſeleſs* excellence is a contradiction.

The

The propenſity to love what is productive of good, extends itſelf much farther than to the powers and properties of moral agents. We naturally acquire an attachment to every object, animate or inanimate, which has been the habitual inſtrument of good to us, or is capable of contributing to our gratification or advantage. Their latent powers firſt induce us to value them as treaſures in reſerve: our opinion of their capacity to become ſerviceable, inclines us to place our affections upon them; and in proceſs of time they will, by the aſſociation of ideas, excite pleaſing emotions, although their powers of utility are not always in our recollection. (See Note *E.*)

II. HATRED.

HATRED expreſſes the diſpoſition we entertain concerning, or the manner in which we are affected by, the contemplation of whatever we ſuppoſe to be an *evil.* It is not confined to abſolute ſuffering; it marks alſo our abhorrence of whatever expoſes to the danger of abſolute ſuffering, or the diminution of that portion of good we enjoy, or wiſh to poſſeſs.

This hatred of miſery and its cauſes, is a natural and

and neceſſary conſequence of our ſolicitude to poſſeſs good; and the affection of hatred is as naturally inſpired by that ſtate, conduct, diſpoſition, &c. which is productive of, or threatens to induce pernicious or diſagreeable conſequences, as the affection of love is attached to their contraries. Nor is our hatred at all times confined to that particular quality, or peculiarity of circumſtance, which is immediately unfriendly to us. It is apt to raiſe unpleaſant ideas, and create prejudices againſt many things, which in themſelves are far from being the objects of hatred, and which may be highly advantageous, merely becauſe they have been diſpleaſing or injurious to us in particular inſtances. As our predilection for whatever proves acceptable, will often prevent our diſcerning its pernicious qualities; thus do we frequently extend our hatred far beyond the juſt limits, until we betray our ignorance, or manifeſt that we are under the dominion of invincible prejudice.

Perſonal hatred, or malevolence towards an individual, commences with ſome circumſtance, quality, or diſpoſition which is diſpleaſing to us, or with ſome ſpecies of injury committed or intended. It has theſe for its profeſſed objects. But here alſo a quick and powerful tranſition is inſtantaneouſly made in our imaginations, from an incidental bleniſh,

miſh, to the whole of character; from a ſingle act, we are prone to form unfavourable ſentiments of general conduct; and the lively ſenſe of an injury annihilates too frequently every ſpecies of merit in the offender. This is obviouſly the ſource of hatreds, long and inveterate.

But notwithſtanding theſe exceſſes and exaggerations of hatred and malevolence, yet they cannot poſſibly be ſo extenſive in their operations as the principle of love. The affection of hatred has particular and partial evils alone for its objects, while the principle of love may embrace the univerſe. As nutritious aliments are infinitely more numerous than the ſubſtances which are of a poiſonous quality; thus does the number of thoſe things which are pleaſing, beneficial, important in their nature, infinitely exceed thoſe which are either in themſelves comfortleſs, or detrimental, or calculated to foſter a malevolent diſpoſition. The true object of hatred is alone ſome particular and partial evil, which we experience or dread; ſome incidental interruption to the uſual tenour of our feelings; or ſome pernicious quality which may threaten this interruption. The objects of our fears, our anger, or our grief, are conſidered in the light of robberies, or painful privations; and not as permanent cauſes of the malevolent affections. They are not looked upon as

ſtreams

ſtreams perpetually flowing from one inexhauſtible ſource, but as interruptions to an uſual or deſirable ſtate, by adventitious cauſes. Happineſs appears to be our birth-right, of which all the painful ſenſations raiſed by hatred, are the profeſſed guardians. The wiſh for happineſs is perpetual and unlimited, while our evil affections expire with the cauſes which gave them exiſtence. Nor can malevolence extend itſelf to every individual in the creation, in a manner ſimilar to the contrary virtue. That happy cultivation of our natures which inſpires a benevolence towards all animated beings, cannot poſſibly have a perfect contraſt or complete parallel in the moſt uncultivated and brutalized. This would conſtitute a ferocity of character which can ſcarcely be found in the moſt inſane. When tyrants cruel and ferocious are diffuſing miſery in the wantonneſs of their power, their conduct does not proceed from univerſal hatred: but from ſome low policy of ſelf-defence; from an infernal ſpirit of revenge for ſuppoſed injuries; from inordinate ſelf-love, which creates an inſenſibility to human woes; from pride, vanity, and exceſſive ignorance, which induce them to imagine that they ſhall be revered as deities, becauſe they imitate the deſtructive thunder of heaven; and to dream that their favourite idol *Power*, can only be made known and eſtabliſhed by deeds which excite conſternation and horror!

Indeed

Indeed the affection of hatred is of ſo unpleaſant a nature, that the being who could hate every thing, would be his own tormentor. The only pleaſure of which malevolence is capable, proceeds from the gratification of revenge; which can only be directed againſt particular objects. Nor is it merely bounded; it is irritating, unſatisfactory, and purchaſed by the ſacrifice of all the enjoyments which flow from the contrary diſpoſition.

SECTION IV.

On Desire and Aversion.

WITH the affections of Love and Hatred, are intimately connected the affections of Deſire and Averſion. That is, we conſtantly deſire, and are ſolicitous to poſſeſs or effectuate, whatever is pleaſing or beneficial; and we are averſe from, and endeavour to ſhun, whatever is diſpleaſing, or threatens to be pernicious. Theſe two affections are therefore the neceſſary conſequences of

the preceding. They are accompanied with a certain eagerneſs of mind, either to poſſeſs or eſcape, which is not ſo eſſential to the former. Love and Hatred may be inſpired by a calmer contemplation of excellence or demerit, or any of the cauſes of happineſs or miſery, without our feeling an immediate intereſt in them: as when we reflect upon beneficial diſcoveries or deſtructive errors; they may approve of worthy conduct or reſpectable characters, from which we can expect no benefit to ourſelves; and deſpiſe villanies by which we cannot be injured. Whereas Deſire and Averſion refer to particular objects, which have ſome relation to ourſelves; and they are indicated by ſome effort of mind, either to poſſeſs the promiſed good, or to repel the impending evil. They are to be conſidered therefore as *manifeſtations* of love and hatred; and the earneſt *application* of theſe principles, in each particular inſtance of their excitement.

As love and hatred may be reſolved into that one principle, the *love of well-being;* thus may the affections of deſire and averſion be reſolved into *deſire:* although the uſe of both terms is in common language, neceſſary, in order to diſtinguiſh the objects of our purſuit, from thoſe we wiſh to ſhun. Strictly ſpeaking, averſion is no other than a particular modification of deſire; a deſire of being liberated from whatever appears injurious to well-being.

The

The objects in our poſſeſſion, productive of this good, we deſire to retain. We are conſcious of this deſire every time we appreciate the worth of the object, and it is neceſſarily excited when we are under the apprehenſions of privation. If the good, or the means of good, be not in our poſſeſſion, we deſire to obtain them; if a privation be unjuſtly attempted by any one, and the paſſion of anger be excited, the deſire of preſerving or recovering the object is connected with a deſire to chaſtiſe the aggreſſor. If they be in danger from any other cauſe, the fear of loſs is excited by the deſire of ſecuring; and if we be actually deprived, the hopeleſs deſire of regaining, is an eſſential ingredient in our grief for the loſs.

But although, in this philoſophical ſenſe, deſire may appear to be equally extenſive with the affection of love, yet it is neceſſarily more confined in its application. Love relates to all things which appear good and beneficial in themſelves, or to beings capable of receiving good. It comprehends the things enjoyed, and the ſtate of pleaſing exiſtence in which thoſe beings are actually placed, as well as the deſirableneſs of ſuch a ſtate, and all the means and inſtruments of good. Deſire moſtly refers to the ſtate in which we *are not*. It ſolicits ſome favourable change, and exerts itſelf to obtain it. Ha-

tred alſo is univerſally applicable to whatever appears pernicious or diſpleaſing in itſelf; averſion more immediately concerns whatever appears pernicious or is diſpleaſing to *us*. They may be conſidered as the ſatellites of love and hatred; that perpetually accompany them, and are prompt to execute their orders. Wherever love or hatred direct their immediate attention, deſire and averſion ſeek to appropriate or repel.

THUS it appears that the love of good and hatred of evil; the deſire of poſſeſſing good and eſcaping evil, are the leading principles of our natures. The love of good commences with our exiſtence, and the deſire of good is coeval with our powers of diſcernment. Neither of them will leave us, until we ceaſe to exiſt, or loſe the conſciouſneſs of our own ſenſations and perceptions. Whatever diverſity there may be in our ſituations, however various and oppoſite the objects engaging our attention, however verſatile our humours, theſe remain the immutable principles of action. They pervade the animal ſyſtem, as the electric fluid pervades the material; and though, like that, they may ſometimes be latent, yet like that they may be inſtantaneouſly rouſed into vivid action, and manifeſt both their exiſtence

exiſtence and their power by the effects they produce.

Our natures poſſeſs various ſenſitive and mental powers, to each of which an infinite diverſity of objects is adapted: and as the gratification of each communicates pleaſure, we are prone to eſtimate every thing as a good which is capable of contributing to theſe gratifications; and every thing as an evil which oppoſes them. However, a contrariety or oppoſition frequently takes place, between the higher and inferior purſuits of our natures; in conſequence of which the intereſts or gratifications of the one muſt yield to thoſe of the other. As ſenſual objects, and things which adminiſter to our immediate deſires, are apt to make the ſtrongeſt impreſſions, and captivate our attention, in preference to things leſs ſenſual and more remote, though of ſuperior importance; thus do we frequently deem that to be a good, which is virtually an evil. We may alſo deem that to be an evil, which is virtually a good; as being productive of extenſive, exalted, or permanent advantage. But notwithſtanding theſe facts, we ſtill purſue every thing as an apparent good; and we avoid every thing under the idea of its being an evil of greater or leſs magnitude. Our appetites, our particular propenſities, our imaginations, our paſſions may ſpread deceitful charms over ſome objects; and our want of attention, our igno-

rance, our impatience of preſent reſtraints, and inconveniences, or the perverſeneſs of our affections, may render objects inimical in their appearance, which are beneficial in their tendency: yet our deſires are alone excited by the idea of ſome enjoyment or advantage; and things are rendered objects of our averſion alone becauſe they are diſagreeable to our feelings, or threaten to endanger, ſome way or other, our well-being. (See Note *E.*)

SECTION V.

Objects of Love and Hatred; their Characteriſtics.

SHOULD it be aſked, "In what do this good and this evil conſiſt?" it would be difficult to give a ſatisfactory anſwer. To ſay that they conſiſt in a certain conſciouſneſs of well-being, or of a comfortleſs exiſtence, would be little more than to aſſert that happineſs conſiſts in being happy, and miſery

miſery in being miſerable. The following obſervations however will diſcover to us what we expect in the means of good, and what we deem to be the cauſes of unhappineſs; and will indicate where theſe are principally to be found.

Creatures formed like ourſelves, with different organs of ſenſe, with various powers of mind, accompanied with quick perceptions and high ſenſibility; creatures endowed with great diverſities of diſpoſitions, taſtes, propenſities, muſt be variouſly affected with every thing around them. We are as it were plunged into the univerſe "tremblingly alive all o'er," and rendered capable of receiving impreſſions pleaſant or unpleaſant, from every object that addreſſes our ſenſes, from every thing we perceive, and from every thing of which we can form an idea. Nothing in this vaſt univerſe can at all ſeaſons be totally indifferent to every perſon in it: nothing ſo inert as to be incapable of exerting ſome influence in one connection or other, and of calling forth a correſpondent paſſion or affection.

Theſe effects are produced by our perception or ſuppoſition of certain powers, properties, or qualities in the different objects, by which ideas of an agreeable or diſagreeable nature are excited within us. The diverſe influences of theſe are to be aſcribed to an apparent aptitude or correſpondence in ſome objects with the frame and conſtitution of

our natures, and to an inaptitude or want of correſpondence reſpecting others; to a certain coincidence between properties and relations in objects and circumſtances, with the appetites, powers, propenſities of our natures; the gratification of which ſeems to promote our well-being; and to the want of this coincidence, or the exertion of a contrary power, which conſtitutes our miſery.

The diverſity of attributes ſeated in different objects, and the no leſs diverſity in our ſituations, and in circumſtances ſurrounding us, render it difficult to make choice of ſuch terms as may be univerſally appropriate. It may therefore be neceſſary to obſerve, that by *attribute*, *property*, *quality*, *&c.* is meant to expreſs that peculiarity, whatever it may be, which exerts an influence upon us: and theſe terms are uſed, to indicate the diſtinguiſhing characteriſtics of various objects, as they are connected with ſome ſingularity in ſtate, circumſtance, or conduct; without the real or ſuppoſed exiſtence of which, the paſſions and affections could not have been excited. (See Note *F.*)

The ſubjects poſſeſſing this real or apparent aptitude and coincidence, or inaptitude, relate to our animal natures, to the various powers and employments of our minds, to our ſtate and connections as ſocial beings, and alſo to the opinions entertained reſpecting

reſpecting our relation to a ſuperior Being, or to a future ſtate of exiſtence.

The various objects ſoliciting our attention under theſe heads; the degrees of their ſuitability, excellence, importance, or the contrary; our ideas and miſtakes concerning them; the facility or difficulty, with which ſome things are purſued, obtained, preſerved, loſt, diſmiſſed; the uncertainty, dangers, contrarieties to which we are conſtantly expoſed, reſpecting whatever may appear intereſting, are perpetually engaging our affections, or exciting our paſſions, during the whole of our paſſage through life, from the cradle to the grave!

Thus is that love of well-being which is one and ſimple in its principle, moſt wonderfully diverſified in its operations! Every object, every circumſtance, every idea which can enter the mind, makes ſome impreſſion upon us of a pleaſant or unpleaſant nature; contributes a ſomething towards, or deducts from the good we ſeek. They all contain powers and properties, by which we are attracted towards the grand deſideratum HAPPINESS, or are repelled to various diſtances from it!

SECTION VI.

New Arrangements proposed.

THE Affections and Paſſions to which theſe circumſtances give riſe are not only innumerable, but like their exiſting cauſes, ſo connected, and intermixed, that to arrange them in a lucid order, would be almoſt as impracticable as to form a regular path through the Hercynian Wood. Very few of the paſſions or affections are perfectly ſimple; ſome are extremely complex: their complexities are ſo various, that it is almoſt impoſſible to reſtore each to its appropriate place; and the moſt oppoſite affections are ſo intermixed, that it is very difficult to aſſign to each its due ſhare of influence.

In this labyrinth, an attention to the following facts may perhaps furniſh us with ſomething of a clue.

Some

Some of our paſſions and affections are inſpired by circumſtances which more immediately relate to *ourſelves*, and to our own perſonal intereſts: that is, they belong to the principle of *ſelf-love*: ſome of them belong to the *ſocial principle*, and refer to our connections with our own ſpecies, or to all animated natures.

In ſome of our Paſſions and Affections, the ideas of *good* are obviouſly predominant, in others the ideas of *evil*.

The paſſions and affections, which relate to ſelf-love, and are excited by the idea of a good, may either refer to the good which is *actually in our poſſeſſion*, and communicates various degrees of enjoyment, from ſimple gratification to ecſtaſies: or

The good we love *may not be* in our poſſeſſion; but it may appear attainable, and become the object of our *deſire*: or

Though it be not in our poſſeſſion, circumſtances may appear highly favourable to our *attaining* it, and it may thus inſpire *hope*.

The ſtate in which *evil* is the predominant idea, referring to ourſelves, may relate:

To the *loſs* of that good which we poſſeſſed, or to *diſappointments* reſpecting the good we deſired, and hoped to obtain; inſpiring *ſorrow*, with its various modifications: or

We

We may be *apprehenſive* concerning the loſs of what we poſſeſs, concerning the approach of ſome poſitive evil, or concerning the accompliſhment of our deſires, which introduces the family of *fear*.

The cauſe of both ſorrow and fear may be ſome *agent*, whoſe deſigned conduct, or even whoſe inadvertency, may threaten or produce injuries, and thus excite *anger* in various degrees.

The cauſes and excitements of our paſſions and affections reſpecting *others*, may alſo be arranged under the predominancy of good, or evil in our ideas.

Under the former head may *benevolence* be placed, which will indicate itſelf either by *good wiſhes*, or *good opinions*; each productive of a large diverſity of affections and paſſions, according to contingent circumſtances.

The predominance of evil in our ideas will ſhew itſelf in actual *malevolence* of diſpoſition concerning another; or in a *diſplacency* and diſapprobation of conduct.

The above ſketch ſeems to indicate a plan of inveſtigation which, upon the whole, is the leaſt confuſed and embarraſſing. It is founded upon the remarks which have been made concerning the grand propenſity of human beings to ſeek felicity; upon

upon their ideas of good and evil, either relating to themſelves or others; and it ſeems to comprehend moſt of thoſe contingent circumſtances which ſurround us.

That the idea of *good* is moſt prevalent in the diverſe kinds of gratification, in the purſuit of various objects of deſire, in the indulgence of hope, and in *benevolent* diſpoſitions, no one will diſpute; and that the idea of *evil* is prevalent in *malevolence* and *diſplacency* is no leſs evident. It will alſo be obvious upon a moment's conſideration, that as the love of good may produce hatred to what is inimical to it, thus in the affections and paſſions correſpondent with this principle, the primary and influential idea is that of *ſuffering*. In *ſorrow*, when we grieve for the loſs of what we love, it is the *privation* which immediately preſents itſelf to the mind, and the hatred of this privation is the efficient cauſe of ſorrow. In *fear* the apprehenſion of *impending evil* takes the lead in our minds, though this evil may virtually conſiſt in being deprived of ſome good. In *anger*, the evil intended or perpetrated is the direct incitement to wrath, and we expatiate with ſo much eagerneſs upon all the circumſtances of aggravation, that we cannot allow ourſelves, at the firſt inſtant, to dwell upon the attributes or qualities of the good thus endangered or deſtroyed. Theſe inſtances manifeſt that the perception of an evil

evil from privation in every inſtance is ſtronger, than our eſtimation of the intrinſic value of that which occaſions the painful emotion.

But although theſe obſervations may ſuffice to juſtify the Order propoſed, yet it is acknowledged that they are not comprehenſive enough to embrace every thing relative to the paſſions. There is a claſs of emotions, in which diſtinct ideas of good or evil are not preſent to the mind, and which in fact may with equal propriety enliſt themſelves under each diviſion. They are vivid impreſſions, productive of effects which ſtrictly ſpeaking, neither belong to the paſſions nor affections; and yet their preſence frequently conſtitutes the difference between an affection and a paſſion.

This enigma will beſt be explained, by our attention to the manner in which our ideas of thoſe influential and operative qualities, exciting paſſions and inſpiring affections are obtained.

SECTION

SECTION VII.

Introductory Emotions.

WHEN the attention is ſtedfaſtly fixed upon any quality or number of qualities apparent in an object, whether they be good or bad, ſome impreſſion is made, or certain ſenſations are produced. Theſe may diſpoſe the mind to dwell yet longer upon the ſubject; and the qualities they exhibit may be contemplated with all their relations and connections. Their former and their preſent influence, future conſequences, &c. may thus be placed before us. Numberleſs correſpondent ideas will preſent themſelves, each producing its particular effect: until ſtrong affections either of love or hatred, deſire or averſion, will be excited; and theſe may gradually ariſe to the moſt violent paſſions and emotions. In this manner have perſons been known to *work themſelves up* into ecſtaſies, or into phrenſies; and the mind has been ſo completely occupied

cupied by its ſubject, that it has totally loſt the power of ſelf-command, nothing foreign being able to gain admiſſion, and divide the attention.

But on the other hand, whatever preſents itſelf in a ſudden and unexpected manner, has in moſt caſes, a much greater effect upon us, than ſubjects of very ſuperior importance for which we have been gradually prepared. The more *ſudden*, that is, the greater the improbability of its appearing at that inſtant; and the more *unexpected*, that is, the greater diſtance the ſtate of the mind was from the expectancy, the more violent will be the firſt percuſſion; and this circumſtance will give peculiar energy to the exiſting cauſe, whatever its peculiar complexion may be. The ſtrong impulſe is given by the very mode of its appearance, previous to our being able to acquire a diſtinct knowledge of its nature. This impulſe is the emotion we term *Surpriſe*.

Another circumſtance which frequently attends the cauſe of any ſpecific emotion, and produces its own characteriſtic effects in ſubjects of ſeeming importance, is that of *intricacy*; in which the mind is thrown into an *embarraſſed* ſtate concerning the particular object, or ſomething material relative to it. This embarraſſment alſo gives an additional impetus to the characteriſtic paſſion, whether it be of a pleaſing or a diſpleaſing nature, and is diſtinguiſhed by the name of *Wonder*.

A

A third adventitious effect is produced by an inſtantaneous perception of the *magnitude* or *extent* of the ſubject which calls forth any of the paſſions and affections. It ſeems to poſſeſs ſomething immeaſurable, unfathomable, beyond the utmoſt ſtretch of comprehenſion. This we call *aſtoniſhment.*

It now appears that ſome of our emotions may be excited, before the mind can poſſeſs leiſure to contemplate the good or evil ſeated in the exciting cauſe! Yet even in theſe caſes, good or evil are not excluded. For theſe emotions are moſt intimately connected with the idea of ſomething peculiarly *important;* but we can deem nothing important unleſs it poſſeſs powers of effectuating good or evil. Their peculiar ſtrength is even occaſioned by the vivid idea of importance, while the emotions themſelves manifeſt our *ignorance* of its ſpecific nature.

Theſe emotions therefore are excited by the confuſed idea of ſomething peculiarly intereſting in the cauſe, and they are manifeſtly intended to awaken and direct the attention to this cauſe, that its nature and character may be aſcertained. Surpriſe, like a watchful centinel, is equally alarmed at a ſudden approach, whether it be of a friend or an enemy. Wonder is excited by a curioſity which induces us

to inveſtigate the character of the intruder with peculiar keenneſs; and although aſtoniſhment is almoſt overwhelmed with the ſubject, yet it is irreſiſtibly attracted towards it, with a force proportioned to its magnitude. At the inſtant in which we feel our imbecillity the moſt, we are the moſt eager to inveſtigate thoſe qualities which we acknowledge to exceed our comprehenſion!

The above characters aſcribed to them plainly indicate that theſe emotions cannot be conſidered ſtrictly ſpeaking either as *paſſions* or *affections*, which are always inſpired by the idea or perception of ſome ſpecific good or evil, but merely as introductory to theſe: and it is very ſingular, that common language, without the ſuſpicion of its being founded on philoſophical inveſtigation, uniformly characterizes them by the term *emotions*. We never ſpeak either of the *paſſion* or *affection* of ſurpriſe, or of wonder, or of aſtoniſhment; but conſent with one voice to denominate them *emotions*. It is alſo agreed that they are very diſtinct from the permanent calmneſs of an affection, and that they are common to the moſt oppoſite paſſions.

The moſt violent paſſions of every kind are well known to proceed more frequently from the impulſe of the moment, than from deliberate thought. There is ground therefore for ſuſpicion that this impulſe is to be aſcribed to one or other of the above emotions.

emotions, and that it is their influence which conſtitutes the difference between a paſſion and an affection. This is certain, that they are equally excited by ſubjects of a pleaſing or diſpleaſing nature; that they are the precurſors of many paſſions, and are able to communicate an energy to all.

Thus we perceive that the paſſions,—uſing this term in a generic ſenſe, may proceed both from our *ignorance*, and from our real or ſuppoſed *knowledge* of the nature and qualities of objects. As the exceſs of cold operates upon the corporeal ſyſtem, with a ſtimulating power like the exceſs of heat; thus the oppoſites of expectancy, of knowledge, of comprehenſion, become powerful ſtimulants to the awakened mind, and communicate a painful energy which is peculiarly inſtrumental in removing their cauſe. This effect is manifeſtly produced by the power of the imagination, which immediately creates alarms, forms numberleſs conjectures, and expands itſelf to the utmoſt, that it may equal if poſſible the vaſtneſs of the object.

Yet theſe diſtinctions are not adapted to a ſyſtematic claſſification of the paſſions; the firſt being no other than introductory to the latter; exerting their influence indiſcriminately over paſſions of the moſt oppoſite natures.

Should it be thought neceſſary to treat the ſub-

ject of the paſſions with *ſyſtematic* preciſion, the inveſtigation we have made will preſent us with the following diſtinctions.

Surpriſe, *Wonder*, and *Aſtoniſhment*, are to be conſidered as INTRODUCTORY Emotions; having no immediate reference to the ſpecific quality of the exciting cauſe.

The exciting cauſe may reſpect either the *ſelfiſh*, or the *ſocial principle*, which form two different CLASSES.

In each claſs, the predominant idea of a *good*, and the predominant idea of an *evil*, will conſtitute two different *Orders*.

The leading paſſions and affections under each order, point out the *Genera*.

The complicated nature of ſome of the paſſions, and other contingent circumſtances, may be conſidered as conſtituting *ſpecies* and *varieties* under each characteriſtic *Genus*.

Theſe diſtinctions were ſuggeſted to the author, by an attention to the natural progreſs of our paſſions and affections, from the firſt exciting cauſe to all the ramifications and diverſities of which they are ſuſceptible. The Reader will doubtleſs perceive a ſtriking coincidence with the claſſification, which Noſological and Botanical Writers have found it expedient to adopt.

The Introductory Emotions from their nature and influence, demand a prior inveſtigation.

SURPRISE.

We have deſcribed Surpriſe to be the ſtrong emotion excited by ſomething which preſents itſelf in a ſudden and unexpected manner, when the mind was totally unprepared for it; ſomething we preſume to be highly important, and yet the kind or extent of this importance may not be aſcertained. It is the apparent *novelty* of the ſubject, or of ſome peculiarity relative to it, or the *unexpectedneſs* of its introduction, at a particular time, or in a particular manner, contrary to probability or expectancy, which produces the effect; and whenever theſe circumſtances take place, ſurpriſe may be equally excited by things agreeable or diſagreeable; by objects of our love or hatred, admiration or horror.

The primary or natural effect of ſurpriſe, is ſimply to rouſe the mind; to force it out of that train of ideas with which it was occupied, and compel it to advert to the novel object; which is afterwards to exert a characteriſtic influence, according to its nature. The ſecondary effect of Surpriſe, is to

add an impetus to the exciting cauſe, whatever that may be. It renders pleaſing ſenſations more delightful; and gives an additional keenneſs to the unpleaſing ones. This effect is evidently produced by the force of an awakened and active imagination; which preceding either deliberate attention, or the exerciſe of judgment, magnifies the apparent good or the apparent ill, as ſoon as their ſpecific natures are perceived. In Surpriſe, the mind is totally paſſive. It can neither be produced nor prevented by any exertions of the will. Nor is it its immediate province, either to reflect or inveſtigate. The pathological effect on the mind is that of a ſimple ſtimulus, whoſe ſole object is to arouſe the attention. Sudden ſtartings, earneſt looks, extenſion of arms and hands, ſtrong exclamations, are the characteriſtic ſigns of the emotion; and when the violence of ſurpriſe excites an alarm, which is oftimes the caſe without the actual preſence of danger, the whole body is inſtantly placed in an attitude of defence.

WONDER.

Wonder expreſſes an embarraſſment of mind, after it is ſomewhat recovered from the firſt percuſſion of ſurpriſe. It is the effect produced by an intereſting

tereſting ſubject, which has been ſuddenly preſented to the mind, but concerning which there are many intricacies, either reſpecting the cauſe or manner in which any event has taken place, motives of extraordinary conduct, &c.

In Wonder the mind begins to re-act, but its ideas are in a ſtate of confuſion. It attempts to examine and inveſtigate, but it ſeems engaged in a fruitleſs inquiry. It rapidly collects together various circumſtances, from which to form conjectures, but rejects them as unſatisfactory, as ſoon as they are formed. Whenever the deſired diſcovery is made, Wonder ceaſes, and gives way to the impreſſion which is correſpondent to the nature of the diſcovery, and to thoſe circumſtances which are perceived to belong to the exciting cauſe; whether they be productive of joy or grief, admiration or abhorrence, hope or fearful apprehenſion. As in this emotion the mind begins to exert its active and diſcriminating powers, ſo is it able to prolong or to ſhorten the effects of the emotion; either by dwelling upon the ſubject, and deliberately following its intricacies, or by diverting its attention to other objects. Being introduced by ſurpriſe, and partaking of its indefinite nature; the pathological indications of Wonder are very ſimilar. They are however leſs violent; and they are intermixed with ſtronger marks of mental embarraſſment. The eyes are

ſometimes faſtened upon the author or narrator of ſomething wonderful; ſometimes they are directed upwards, to be more detached from every ſurrounding object, which might diſtract the attention; ſometimes they roll about, as if they were in ſearch of ſome object that may be equal to the explanation; and the half-opened mouth, ſeems eager to receive the deſired information. In very intricate and important concerns, total abſtraction from every thing external, and depth of thought marked by countenance and poſture, indicate how buſily the mind is employed in ſearching out the myſtery.

ASTONISHMENT.

ASTONISHMENT is the kind and degree of wonder introduced by ſurpriſe, which as it were, overwhelms or petrifies the ſoul. The mental powers are in a ſtupor, in a ſtate of ſtagnation. High aſtoniſhment is the *incubus* of the mind, which feels nothing at the inſtant, ſo much as its inability to act. This emotion always relates to things of the higheſt importance, to things which appear too vaſt and extenſive for the graſp of intellect, rather than to intricacies. When it relates to human conduct, aſtoniſhment is excited by great undertakings,

ings, or extenſive projects; by the accompliſhment of plans which appeared more than human, whether beneficial or deſtructive; or to ſome exceſs either of virtue or of vice.

The Body marks, in a ſtriking manner, the ſingular ſtate of the mind. That alſo becomes immoveable; *petrified* as it were, or *thunder-ſtruck*; which is the favourite expreſſion in almoſt every language. The eyes are firmly fixed, without being directed to any particular object; the character of countenance which was formed by the habitual influence of ſome predominant affection, is for a time effaced; and a ſuſpenſion of every other expreſſion, a certain vacuity, ſtrongly notes this ſingular ſuſpenſion of mind.

Wonder and aſtoniſhment are expreſſions which, in many caſes, may be uſed ſynonimouſly; as both cauſes and effects are very analogous: for the intricacy attending an important ſubject, may be connected with its vaſtneſs; and ſometimes occaſioned by it. When theſe are introduced by ſurpriſe, that is, when ſubjects of the kind are *ſuddenly* and *unexpectedly* forced upon the attention, their united effects are extremely powerful; and they give an infinite momentum to their cauſes, whether they be of a pleaſing or diſpleaſing nature.

According to the above view of the emotion, it may obviouſly be connected with the cauſes either of

of happineſs or miſery. Theſe exciting cauſes may introduce the pleaſing ſenſations, which ſo often accompany the perception of things ſublime and ſtupendous, or of things we deem horrible. It may introduce the exceſs of joy, or the exceſs of fearful apprehenſion: call forth the moſt exalted admiration, or inſpire the deepeſt indignation and contempt.

The term *amazement*, which is ſometimes employed, ſeems to expreſs a medium between wonder and aſtoniſhment. It is manifeſtly borrowed from the extenſive and complicated intricacies of a labyrinth; in which there are endleſs mazes, without the diſcovery of a clue. Hence an idea is conveyed of more than ſimple wonder; the mind is *loſt* in wonder.

Though all theſe emotions have, generally ſpeaking, the greateſt power in things which unexpectedly arreſt the attention; yet they may alſo proceed from contemplation. When the ſubject is complicated, the more we diſcern concerning it, the more will unexpected novelties preſent themſelves, and ſucceſſively become the cauſes of ſurpriſe. Theſe novelties may be of ſuch a nature, as to amaze and confound the underſtanding. We may alſo be the more deeply penetrated with a conviction of the vaſtneſs and incomprehenſibility of the ſubject, ſo as to be worked up into aſtoniſhment.

ment. The powers of the ſoul may become petrified as it were, or paralyzed by their fruitleſs attempts to comprehend what is far beyond their reach, and to fathom that which is unfathomable!

CHAP. II.

CHAP. II.

WE are now prepared to contemplate the immediate effects of thoſe particular qualities, ſuppoſed to be ſeated in the ſubjects themſelves; which the emotions of *Surpriſe*, *Wonder*, and *Aſtoniſhment* may have forced upon our attention, or which may have been diſcovered by calmer obſervation.

According to the order propoſed, we ſhall firſt attend to thoſe which are the moſt intereſting to *ourſelves*, or which relate to the principle of SELF-LOVE.

CLASS I.

On the Paſſions and Affections, which owe their Origin to the Principle of SELF-LOVE.

THESE may be divided into two diſtinct Orders; that in which *Love*, or the *Idea of Good*, that is, ſomething either beneficial or pleaſing is more immediately preſent to the mind; and that in which *Hatred*, or the *Idea of Evil* is moſt impreſſive.

OR-

ORDER I.

The Passions and Affections founded on SELF-LOVE, *which are excited by the Idea of* Good.

THESE are of two Kinds: the one relates to good in *poſſeſſion*, the other to that in *expectancy*.

That in *poſſeſſion* inſpires the following paſſions and affections.

JOY.

JOY is the vivid pleaſure or delight inſpired on the immediate reception of ſomething peculiarly grateful, or of ſomething obviouſly productive of an eſſential advantage, or which promiſes to contribute to our preſent or future well-being. This delight may be communicated by our liberation from fearful apprehenſions, or from a ſtate of actual diſtreſs, by obtaining ſome new acquiſition, ſome addition to our ſtock of enjoyment, or by the full aſſurance of this without any mixture of doubt.

The various degrees of *Impetus* produced by this paſſion,

paſſion, will depend upon the ſenſibility of the ſubject, the ſuppoſed importance of the object, the ſudden and unexpected manner in which it has been communicated, and the contraſt formed between the preceding and the preſent ſtate. A ſudden and inſtantaneous tranſlation from extreme anxiety or the depth of diſtreſs, to an exalted pinnacle of happineſs, conſtitutes the higheſt poſſible degree. In this caſe, *Surpriſe*, *Wonder*, *Aſtoniſhment*, take poſſeſſion of the ſoul; and though they may at firſt confound, they afterwards are productive of unutterable tranſports.

On the firſt impulſe of joy, we are perfectly paſſive. No effort of the will can check the ſenſation itſelf; and where the joy is exceſſive, it is not in the power of reſolution to ſuppreſs every external ſign. The ſtate of paſſive impreſſion is ſucceeded by the exertions of a vigorous imagination; which runs over, with rapid confuſion, the many ſuppoſed advantages to be derived from the welcome treaſure. Theſe it is diſpoſed to multiply and aggrandize far beyond the bounds of reaſon or probability. This pleaſing, I had almoſt ſaid, *intoxicated* ſtate of mind, produces correſpondent effects upon the ſyſtem. A briſk and delectable flow of the animal ſpirits diffuſes a pleaſurable ſenſation over the whole frame. Every ſpecies of torpor is ſubdued, an exhilaration ſucceeds; indicating itſelf by emotions,

tions, which not only manifeſt the influence of the paſſion to ſpectators, but ſolicit their participation. The ſubject feels himſelf too much animated to remain in a tranquil ſtate. Unuſual vivacity in the eyes, and ſmiles upon the countenance, are accompanied by joyful acclamations, clapping of hands, and various other lively geſtures. Where the mind is ſtrongly agitated, and under no reſtraint from a ſenſe of decorum, or ſolicitude for character; loud laughter, jumping, dancing, and the moſt wild and extravagant geſtures, indicate the frolickſomeneſs of the heart.

Intenſe meditation upon ſome ſuppoſed good, the contemplation of its intrinſic worth, and of the happy conſequences which are expected to flow from it, have ſometimes raiſed the mind to tranſports, over which reaſon has loſt its controul. But theſe inſtances ſeldom occur; as they require the union of ſtrong conviction, lively imagination, and a warm heart. The tranſports of joy uſually proceed from ſudden impulſe; and of conſequence, ecſtaſies will ſometimes be great, from very trivial cauſes.

Gladneſs is an inferior degree of joy; it may be excited by incidents agreeable or deſirable in themſelves, which are not of ſufficient moment to raiſe the ecſtaſies of joy; or it may conſiſt in that lively

ly flow of ſpirits, which immediately ſucceeds to the tranſports of joy.

Cheerfulneſs is an emotion of ſtill gentler influence. It is often inſpired by very trivial circumſtances in perſons of a lively diſpoſition, and free from anxious care.

Mirth is a higher degree of cheerfulneſs, generally excited by things facetious, or ludicrous; and greatly augmented by the power of ſocial ſympathy. Thus it frequently becomes noiſy and boiſterous, from cauſes not able to communicate the ſmalleſt emotion to an individual in a ſolitary ſtate.

When the mind is more compoſed, and we are able to reflect with a degree of calmneſs upon the good received or anticipated, we become variouſly affected; according to the value we place upon the object, according to its apparent ſuitableneſs to our ſtate and ſituation, and according to its correſpondence with our previous deſires and expectations: and if the good be not tranſitory or evaneſcent, we remain under the influence of *Contentment*, *Satisfaction*, or *Complacency*.

Contentment expreſſes the acquieſcence of the mind in the portion of good we poſſeſs. It implies a perception that our lot might have been better, or that it is inferior to what others enjoy, or that it does not fully anſwer the expectations we had form-

ed. An effort of reaſon or of prudence is neceſſary to produce it. We compare our preſent with our former ſituation, or with the inferior lot of others; and thus learn to acquieſce in the degree of advantage obtained.

Satisfaction denotes a pleaſing ſtate of mind exceeding that communicated by ſimple contentment. The good obtained is duly appreciated; is found to be correſpondent to our deſires, and adequate to our wiſhes. The word Satisfaction is frequently employed to expreſs the full accompliſhment of ſome particular deſire; which always communicates a temporary pleaſure, whatever may be the nature of that deſire. This affection by no means implies, that felicity is complete; as it chiefly refers to particular objects; and when it reſpects our ſtate and ſituation, it admits that greater good might have been our portion, though we are more than contented, we are *well-pleaſed* with what we poſſeſs.

Complacency is full and continued ſatisfaction connected with a conſiderable degree of approbation. It has intrinſic value, or ſome ſpecies of *worth* for its object; ſome mental excellencies, or advantages accruing from them; ſome ſentiment, diſpoſition, acquirement, conduct, performance, either of ourſelves or others with whom we are immediately connected, which upon cloſe examination, we deem deſerving of eſteem or applauſe.

Compla-

Complacency may be enjoyed as the reward of our own conduct, or of the purity and benevolence of our motives. It may be inſpired by a review of conduct, acquirement, diſpoſition, on which we can pronounce that it *was well done*, or *well intended*. Complacency may alſo relate to the approved conduct, ſentiments, attainments, diſpoſitions of others, for whom we are deeply concerned. In this caſe, the affection may be inſpired, by their conduct and diſpoſitions towards ourſelves; or by the intereſt we take in whatever contributes to the promotion of their own honour and happineſs.

The *ſatisfaction* produced by Complacency, indicates that we have, in ſome reſpect or other, a perſonal intereſt in the object of it; which diſtinguiſhes the affection from that high gratification we may enjoy when we contemplate and applaud the ſentiments, diſpoſitions, and actions of great and reſpectable characters, with which we can have no immediate concern.

The *approbation* which accompanies Complacency, diſtinguiſhes its object from the more common cauſes of ſatisfaction. Theſe may ariſe from whatever quadrates with our wiſhes and deſires, without paying attention to their intrinſic merit. A ſuitability to the occaſion is the only requiſite to inſpire ſatisfaction; but the *approbation* implied in complacency, conveys the idea of ſome kind of *excellency*.

The term has never been profaned by the application of it to guilty purſuits, diſhonourable ſucceſs, or unworthy ſentiments; however they may flatter our vanity, or be the completion of our wiſhes. Nor are things of a trivial or tranſient nature deemed worthy of this affection. It is not ſaid of a mere ſpectator, that he takes complacency in a ball, a concert, or at a theatrical exhibition; however highly he may be delighted and ſatisfied with the performance.

Nor can the term be applied with propriety to any beneficial acquiſition, which has been purely accidental. The higheſt prize which the wheel of fortune may have thrown into our laps, may be received with joy, delight, and ſatisfaction; but the terms approbation and complacency would be equally improper to expreſs our feelings.

It may refer to ſome parts of the inanimate creation that communicate pleaſure on the review. Works of art well executed, may be contemplated with complacency; certainly by the *Artiſt*, if he has ſucceeded to his wiſhes; and the *poſſeſſor* will enjoy ſomething of a ſimilar pleaſure, if the performance be calculated to recal pleaſing ideas, or if he ſhould have manifeſted either taſte or addreſs in the purchaſe of it. (See Note *G.*)

The above inſtances will evince that, in ſtrict propriety of language, *Complacency* is appropriate

to

to that ſpecies of good, which originates from ſome mental or moral excellence; where there is an indication of propriety, ingenuity, wiſdom, addreſs, or dignity in ſentiment, deſign, execution; or of rectitude and benevolence in the motive.

It is obvious that the affection of complacency, will poſſeſs different degrees of ſtrength, according to the various kinds and degrees of excellence diſcernible in the exciting cauſe. The higheſt degree of complacency can alone be inſpired by the obvious uſe of wiſe and pertinent meaſures from beneficent motives, which are, or promiſe to be, productive of the moſt deſirable ends: or by laudable diſpoſitions, and powerful exertions, crowned with the ſucceſs we moſt ardently deſired. When the means have been as wiſe as the nature of the thing would admit, the motives the moſt noble and generous; when the execution indicates ſkill, and the reſult proves as ſucceſsful as could have been wiſhed, Complacency, reſpecting that object, is complete.

High Complacency is the moſt grateful of all the Affections. It poſſeſſes an elevation and a ſuavity peculiar to itſelf. It is permanent ſatisfaction, enjoying the full approbation of reaſon; and conſequently it ſuffers no alloy from the ſtruggle of contending paſſions, or oppoſite deſires. When it is inſpired by our own conduct, it is accompanied

by ſelf-approbation, or the teſtimony of an applauding conſcience, enlivened perhaps by the voice of gratitude, and enriched by the eſteem of the worthy. If it proceed from the conduct of others, it augments the pleaſures of affection, friendſhip, and gratitude.

According to the above view of the affection, may a virtuous and comprehenſive mind, contemplate things in themſelves of a diſpleaſing nature with complacency: Such as difficulties, which are introductory to benefits; and ſufferings, which may be requiſite for the production of the moſt eſſential good.

But the affection of Complacency has its counterfeit. Being more complicate than either of the preceding, and the approbation of the mind forming a conſtituent part of it, an erroneous opinion of ourſelves may change the nature of this ſublime affection, and render it the parent of vice and folly. Thus falſe conceptions of our own talents, acquirements, conduct, may inſpire *Pride*, *Vanity*, *Haughtineſs*, and *Arrogance*.

Notwithſtanding theſe affections are evil in their nature and tendency, yet as they are the illegitimate offspring of Complacency violated by Self-love, and have the appearance of great good for their object, they demand a place in this arrangement.

Pride

Pride is that exalted idea of our ſtate, qualifications, or attainments, which exceeds the boundaries of juſtice, and induces us to look down upon ſuppoſed inferiors with ſome degree of unmerited contempt.

When this elevated idea of ourſelves becomes a motive to avoid and deſpiſe any thing mean and unworthy, its impropriety is overlooked; and as it leads to worthy conduct, it is honoured with the appellation of *laudable* Pride.

It ſometimes conſiſts in exaggerated ideas of the ſuperiority of our own country; of merit in our relatives or intimate connections, whoſe character and conduct reflect ſome rays of honour upon ourſelves; ſuch as the pride of family deſcent; that of children whoſe parents may have acquired celebrity; or of parents in the accompliſhments of their children, or particular honours conferred upon them. This proceeding from the exceſs of affection, where affection is natural, is called a *pardonable* Pride. When Pride is manifeſted by an oſtentatious diſplay of wealth, ſtation, or accompliſhments, it is deemed a *vain* Pride.

When it is indulged to ſuch an exceſs, that it looks down with diſdain upon others, but little inferior, perhaps equal, poſſibly much ſuperior in real merit, it is branded with the title of *inſufferable* Pride. (See Note *H.*)

Vanity is that ſpecies of Pride, which, while it preſumes upon a degree of ſuperiority in ſome particular articles, fondly courts the applauſe of every one within its ſphere of action: ſeeking every occaſion to diſplay ſome talent, or ſuppoſed excellency. Generally ſpeaking, it is the foible of ſuperficial and frivolous minds, that think much more of their attainments, than of their remaining deficiencies. Yet it may be founded on the exceſſive love of praiſe, in thoſe who poſſeſs no inconſiderable ſhare of merit.

Haughtineſs is an overt act of Pride, manifeſted by ſome conduct or expreſſion, indicative of unmerited contempt of others. It may be deemed in this caſe, the ſwelling of Pride into an emotion.

Arrogance indicates itſelf by ſome particular claims to precedency, or marks of diſtinction and reſpect from thoſe whom Pride conſiders its inferiors in ſtation and character; or by impertinent pretenſions to an equality with ſuperiors.

Theſe indications of falſe complacency in their mildeſt influence, may be placed with ſtrict propriety among the affections. Upon ſudden occaſions they riſe into *emotions*; and ſometimes, particularly when connected with anger, from a ſuppoſed inſult or neglect, they poſſeſs every characteriſtic of *paſſion*.

Having

Having conſidered the Paſſions and Affections immediately connected with the *Poſſeſſion* of good, we ſhall proceed to the Paſſions and Affections which are excited by the contemplation of good when it *is not* in our poſſeſſion, but of which the attainment is deemed poſſible. Which conſtitutes our ſecond diviſion under the preſent *Order*. Theſe are *Deſire* and *Hope*.

DESIRE.

The general nature of Deſire has already engaged our attention. It has been deſcribed as the influential effect which the perception of good or evil produces within us; in conſequence of which we ſeek to obtain the one and avoid the other. Our plan demands that we now contemplate Deſire as it is excited by particular objects, conducive of ſome kind of good, either benefit or pleaſure, which we have not yet obtained.

According to the common acceptation of the term, Deſire may be conſidered as an eager longing for ſome apparent good, centered in particular objects, ſituations, or circumſtances.

This deſcription is made as general as poſſible, in order to comprehend two different acts of the mind

mind concerning ſuch objects; which are ſignified by the terms *Wiſh* and *Deſire*.

Lord Kaims * expreſſes this difference in the following manner: "Deſire, taken in its proper "ſenſe, is that internal act which by influencing "the will, makes us to proceed to action. Deſire "in a lax ſenſe reſpects alſo actions and events that "depend not on us; as when I deſire that my friend "may have a ſon to repreſent him; or that my "country may flouriſh in arts and ſciences: but "ſuch internal act is more properly termed a WISH "than *deſire*." Though this obſervation does not fully mark the difference, it plainly indicates that there is one.

We will therefore firſt conſider the deſire which is influential to action; and then advert more particularly to the characteriſtic diſtinctions between that and a *wiſh*.

In the firſt ſenſe, Deſire may be defined, that uneaſy ſenſation excited in the mind by the view or contemplation of any deſirable good, which is not in our poſſeſſion, which we are ſolicitous to obtain, and of which the attainment appears at leaſt *poſſible*.

Deſire is in its nature reſtleſs. Mr. Locke juſt-

* Elements of Criticiſm, vol. 1. p. 42.

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ly remarks that "it is the uneaſineſs it occaſions, "which excites the mind to purſue its object, and "rouſe it from its natural ſtate of apathy and inacti-"vity." Thus is it founded on ſome ſpecies of diſcontent; for were we perfectly contented and ſatisfied with all our ſenſations, and with every circumſtance ſurrounding us, all deſire muſt ceaſe. It relates to ſomething which is not immediately in our power, and which requires either our own exertions or the agency of others, over whom we poſſeſs ſome influence. It implies therefore that ſomething is to be done, before the end can be obtained: and this neceſſarily implies alſo that there is a poſſibility of ſucceſs attending the attempt. It is not always diſcouraged by difficulties; but our moſt active deſires are never ſo ardent as to attempt known impoſſibilities.

Deſires are either excited by the wretchedneſs of our preſent ſituation; by periodical wants, which demand gratification; by comparing the defects and imperfections of our own ſtate, with the preferable ſtate of others; or by the perception of ſome pleaſing and uſeful quality in objects which we wiſh to appropriate.

When deſire is excited by wretchedneſs itſelf, it looks forward towards *good;* towards liberation from this ſtate, and the enjoyment of a better. Relief, and the means of relief, are the predominant ideas

ideas accompanying defire. In this caſe, the idea of a good is immediately engrafted on the ſtock of evil. The deſires excited by periodical wants belong to the appetites excluſively. When the compariſon of our own ſtate with that of others, implants deſires, they proceed from the diſcovery of new ſources of enjoyment, to which we were ſtrangers, united with a conviction that there is a poſſibility of attaining them. The recent perception of pleaſing qualities in objects, has a ſimilar influence. Our natural love of good inſpires a wiſh to poſſeſs whatever promiſes an augmentation of our welfare.

Hence it appears, that our ignorance is often the parent of contentment. We muſt acquire ſome knowledge of ſtations and qualities before we can deſire them. The enlargement of our ideas becomes a copious ſource of diſcontent with our preſent poſſeſſions, and inſpires ardent deſires after new objects. Nothing can injure the good we poſſeſs, ſo much as the idea of a ſomething better: and the ſuperlative is equally injurious to the comparative.

The objects of deſire are infinite, and infinitely diverſified. They relate to whatever is eſſential to our exiſtence and welfare, and to every thing which may ſtrike the fancy; that is, to all our natural, and all our artificial wants. They refer alſo to

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all our ſocial connections, and all our mental purſuits. Theſe deſires acquire ſuch a diverſity of character according to their origin, the degrees of their ſtrength, and other circumſtances, as to render a minute analyſis impoſſible. We ſhall therefore confine ourſelves to a few remarks.

It is obſervable that many of thoſe deſires which are common to all men, and without which the uſual offices of life could not be diſcharged, are of the mildeſt and moſt permanent natures: ſuch as the deſire of preſerving health, a deſire of procuring a competency ſuitable to our ſtation, to provide for our families, &c. Deſires of this claſs are not diſtinguiſhed by any particular epithet; nor are they denominated either affections or paſſions, though they obviouſly belong to the former. But when any extraordinary and unuſual deſire preſents itſelf, which exceeds the common tenor of diſpoſition; or when the object of deſire is ſomething peculiarly ſtriking and important, it is diſtinguiſhed by ſome diſcriminating epithet, and frequently aſſumes the character of an *affection*, *emotion*, or *paſſion*.

Thus the moderate and legitimate gratification of the ſenſual appetites, is not marked by any particular appellation; but inordinate deſires, which tranſgreſs the bounds of ſobriety and decency, are ſtigmatized by the names of *Gluttony*, *Drunkenneſs*,

neſs, Debauchery, Luſt, &c. When we expatiate upon ſuch a character, we remark that the perſon to whom it belongs, is *paſſionately* fond of good eating, or of his bottle; that he is led by his *paſſions*, &c. An exemplary command over theſe exceſſes is honoured with the title of *Temperance*, and *Chaſtity*. Theſe, conſiſting in the love of moderation in conduct, and purity of mind, deſerve to be placed among the affections; though from the mildneſs of their perpetual influence, they are ſimply termed diſpoſitions. The moderate deſire of wealth has no particular name, but when the deſire becomes exceſſive; when it conſiſts in amaſſing riches, without applying them either to utility or enjoyment, it is termed *Avarice*. This alſo is denominated a *paſſion;* not from the violence of any emotion, but from the paſſive and abject ſtate of the perſon who is under its influence. When riches are eagerly purſued, in defiance of juſtice and humanity, the conduct is termed *Rapaciouſneſs*. The wiſh to improve in any valuable qualification or to acquire eſteem, when moderate, has no diſtinguiſhing character: but an eager deſire to equal or excel others in any particular accompliſhment, is called *emulation;* and to ſeek pre-eminence in office, title, or ſtation, is *Ambition*. Theſe deſires are frequently ſo inordinate, as to require the name of paſſions: thus the *ambitious paſſions* is a familiar

familiar expreſſion. (See Note *I.*) The exemplary deſire of regulating our thoughts and purſuits, by right principles, conſtitutes *Virtue;* and all the duties which are performed with warmth and feeling are deemed virtuous *affections:* the oppoſite propenſities and conduct, conſtitute *Vice*, whoſe characteriſtic conſiſts in depraved affections, and ungoverned paſſions. The deſire of yielding obedience to the divine command, and habitual ſolicitude to obtain the divine favour is *Religion.* This under its mildeſt influence is termed, a diſpoſition or character. When a religious temper is indicated by prayer and meditation, which warmly intereſt the *affections*, it is called *devotion.* If any one imagines that *this* favour is to be obtained, by a ſcrupulous attention to frivolous ceremonies, he is conſidered as *ſuperſtitious.* Superſtition is deemed a principle of action rather than an affection. It is in fact, a conſecrated ſelf-intereſt, devoid of love or regard to the ſuppoſed duties it enjoins, or to its object. A tenacious reverence for unimportant ſentiments, with a cenſorious diſpoſition towards thoſe whoſe opinions are oppoſite, is the province of *bigotry;* which if it deſerve the title of an affection, certainly does not belong to the benevolent claſs. An earneſt deſire, and unremitted endeavours to propagate any particular ſentiment, or to enforce a particular rule of conduct, either out of love of truth, or of thoſe

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we wiſh to become proſelytes, or in order to recommend ourſelves to ſome Principal, by our aſſiduity, is denominated *zeal;* which is deemed an *affection.* When ſome particular object gains the aſcendancy over every other, and occupies the greater portion of our attention, it is occaſionally termed a *paſſion;* as a paſſion for muſic, &c. in what ſenſe, and with what propriety has already been conſidered. Such an invincible predilection for any ſubject as ſhall occupy the choiceſt of our thoughts, and incite to the moſt vigorous exertions with ſuch an ardour and conſtancy, as to brave difficulties and danger, is termed *enthuſiaſm;* which has a place among the *Paſſions.*

The very *motives* by which we are actuated, and the choice of means in order to effectuate our purpoſe, form various ſpecies of deſire, ſufficient to characterize the prevailing diſpoſition. Theſe conſtitute integrity, honeſty, induſtry, honour, &c. or artifice, deceit, cruelty, &c. according as the prevailing deſire is under the influence of worthy or baſe and unworthy principles and diſpoſitions.

It ſhould alſo be recollected, that a particular deſire may, in certain circumſtances, become the parent of various other affections and paſſions. Of this

this the Paſſion of Love preſents us with ſtriking inſtances; which in its progreſs is ſo frequently productive of hope, fear, joy, grief, and tormenting jealouſies. In ſhort, every purſuit, which primarily reſpected the gratification of our ſenſes, may become the occaſion of hope, joy, fear, anger, ſorrow, envy, &c. according to the impediments or aids received from others, or according to our ſucceſs or diſappointments.

The *novelty* of an object will frequently elevate deſire into a paſſion. This doubtleſs proceeds from the force of imagination, which greatly enhances the value of thoſe qualities of which the object may be poſſeſſed, and is very prone to ſupply defects. Love at firſt ſight illuſtrates and confirms this idea. Thoſe charms which had ſeized the mind by ſurpriſe, become both unrivalled and irreſiſtible to an heated imagination.

Impediments to our deſires, if they be not ſufficiently powerful to ſubjugate them, redouble their ardour. The affections being once engaged, deſires being once enkindled, we are placed in a very different ſtate of mind, from that we experienced previous to the excitement. We know that the diſappointment of our wiſhes will not leave us in the former ſtate of tranquillity; but will become a ſource of unhappineſs: we therefore redouble our

energy not to ſuffer a diſappointment. This alſo is ſtrongly exemplified in the paſſion of Love. Pride, anger, &c. are ſometimes called in as powerful auxiliaries; and they exert all their impetuoſity in ſupport of our pretenſions. Inordinate ambition abundantly illuſtrates this fact. It engenders a thouſand evil paſſions, which like the Imps of Sin in *Milton*, yelp around it. Where it meets with obſtacles, it is not ſcrupulous about the means of oppoſing them. Succeſs increaſes its powers; and contrary to every other monſter, it is rendered more inſatiable and ravenous by being fed. In either ſtate, therefore, it becomes the terror and ſcourge of the earth.

Mental purſuits ſeem to be the moſt remote from every thing paſſionate and turbulent. An affection for ſcience is in general, the moſt productive of a pleaſing ſerenity of mind. Yet even here no ſmall diverſity is obſervable, according as the memory, the reaſoning powers, or the imagination are employed. The knowledge of intereſting facts, and the examination of the relation of things to each other, are generally of the calmeſt nature; though the latter may juſtly be deemed of a more elevated character than the former. It is ſometimes alſo rewarded with the tranſports of joy, inſpired by the ſurpriſe of ſome new and important diſcovery. The creative powers of the mind, are as various in their effects

effects as they are unlimited in their operations. They are the ſources of lively amuſement, or they may excite ecſtaſies. Where the imagination is the moſt vivid, its pleaſures are the ſtrongeſt; but they are of ſhort duration: whereas the purſuits of knowledge furniſh a temperate perpetuity of gratification, ſufficient to comfort and ſupport the indefatigable ſtudent in his moſt arduous reſearches.

The *motives* to ſtudy are accompanied with various effects upon the mind. When ſcience is purſued ſimply from the pleaſure which knowledge affords, that pleaſure is placid and mild. When the primary motive is to benefit mankind by uſeful communications, the purſuit itſelf has ſelf-complacency for its companion. When the object is perſonal advantage, either of fortune or of reputation, adventitious paſſions will ariſe according to the proſpects of ſucceſs, or the actual accompliſhment of our deſires; according to apprehenſions entertained, or to diſappointments experienced. When high ambition is the primary object, the turbulent paſſions proceeding from diſappointment, uncertainty, rivalſhip, renown, diſgrace, as joy, vexation, hope, fear, jealouſy, &c. will agitate the mind.

The deſires reſpecting our ſocial connections, are for the reaſons given above, and according to the plan propoſed, referred to a diſtinct claſs.

Deſires, inſpired by religious principles, are of

all others the moſt diverſified, both in kind and degree, according to the notions we entertain of religion, and the ſtronger or weaker effects of theſe notions upon our feelings. The moſt extenſive ſignification of the term *Religion*, that which comprehends the greateſt diverſity of opinions, and meets the ideas of moſt philoſophers, ſeems to be the following: *An impreſſive ſenſe of the irreſiſtible influence of one or more ſuperior Beings over the concerns of mortals, which may become beneficial or inimical to our welfare.* It is evident, that a great diverſity of the moſt oppoſite principles may be included under this general definition; and it is no leſs evident, that theſe principles, as often as they become influential, will be productive of effects correſpondent with their natures; will form the temper and implant deſires, moſt congenial with themſelves, but the moſt oppoſite to each other. Zeal and enthuſiaſm are common to them all; but their indications will be correſpondent with the ſuppoſed characters of the Powers they revere, and the methods ſuppoſed to be neceſſary to conciliate their favour, and avert their diſpleaſure. Fear, terror, bigotry, ſuperſtition, cruelty, may thus be engendered; every evil propenſity and atrocious vice may thus be conſecrated; however inconſiſtent with the genuine dictates of religion, or the feelings of humanity. (See Note *K*.)

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When, on the contrary, the mind is inſpired with the moſt exalted conceptions of Deity, and correſpondent ſentiments of moral obligation, religion may cheriſh the pureſt diſpoſitions and affections, moderate and reſtrain inordinate deſires, elevate the mind by the contemplation of perfection in character, and by a warm deſire to imitate. It may inſpire love, joy, hope, gratitude; correct impatience and diſcontent; foſter the principles of univerſal benevolence, and of every ſocial virtue. Thus may religion, according to the ideas formed of its object and duties, be rendered capable of exciting the moſt deſpicable or the moſt noble affections; and of forming the moſt abject, or the moſt elevated of characters!

Mr. Hume has remarked, that Religion is the fulcrum, which Archimedes required, to enable him to move the world. He might have added, that according to the manner and addreſs exerciſed in applying the lever of opinion to this fulcrum, will the world be raiſed up to the heavens, or depreſſed down to the abyſs.

A WISH is an inactive deſire. It is the reſult of that longing after happineſs ſo natural to man, in caſes where no expectations can be formed, no efforts can be made. It is the breathing after ſomething deſirable, where the means to obtain it are not

in our power; or where the opportunity may be for ever loſt. It is excited by the contemplation of a ſomething, which if it could poſſibly be obtained, might augment our portion of good; or by reflecting upon a ſomething, which, had it been poſſeſſed, performed, or avoided, might have proved highly advantageous. Thus we may wiſh for impoſſibilities, which cannot be the objects of our active deſires. The *beggar* may wiſh to be a *King*, who cannot ſeriouſly *deſire* it. We may wiſh that we could fly, even without wings, and pay a viſit to ſome of the planets; though we know that the wiſh will be in vain.

A Wiſh may refer to *paſt* ſcenes, where Deſire is totally inapplicable. The eſſence of repentance conſiſts in wiſhing that we had conducted ourſelves in a different manner.

Theſe inſtances abundantly confirm the remark of *Lord Kaims*, that we may wiſh for things not in our power; and they ſhew that the range of our wiſhes is of an infinite extent, comprehending impoſſibilities, which refer to the paſt, preſent, or future. (See Note *L.*)

HOPE is the encouragement given to deſire; the pleaſing expectancy that its object ſhall be obtained. Without this affection, deſire would ſink into deſpondency; like a ſimple wiſh it would remain inactive,

inactive, and prey upon itſelf; producing perpetual uneaſineſs, deſtitute of any advantage. Hope is ſo pleaſing, and ſo invigorating an affection that it is emphatically ſtyled the *Balm of Life*. It preſerves the mind from ſtagnating in its preſent poſſeſſions, corrects the uneaſineſs of deſire, and animates it to ſtruggle with the difficulties it may have to encounter. Hope poſſeſſes the happy ſecret of *anticipating* the good we deſire. By the pleaſing ſenſation it communicates, we already taſte the pleaſures we ſeek. Where the object has not been of the firſt importance, the pleaſures of hope have frequently been experienced to ſurpaſs thoſe of actual poſſeſſion: for the imagination is in this affection ſolely occupied by the ſuppoſed advantages and eligible qualities of its object, without attending to any of its imperfections. In its general operation, the indulgence of hope is mixed with certain portions of doubt and ſolicitude: but when doubt is removed, and the expectation becomes ſanguine, hope riſes into joy, and has been known to produce tranſports and ecſtaſies, equally with the full accompliſhment of ardent deſires. Thus, according to the degrees of force with which it affects the mind, it may be conſidered either as an affection or a paſſion.

It alſo appears that joy and hope are perfectly ſimilar in their natures; and that the pleaſing ſenſa-

tions they inſpire, are perfectly correſpondent. The difference conſiſts in the degree of uncertainty, which intervenes before poſſeſſion, and checks the ardour of hope; and as the object was in expectancy, the pleaſure is not ſo powerfully quickened by the influence of ſurpriſe. Yet where the object has been highly valued, and the anxiety great concerning its attainment; a releaſe from this anxiety has communicated a delectable elaſticity to the mind, and rendered its ſenſations as vivid as thoſe excited by more unexpected cauſes.

As the above paſſions and affections are inſpired by the contemplation of good, thus are moſt of them of a *pleaſant* nature. This is obviouſly the caſe with *Joy*, and all the affections connected with it. *Hope* is alſo uniformly, a pleaſant affection. *Deſire* will vary according to its object, degrees of ſtrength, and the different paſſions and affections ſo frequently ariſing from it. Although in its mildeſt ſtate, it poſſeſſes a degree of reſtleſſneſs, which ſerves as a ſtimulus to exertions, yet its immediate attendants give a preponderancy in its favour. Deſire, as defined above, has always ſome ſpecies of *good* for its object, which is always a *pleaſant* object; and it is encouraged in its attempts by the poſſibility or probability of *attainment*. Theſe two circumſtances united, more than compenſate for the degree of reſtleſſneſs it in general occaſions.

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The ſportſman, who delights in the chace; who endures cold, hunger, and fatigue, with more than patience, inſpired by the hopes of exerciſing his ſkill, and carrying home the triumphant, though trifling, reward of his aſſiduity; is a juſt emblem of the ſtate of our minds, in the purſuit of objects we deem of ſuperior importance. Deſires are not only comfortleſs, but approach to *miſery*, when they are impetuous and ungovernable, when hopes are frequently checked by diſappointments, when patience is wearied out by procraſtinations, and when deſires are borne away by the whirlwind of turbulent paſſions, which they have excited.

The *wiſh*, which characterizes the benevolent heart, is of a pleaſing nature. When it refers ſimply to the amelioration of our ſtate, not being ſupported by hope, it ſubſides almoſt as ſoon as it is formed. It is moſt painful, when it is excited by our own improper conduct, or by the neglect of advantages which are never to return.

ORDER II.

WE proceed to conſider thoſe Paſſions and Affections operating upon the principle of *Self-love*, in which the idea of EVIL is immediately preſent to the mind.

Theſe are diſtinguiſhed into *three Kinds*: the *firſt* relates to actual loſſes and diſappointments; the *ſecond*, to evils of which we are apprehenſive; and the *third*, to the conduct which ſeems to deſerve reprehenſion. They inſpire the paſſions of *Sorrow*, *Fear*, and *Anger*, with their different modifications and combinations.

It is obvious from this general deſcription of each, that they muſt be frequently blended together. Partial evils inſpiring *ſorrow*, are frequently the harbingers of others which alarm our *fears*; and both the evils we lament, and thoſe we dread, may be occaſioned by a conduct calculated to excite our *anger*. It is in conſequence of theſe combinations, that many of the affections under this claſs

claſs become ſo complicated, as to render it difficult to give them a ſpecific arrangement.

Thoſe which are the leaſt complex demand our firſt attention.

I. SORROW.

It is ſcarcely needful to obſerve, that Sorrow is the direct oppoſite of Joy. It expreſſes a mental ſuffering under the privation of ſome good which we actually poſſeſſed; or concerning which we entertained a pleaſing expectation. The one we term loſs, the other a diſappointment. When the loſs or diſappointment has been very great, and we feel it as a privation of ſomething which was deemed eſſential to our felicity, or upon which our affections were ſtrongly placed; when the event arrived in a ſudden and unexpected manner, ſo that the mind was not able to collect itſelf or prepare for it; this paſſion produces extreme anguiſh. Surpriſe, Wonder, and Aſtoniſhment exert their powerful influence, and greatly augment the pangs of ſorrow. The ſenſes are troubled; the ſoul is overwhelmed, and ſometimes ſinks into a painful ſtupefaction. This ſtate marks the *paſſion* of Sorrow, according to

to the diſtinctions noticed in the preceding pages; for it is here that the mind is perfectly paſſive. As ſoon as it is able to collect its powers, it wanders over and exaggerates every diſtreſſing circumſtance and poſſible diſadvantage, that may be conſequent upon the loſs; until tumultuous emotions are excited, bordering upon phrenſy. Violent agitations, and reſtleſs poſitions of the body, extenſion of the arms, clapping of the hands, beating the breaſt, tearing the hair, loud ſobs and ſighs, manifeſt to the ſpectator the inward agony of the ſoul. Such are the *emotions*, which indicate the nature and ſtrength of the *paſſion*. Sometimes a flood of tears relieves theſe pathognomonic ſymptoms. Univerſal laſſitude and a ſenſe of debility ſucceed, with deep dejection of countenance and languor in the eyes, which ſeem to look around, and ſolicit in vain for aſſiſtance and relief. Every thing, which uſed to communicate pleaſure and inſpire vivacity appears frivolous, or becomes indifferent to the mind. The only delight which is now enjoyed, is to contemplate the cauſe of its affliction; to enumerate all the excellencies and advantages of that which was once poſſeſſed, or might have been poſſeſſed; and fondly to dwell upon each. Thus the *emotions* gradually ſink into permanent *affections*.

Grief is ſometimes conſidered as ſynonimous with Sorrow; and in this caſe we ſpeak of the *tranſports*

ſports of grief. At other times it expreſſes a more ſilent, deep, and painful affection, ſuch as are inſpired by domeſtic calamities; particularly by the loſs of friends and relatives; or by the diſtreſs, either of body or mind, experienced by thoſe we love and value.

When the mind is very deeply impreſſed with a ſenſe of calamity, for a continuance, and the attention cannot by any means be diverted from it; the ſubject is in a ſtate of *melancholy*.

This affection manifeſts itſelf by dejection of ſpirits, debility of mind and body, obſtinate and inſuperable love of ſolitude, univerſal apathy, and a confirmed liſtleſſneſs, which emaciate the corporeal ſyſtem, and not unfrequently trouble the brain.

It is a ſtriking characteriſtic of deep Sorrow, that it is of a tacit and uncommunicative nature. In this alſo it is the oppoſite to Joy. After the violent effuſions of the mind in the firſt emotions, it ſubſides into a penſive and reſerved ſtate. It attempts concealment, even from the boſom of a friend; like Viola in Shakeſpear,

> Who never told her love:
> But let concealment, like a worm in the bud,
> Feed on her damaſk cheek.

This diſpoſition may proceed from ſome peculiar delicacy in the cauſe of grief; from that indolence, which

which is the reverſe both of the vivacity and loquacity of joy; from the apprehenſion that the many will not ſympathize with the ſufferer; and a reluctance to afflict the few that will.

The above remarks refer to Sorrow, excited by more ſimple cauſes, and unconnected with any other affection: but it is very frequently blended with other affections, by means of which it is greatly diverſified. Sometimes it aſſumes the appearance of *diſcontent* and *diſſatisfaction*. The firſt is moſtly inſpired by a compariſon of our ſituation with that of others, and the diſcovering an humiliating inferiority. The other principally refers to the diſappointment of our deſires, or a partial and imperfect accompliſhment of our ardent wiſhes. In diſappointments, where the affections have been ſtrongly placed, and the expectations ſanguine, particularly where the agency of others is concerned, ſorrow may degenerate into vexation and chagrin, which are ſtill higher degrees of diſſatisfaction. They all imply an *irritated*, as well as *ſorrowful* ſtate of mind.

Impatience is alſo a mixture of ſorrow and anger, under the immediate ſenſation of ſomething irkſome; or at the cauſes of delay, where any deſirable object is in expectancy.

Repining is ſorrow united with a degree of reſentment

ſentment againſt ſome ſuperior agent, where the mind dares not to break forth into ſtrong expreſſions of anger.

Sympathetic ſorrow is that ſpecies of ſorrow we participate with others, in conſequence of our ſocial connections, or the general benevolence of our natures. Theſe will be more amply conſidered hereafter.

Of the virtuous affections inſpired by ſorrow, which are perſonal, the moſt conſpicuous are, *Patience*, *Reſignation*, and *Humility*. Theſe by their habitual influence often form the diſpoſition and character.

In the exerciſe of *patience*, the mind has wiſely determined to render the evil as light as poſſible, by counteracting the uſual effects of ſorrow or vexation. It endures actual ſufferings with compoſure, or waits for expected bleſſings, without a culpable reſtleſſneſs. In ſhort, patience is a calm acquieſcence in a ſtate, of which it perceives the evils and diſcomfiture: by this it is ſufficiently diſtinguiſhed from *inſenſibility*.

Reſignation ſuperadds to patience a ſubmiſſive diſpoſition, reſpecting the intelligent cauſe of our uneaſineſs. It acknowledges both the power and the right of a ſuperior to afflict. It is uſually connected with a confidence in his juſtice; and indul-

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ges a hope alſo in ſome future exemption. Thus it oppoſes a fretful repining temper of mind.

Humility is a degree of habitual ſorrow, or painful apprehenſions,—by which it is connected with fear,—concerning our deficiencies in intellectual or moral attainments. It is inſpired either by comparing ourſelves with others, who appear to be our ſuperiors in theſe excellencies; or by the contemplation of their intrinſic value, importance, extent, and the obſtacles which we have ſuffered to impede our progreſs. (See Note *M.*)

We have conſidered the principal cauſe of ſorrow to be *privation;* becauſe the loſs of ſome good is in moſt inſtances the prevalent idea. Pecuniary loſſes, the loſs of relatives and friends, of their good-will and affection, are obvious privations. Sickneſs is the privation of health; impriſonment the privation of liberty; and the hardſhips endured in priſon, the privation of accuſtomed indulgencies: calumny and diſgrace are the privations of a good character. Yet it is acknowledged, that being in the habit of conſidering theſe things as eſſential to comfort and happineſs, we view this privation in a poſitive light; and if we attend ſimply to the effects, the idea is doubtleſs pertinent; for all miſery, whatever be the cauſe, is a poſitive ſenſation. In bodily pains or corporeal ſufferings, the evil

evil endured is uniformly conſidered as of a poſitive nature; nor does the idea of a loſs preſent itſelf to the mind. It would be an affection of philoſophic preciſion, to conſider the agonies of the torture as a privation of former eaſe. Perhaps the reaſon of this diſtinction is founded in our claiming an exemption from pain, as our natural and only inheritance. Every thing beſides is an acquiſition, either as a gift, or the purchaſe of our own labour. The following peculiarity confirms this idea; the term ſorrow cannot with any propriety be applied to our bodily ſufferings. We ſhould ſmile at any one, who aſſerted that he was *ſorry* becauſe he had a fit of the gout, or ſuffered a publick flagellation; though in fact, the body cannot ſuffer without the participation of the mind. Hence it appears that the prevalent cauſe of Sorrow is privation, though the effects are poſitive miſery.

II. FEAR.

The ſecond effect produced by the hatred of evil that we ſhall mention, is Fear.

Fear is a painful ſenſation produced by the immediate *apprehenſion* of ſome impending evil. This evil may conſiſt in being deprived of what we at

preſent enjoy, in being diſappointed in what we expect, or in the infliction of a poſitive miſery.

The paſſion of Fear is ſtill more painful than that of Sorrow, which notwithſtanding its ſeverity has when calmed into an affection, ſomething ſoothing in its nature. Fear produces an agony and anxiety about the heart not to be deſcribed; and it may be ſaid to paralyze the ſoul in ſuch a manner, that it becomes inſenſible to every thing but to its own miſery. Inertneſs and torpor pervade the whole ſyſtem, united with a conſtriction of the integuments of the body, and alſo a certain ſenſe of being *fettered*, or of being rendered incapable of motion. The eyes are pallid, wild, and ſunk in their ſockets; the countenance is contracted and wan; the hair ſtands erect, or at leaſt excites the ſenſation, which every child experiences as often as he is terrified by ſtories of ghoſts, witches, &c; the bowels are ſtrongly affected, the heart palpitates, reſpiration labours, the lips tremble, the tongue faulters, the limbs are unable to obey the will, or ſupport the frame. Dreadful ſhrieks denote the inward anguiſh: theſe are often ſucceeded by ſyncopies; which, while they manifeſt that the ſufferings are greater than nature can ſuſtain, afford a temporary relief.

Such are the external ſigns which indicate the wretched ſtate of mind under this horrid paſſion. Since torpor, debility, and painful conſtrictions frequently

frequently accompany fear more than any other paſſion, the *emotions* will in ſuch inſtances be leſs vivid. Inſtead of violent tranſports, a deep depreſſion and numbneſs as it were both of body and mind characterize the paſſion; though theſe may be viſible to the ſpectator, and are not leſs expreſſive of inward anguiſh.

When the effects of fear operate powerfully, without any mixture of hope, theſe paſſive impreſſions are predominant: but where there is a poſſibility of eſcape, the mind reacts with wonderful energy. Abject depreſſion is changed into violent agitations; collected force takes place of debility; and tremendous exertions ſucceed to the torpid and inert ſtate. When a perſonal attack is apprehended, momentary and trembling ſtrength is thrown into the muſcles; the body inſtinctively places itſelf in the attitude of defence; a mixture of fierceneſs and wild horror is expreſſed in the countenance, well adapted to alarm and terrify the enemy. If eſcape be attempted, an unuſual energy is thrown into the limbs, enabling the ſufferer to precipitate his flight, by exertions that would have been impracticable in a more compoſed ſtate of mind.

Conſternation. This ſpecies of fear is a ſtrong foreboding of tremendous evils, which are likely to follow misfortunes that have already taken place. It may ſeize an individual, when ſurpriſed by the

arrival of ſome dreadful diſaſter; or at the inſtant of his being made acquainted with the event: but it chiefly refers to alarms of a more extenſive nature; to thoſe excited by ſome general calamity, which threatens evils beyond the power of calculation. Earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, inundations, conflagrations, the ſudden approach of an incenſed and powerful enemy are of this kind. Here the danger is widely diffuſed. Fear is rendered contagious, and by the influence of ſocial ſympathy, the conſternation becomes univerſal, without having any particular tendency, or being directed to any particular object. When calamities of this nature arrive in a ſudden and unexpected manner; particularly where the ideas of perfect ſecurity had been indulged, and perhaps were triumphant and inſulting; ſurpriſe, wonder, aſtoniſhment manifeſt their powers, by the augmentation of miſery; while a troubled imagination aggravates every poſſibility of horror. In all theſe caſes the expreſſions of fear are wild and frantic. Beating the breaſt, tearing the hair, loud lamentations indicate the agony of the ſoul.

The panic which has ſometimes ſeized a whole army, flushed perhaps with victory, will illuſtrate the preceding obſervations. Rapid ſucceſs had excited the arrogant idea of *invincibility*. An unexpected defeat, has not only ſubdued this vain conceit, but given an oppoſite direction to the active imagination,

imagination, and has transferred the idea of invincibility to the *enemy*. They think it will be in vain any longer to reſiſt a power which has ſhewn itſelf ſuperior to their own wonted proweſs; and where reſiſtance is ſuppoſed to be abſolutely in vain, it never will be attempted. The force of ſuperſtition either in depreſſing or animating courage, is well known. This has made the moſt valiant tremble at ſhadows; and conſecrated banners have ſecured victory over an hoſt of enemies. Thus the warlike Achilles, who was the bulwark of the Grecian cauſe, and whoſe ſole delight was in the tumults of war, trembled at the ſudden appearance of Minerva.*

Abject Fear, which is accompanied by the more ſilent ſymptoms of depreſſed ſpirits, ſeems to be inſpired chiefly by the idea of an *irreſiſtible* power in its cauſe. This alſo is the faithful companion of ſuperſtition. It is eaſily excited in feeble minds by every tale of horror. It is very obſervable in thoſe who are led into captivity, or to priſon; in thoſe detected in the commiſſion of a crime, which expoſes them to the ſeverity of the law; in thoſe who are under the expectation of immediate puniſhment. That is, in caſes which admit of no eſcape or redreſs. *Terror* is that ſpecies of fear, which rouſes to

* Θαμβησεν δ' Αχιλλευς. See Homer. Iliad. A. l. 199.

defend or eſcape; and *conſternation* is the anguiſh excited by ſuch calamities, as threaten the moſt miſchievous conſequences.

So painful is the paſſion of Fear, that the evil can ſcarcely exiſt which induces anguiſh equal to its feelings. Innumerable are the inſtances in which the fear of a calamity of the greateſt magnitude, has greatly exceeded the miſeries it brought with it; and the mind has reſumed a tranquillity under misfortunes, which in the proſpect appeared inſupportable. (See Note *N.*)

Buſy imagination always magnifies the evil, and caſts the darkeſt ſhades over every poſſible concomitant. It will not ſuffer the ſuppoſition that any circumſtances of alleviation can be attached to a ſtate ſo much dreaded. But when the dreaded evil is arrived, an immediate releaſe from the agonies of fear, is of itſelf a ſpecies of conſolation. In the worſt of circumſtances, fear yields its place to *ſorrow*, which is certainly ſome mitigation of ſuffering. Habit reconciles to many things, which were at firſt repugnant to our nature. Experience in a ſhort time points out many comforts, where they were leaſt expected. In moſt caſes, as ſoon as we ceaſe to fear, we begin to *hope;* for there are few ſituations ſo completely dark and gloomy, as to exclude every ray of conſolatory hope.

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The union of ſuch cauſes ſufficiently explains the reaſon why, in numberleſs inſtances, the agony of actual ſufferings, is not ſo great as the dread of their arrival.

The *affections*, that is, the more permanent impreſſions of fear, unaccompanied with the external ſigns which characterize emotions, are principally the following:

Dread. This is a degree of permanent fear; an habitual and painful apprehenſion of ſome tremendous event, which may be too remote to excite any of the preceding paſſions. It keeps the mind in a perpetual alarm; in an eager watchfulneſs of every circumſtance that bears any relation to the evil apprehended.

It is obvious, that this ſtrong and painful affection cannot be the reſult, or the reſidue of fear, in the ſame manner as ſatisfaction may be the reſult of joy, and melancholy of the tranſports of ſorrow; becauſe it is not ſuſceptible of a retroſpect. When the evil is arrived, the dread of that evil is removed; though the affection may become attached to ſome pernicious conſequences, that may poſſibly follow. (See Note *O.*)

Deſpair. This is a permanent fear of loſing ſome valuable good, of ſuffering ſome dreadful evil, or

or of remaining in a ſtate of actual miſery, without any mixture of hope. It generally ſucceeds to ineffectual efforts, which have been repeatedly made; and of conſequence is excited where no means can be deviſed equal to the magnitude of the ſuppoſed evil.

Remorſe has already been placed under *Sorrow;* but whenever it is connected with a fear of puniſhment, it deſerves a place under this paſſion alſo, which greatly increaſes its agonies. When remorſe is blended with the fear of puniſhment, and ariſes to deſpair, it conſtitutes the ſupreme wretchedneſs of the mind.

Cowardice, conſidered as diſtinct from the occaſional panic mentioned above, is that habitual temper and diſpoſition, which diſqualifies from oppoſing the dangers and difficulties it is our duty or intereſt to combat. Every indication of cowardice, is an indication of culpable and unmanly fear.

Puſillanimity is a feebleneſs of mind, ſtill more diſgraceful; by which it is terrified at mere trifles, or imaginary dangers, unauthorized by the moſt diſtant probability.

Timidity, though ſimilar, is not ſo reproachful. The term is chiefly uſed, where there is ſome apology, from ſex, tender years, or feebleneſs of frame.

Doubt, conſidered as an affection, and diſtinguiſhed

guiſhed from ſimple deliberation of the mind, is a comfortleſs ſtate occaſioned by the uncertainty of an event, and the predominancy of fearful apprehenſion concerning it, though a degree of hope is ſtill indulged. (See Note *P.*)

Irreſolution repreſents the mind as fluctuating between hope and fear, between fits of courage and painful apprehenſions, in caſes where it ought to determine. It is ſuſpended between probabilities of ſucceſs, and apparent dangers of diſappointment.

Shame is a painful ſenſation occaſioned by the quick apprehenſion, that reputation and character are in danger; or by the perception that they are loſt. It may ariſe from the immediate detection, or fear of detection in ſomething ignominious. It may alſo ariſe from native diffidence in young and ingenuous minds, when ſurpriſed into ſituations where they attract the peculiar attention of their ſuperiors. The glow of ſhame indicates, in the firſt inſtance, that the mind is not totally abandoned; in the laſt, it manifeſts a nice ſenſe of honour and delicate feelings, united with inexperience and ignorance of the world.

Modeſty may be deemed an habitual concern and ſolicitude not to offend againſt any ſpecies of decorum; either by unſuitable behaviour, in which it is oppoſed to indelicacy; or by too exalted an opinion of our own good qualities, in which it is oppoſed

ſed to vanity. It ſometimes manifeſts itſelf by reſenting indecencies in ſpeech or conduct; in this caſe it is united with anger.

Fortitude, *Courage*, *Intrepidity* are affections and diſpoſitions oppoſed to fear. They are virtuous affections, excited alone by expoſure to thoſe evils, which are uſually productive of that emotion: and therefore they deſerve to be mentioned in this connection.

Fortitude expreſſes that firmneſs of mind, which reſiſts dangers and ſufferings. It is founded on a reſolution of the will to counteract or ſurmount thoſe cowardly impreſſions, which terrific objects will infallibly make upon inferior minds. It is ſecretly ſupported by hope, and greatly invigorated by ſome portion of the angry affections.

Courage is active fortitude. It meets dangers, and attempts to repel them.

Intrepidity, according to its etymology, proceeds yet farther; it expreſſes a courage perfectly undaunted, a ſuperiority to the very ſenſation of fear; boldly impelling the mind forwards to meet the greateſt dangers, to which a ſenſe of obligation may expoſe it.

III. ANGER.

III. ANGER.

This is the third ſtrong effect produced by the immediate perception of evil.

Anger has been conſidered as a paſſion directed againſt the real or ſuppoſed cauſe of our danger or our ſufferings. In the firſt tranſport of the paſſion, a ſenſe of perſonal evil unjuſtly inflicted is the primary idea; and thus from the *effect*, the mind makes an inſtantaneous and powerful tranſition to its *cauſe*. The primary idea entitles it to a place among the paſſions excited by Self-love; but many of the effects derived from it properly belong to the ſocial affections, and conſtitute no ſmall portion of malevolence and diſplacency. The paſſions of Sorrow or of Fear do not immediately or neceſſarily direct the attention to their cauſe, ſo as to have an influence upon their ſpecific characters. That of Anger does. Thus it becomes as it were the connecting medium between ourſelves and others; exciting painful and irritating ſenſations, which relate to both. We ſhall therefore conſider in this place the general nature of the paſſion, as excited in conſequence of a keen ſenſe of perſonal injuries, without

without paying particular attention to its objective cauſe; and refer its influence over the ſocial affections to the Order aſſigned them.

Anger is the ſtrong paſſion or emotion impreſſed or excited by a ſenſe of injury received, or in contemplation; that is, by the idea of ſomething of a pernicious nature and tendency, being done or intended, in violation of ſome ſuppoſed obligation to a contrary conduct. It is enkindled by the perception of an undue privation of that to which we thought ourſelves in ſome degree or other entitled; or of a poſitive ſuffering, from which we claimed an exemption. Theſe are obviouſly the exciting cauſes; though our ignorance, or inordinate ſelf-love may ſuggeſt erroneous ideas reſpecting our claims, or render the reſentful emotion very diſproportionate to the offence. The pain we ſuffer from the injury, the unexpectedneſs of the offence, our wounded pride, &c. are ſo apt to diſturb our reaſoning and diſcriminating powers, that we are at the firſt inſtant prompted to conſider every injury received as an injury intended. Nor are there wanting numerous inſtances, in which an heated and irritated imagination attributes deſign to the irrational and inanimate creation, in order to gratify the paſſion of reſentment.

Anger viewed as a paſſion, that is, as referring to the firſt impreſſion in which we are paſſive,—or the impreſſion

impreſſion preceding the external ſigns, which conſtitute the emotion,—may be conſidered as a painful ſenſation of a heating and irritating nature. It is an irkſome ſtimulus, by which the animal ſpirits are troubled and violently agitated. Yet the ſenſation is not ſo painful as in the exceſſes of ſorrow or of fear. Where the injury appears great, totally unprovoked, too recent or ſudden for the mind to call up motives of reſtraint; when ſurpriſe at receiving an offence from a quarter the moſt remote from expectation, or aſtoniſhment at baſe and ungrateful returns for benefits conferred, accompany the firſt impulſe of paſſion, an ardent deſire of *revenge* is immediately excited. The imagination runs over every circumſtance of aggravation; depicts the offence as a crime of the moſt atrocious nature; and vengeance is denounced againſt the aggreſſor, as an indiſpenſable obligation of juſtice, and as a retribution due to the violated laws of morals, of honour, or of gratitude. The emotions ſtrikingly correſpond with this ſtate of mind. The corporeal ſyſtem immediately aſſumes attitudes and appearances, calculated to inſpire the offender with terror, and preparatory to the infliction of the chaſtiſement, he is ſuppoſed to have deſerved. The countenance reddens, the eyes flaſh indignant fire, and the aſpect ſpeaks horror; muſcular ſtrength is abundantly increaſed; and powers of exertion

exertion are acquired, unknown to cooler moments. This new appetite for revenge gains the aſcendancy, not only over every conſideration of compaſſion, but of perſonal ſafety; and impels to dangerous encounters, totally regardleſs of the danger. In ſome inſtances, an apprehenſion of dreadful conſequences; a kind of preſage of the miſchief that may poſſibly enſue, and become the ſubject of future regret, intermixes fear with the paroxyſms of anger; and a pallid tremour unites with ſymptoms peculiar to wrath, or accompanies the firſt tokens of revenge.

Anger is deſervedly placed among the moſt violent emotions. From its ungovernable exceſſes, it has almoſt appropriated to itſelf the term *paſſion*. When the paroxyſms of anger are exceſſive, the ſubject is deaf to the moſt cogent reaſons, or to the moſt pathetic repreſentations of the miſchief it may occaſion; and being worked up to a degree of phrenſy, he fully vindicates the adage *Ira brevis furor*. While under the influence of this turbulent emotion, the incenſed perſon often imagines that he is ſolely actuated by the pureſt love of equity, and ardent deſire to adminiſter juſtice; though at the inſtant he may be violating the dictates of compaſſion, in the perpetration of the moſt atrocious deeds.

It is obſervable, that Sorrow and Fear, though they may be the reſult of culpable conduct or even criminality,

criminality, are calculated to excite our compaſſion. The anguiſh manifeſted by the ſubject, calls aloud for our ſympathy: but Anger, though it is a painful emotion, excites no ſympathy, unleſs we ſuppoſe the ſubject to be inſane. In caſes where we acknowledge the provocation has been very great, our ſympathy is transferred to the object of reſentment; prompting us to act as mediators, and exert all our influence to mitigate or avert the puniſhment to which he is expoſed.

Anger in the exceſs of its violence, when it is excited to a degree of phrenſy, ſo that the mind has totally loſt ſelf-command; when it prompts to threats and actions extravagant and atrocious, is termed *Rage*.

Wrath is violent and permanent anger; and as ſuch it may be deemed an *affection*. This may be ſeated in a breaſt poſſeſſing too much ſelf-command to will the infliction of puniſhment, though it notices and dwells upon every circumſtance of aggravation; and though it ſhould reſolve to puniſh, it is capable of being appeaſed by the conceſſions and penitence of the offender.

Reſentment is a leſſer degree of wrath, excited by ſmaller offences, or by offences committed againſt leſs irritable minds. It is a deep reflective diſpleaſure againſt the conduct of the offender.

Indignation is a reſentment againſt a conduct that appears

appears peculiarly unworthy; ſome atrocious violation of the principles of gratitude, or ſomething which appears peculiarly deſpicable and baſe.

But we are now treſpaſſing upon the affections which properly belong to another Claſs, and which will demand our attention under the article of diſplacency.

Anger and its principal ramifications are generally directed againſt the conduct of others, and almoſt univerſally with ſuperior degrees of violence; however they are ſometimes directed againſt ourſelves, when our conduct has been either negligent or criminal. In *Repentance*, *Contrition*, and *Remorſe*, Self-reproach, and even *Indignation* are largely intermixed with the affection of Sorrow.

Vexation, *Chagrin*, *Impatience*, do not relate to perſons, ſo much as to particular circumſtances of a teazing nature. They are chiefly excited by diſappointments, and tedious delays to the accompliſhment of our wiſhes.

Peeviſhneſs may be conſidered as a ſlighter degree of anger, perpetually recurring to irritable perſons from trifling cauſes. It is ſuch a ſoreneſs of temper, that it can ſcarcely ſuffer the touch of the gentleſt hand; and it reſents upon the moſt innocent, the vexations that have been excited by cauſes with which they had no concern.

Although

Although *Fortitude, Courage, Intrepidity* have been conſidered under the article of *Fear*, as they are virtuous reſolutions which oppoſe themſelves to the objects of our fear, or to the dangers which threaten us; yet they might with no impropriety have been placed under the paſſion of *Anger*. If we advert to the phyſiological, or rather pathological effects of anger, we ſhall perceive that it rouſes the mind, increaſes muſcular ſtrength, braces the ſyſtem for action, and renders the ſubject heedleſs of danger; and theſe are the effects produced by fortitude and courage. Though that ſtrong irritation of mind peculiar to anger, may not be ſenſibly felt by generous ſpirits, and ſelf-command may calm the agitations natural to this paſſion, as well as thoſe peculiar to terror, yet ſome modifications of it obviouſly remain. Where courage is merely inſtinctive, it is manifeſtly quickened by anger, though cultivation and noble principles may ſuppreſs the appearance and almoſt the ſenſations, in minds endowed with the virtues of fortitude and magnanimity.

It may perhaps be aſſerted with juſtice, that ſome degree of anger is naturally excited by every object of hatred. Though privation or danger be the predominant ideas in Sorrow or Fear, yet theſe are moſtly, it may be ſaid *always* accompanied with a

ſenſe of injury, in minds free from every moral reſtraint. In ſorrows inflicted by a Power againſt which we dare not to murmur, the irritations natural to a wounded mind may be ſubjugated by motives of virtue and piety: but without theſe it would be ſtrongly diſpoſed to burſt forth into frantic and impotent rage. This may be explained by the ſtrength and quickneſs of our painful feelings, which at the firſt inſtant diſpoſe us to impute blame where no blame can be attached. Hiſtory makes us acquainted with many curious inſtances in the heathen world, where the images of their deities have been very roughly treated, and even ſuffered public flagellation, for not having averted the calamities which had been deprecated; and the repinings of thoſe who have been better inſtructed, manifeſt a ſimilar temper, though it may be ſomewhat checked by awe.

It is an indication of no inconſiderable progreſs in reaſon and in reſolution, always to diſtinguiſh with accuracy between an evil endured and its inculpable cauſe; and to ſupport the calamity without the leaſt mixture of reſentment. Nor are theſe obſervations confined to the occaſions of ſorrow; in the paſſion of *Fear*, the firſt object being ſafety, every other conſideration may be ſuppreſſed for the inſtant. But in the emotion of *Terror*, not only ſome degree of courage, but a very conſiderable

rable portion of anger is perceptible : the rage of a coward deſpairing of eſcape by flight is proverbial.

The moſt accurate diſtinctions therefore which we have been capable of making in the above Analyſis of the Paſſions, have been to mark the leading characteriſtic of each. The primary idea exciting Sorrow is that of loſs, or painful privation ; that of Fear is danger ; and the genuine idea appropriate to Anger is that of injury, or ſome ſpecies of injuſtice. Theſe are very diſtinct in themſelves, though inordinate ſelf-love ſo frequently confounds them together.

We have thus endeavoured to trace the various Paſſions and Affections, which are of a perſonal nature ; and which are more immediately excited in conſequence of the principle of Self-Love.—A principle implanted in every breaſt ; ſeated in every individual of our ſpecies, from the moſt ignorant to the moſt intelligent ; from the capricious infant, to the ſublimeſt philoſopher. All who are able to diſcern, or *think* that they diſcern, things conducive to their happineſs or enjoyment, are occaſionally placed in ſituations which expoſe them to the influence of one or other of the above Paſſions,

Emotions, and Affections in their individual capacities.

The Paſſions and Affections, which belong to the *ſocial* Principle, next demand our attention.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

CLASS II.

On the Passions and Affections, derived from the SOCIAL PRINCIPLE.

IF our connections with the *inanimate* creation expoſe us to be differently influenced by various powers and properties diſcernible in every part of it: if many things around us call forth our paſſions and affections, by ſuſtaining certain relations with our corporeal and intellectual natures, it is to be expected that a ſtill more intimate connection with the *animated* creation, ſhould implant within us various diſpoſitions correſpondent to thoſe higher qualities and properties belonging to it. The *animated beings* around us not only excite certain Paſſions and Affections ariſing from the principle of

Self love, in common with other parts of nature, but they alſo are rendered capable of *enjoying* or of *ſuffering*, equally with ourſelves; and we poſſeſs the power of adminiſtering to their well-being, or of proving injurious to it.

Rational and intelligent agents being furniſhed with certain rules of conduct, which reſpect both themſelves and others, are ſubjected to various degrees of approbation or cenſure, according as they act conformably to ſuch rules, or in violation of them.

Theſe peculiarities introduce a train of Paſſions and Affections, very diſtinct from thoſe which are excited by the ſelfiſh principle alone. Self-love confines its attention to certain qualities and properties, merely as they have an influence upon our own perſonal welfare; and we deem theſe qualities good or bad, ſolely as they produce certain effects upon *ourſelves*. The Social Principle extends its regards to the ſtate, the conduct, and the character of *others*; and operates according to the degrees of their connection with us, to their powers of communicating or receiving from us either good or evil; to their actual enjoyments or their ſufferings; to their proſpects of future good, or expoſure to evil; to their occaſional or habitual deportment; and to the degrees of merit or demerit attached to their diſpoſitions

poſitions and conduct as conſcious and intelligent agents.

Numberleſs are the Paſſions, Emotions, and Affections proceeding from theſe different cauſes; and they vary in their complexion and character according to the peculiarities of their excitements. Yet they are all reducible to the two grand diſtinctions which have been already pointed out. They may be placed under the Cardinal Affections of *Love* and *Hatred*, in which *Good*, or *Evil* are the predominant ideas. Nor can there be a diſpoſition in this claſs of objects, or of ourſelves towards them, which may not, in one point of view or other, be ranged under theſe general heads.

It is obvious that theſe affections primarily relate to the *perſons* and *characters* of their objects. The *good* refers to that which we behold in them, or wiſh them to poſſeſs; and the *evil* to the ſuppoſed depravity of their characters, or the malevolence of diſpoſition we may entertain towards them. The predominant ideas therefore of good and evil reſpect theſe alone. The affections of love and hatred are excited by the immediate intereſt we take in their merits or their welfare, or the reſentments indulged againſt them; without immediate reference to concomitant circumſtances. Thus the love and deſire of good reſpecting their perſons, may often be connected with

the contemplation of the evils that ſurround them; and malevolent diſpoſitions may in ſome caſes be implanted by the contemplation of the good they poſſeſs, or have the proſpect of enjoying. In the ſocial affections, for example, which are inſpired by the diſtreſſes of our fellow-creatures, a compaſſionate heart cannot contemplate their ſituation, without contemplating their miſery. This neceſſarily fixes the attention upon the *evils* to which they are expoſed; yet as it is the benevolent principle which induces us to direct this attention towards their ſufferings, and as an ardent wiſh is inſpired that they may be reſcued from them, the love of good reſpecting them, is evidently the predominant principle.

On the other hand, it is very poſſible for us to be more diſpleaſed with the conduct of others than with our own; to entertain very *different* ideas of their characters, from thoſe we ſhould entertain of our own, were we preciſely in their ſituation; and alſo to wiſh to another much greater evils, than we ſhall ever wiſh to ourſelves. Theſe peculiarities may inſpire perſonal hatreds, which ſhall indicate themſelves not merely by malevolence, or actually wiſhing them evil, but alſo by deep reſentment at the good they actually enjoy. In this caſe, malevolence is predominant even in the act of contemplating good.

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No one general term is adapted to all thoſe paſſions and affections which belong to the ſocial principle. Dr. Hartley, however, has comprehended them all under the name or character of *Sympathy*; which he divides into four Claſſes: rejoicing at another's happineſs; grieving at his miſery; grieving at his happineſs; and rejoicing at his miſery. But the word *ſympathy*, whether we advert to its genuine import or common uſage, is ill adapted to the two laſt diviſions. The uſual idea of ſympathy is that of *ſuffering with* another; which is the moſt oppoſite poſſible to grieving at his happineſs, or rejoicing at his miſery: the laſt is not ſuffering, and the other is ſuffering in a manner directly contrary.

Theſe two oppoſite diſpoſitions are uſually expreſſed by the oppoſite terms *Benevolence* and *Malevolence*; the firſt referring to kindly diſpoſitions towards its objects, and the other to the reverſe. But ſhould they be the beſt terms we are able to employ, yet they are not entirely unexceptionable; as they do not always convey ideas perfectly correſpondent with the various differences compriſed under theſe general heads.

Benevolence ſignifying *good-will*, might, according to its etymology, be conſidered as applicable to *ourſelves* as well as to others; yet in its uſual acceptation the idea of *Self* is totally excluded; and

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it expreſſes a diſpoſition directly oppoſite to the *ſelfiſh* principle. This good-will does not indicate itſelf in all thoſe affections which are ranged under Benevolence. We may warmly commend ſome particular conduct, and admire peculiar excellencies, in thoſe for whom we entertain an indifference, or a degree of *ill-will*. Some characters inſpire us with the deepeſt reverence and awe; which affections, though they do not exclude benevolence, are not immediately inſpired by it. Notwithſtanding theſe ſlight objections, the word appears to be more deſerving of being employed as a *generic* term, than any other that can be adopted.

Were we more familiarized to the ſignification given to the term *Paſſion* in our introductory Chapter; were it confined to the idea of *paſſiveneſs*, whether the cauſe be of a pleaſing or diſpleaſing nature, then might we with the ſtricteſt propriety uſe the term *Sympathy* to expreſs a *fellow-feeling* with another, both upon joyful and mournful occaſions. It would be applicable to every coincidence of ſenſation, ſentiment, and diſpoſition, comprehending our good wiſhes, good opinions, and that benignity which rejoices in their proſperity.

But even in this caſe, *Sympathy* can only be applied to incidental indications of benevolence, and is not to be ſubſtituted for the word itſelf. It will have the ſame relation to the benevolent principle

as

as *deſire* has to that of *Love*. The principle of benevolence prediſpoſes to theſe ſocial virtues, and ſympathy engages in particular acts of benevolence. To this ſenſe its etymology neceſſarily confines it; for we can neither ſuffer with another, nor have any kind of ſenſation in common with him, until he be placed in certain ſituations, with which we are become acquainted.

There are much ſtronger objections to the word *Malevolence* as a generic term, than to the preceding. It always conveys the idea of *ill-will* to a conſiderable degree. But there are hourly inſtances of diſplacency, and even of anger and reſentment, without any mixture of that ill-will it deſcribes. In ſome caſes, painful reſentments may be excited by the pureſt *good-will;* as in the anger of a parent towards his child, on account of conduct prejudicial to his welfare. Even the momentary ill-will indulged by a paſſionate man, ſeeking revenge for injuries received, deſerves not to be ſtigmatized by the odious name of malevolence, which conveys the idea of permanent ill-will.

For the above reaſons, and from a reluctance to uſe a term ſo malevolent in its complexion and character more frequently than abſolute neceſſity demands, I beg leave to ſubſtitute *diſplacency* as a generic term. Its ſuperior propriety will be manifeſt

feſt from the conſideration, that every inſtance of *malevolence* is an indication of *diſplacency* to a high degree, although the latter is not at all times an indication of the former.

The Reader will not be diſpoſed to cenſure as ſuperfluous theſe minute inveſtigations, reſpecting the ſignification of terms, when he recollects that the want of preciſion has been the grand ſource of confuſion of ideas even among philoſophers. The leaſt difference in our conceptions reſpecting the force of words may direct to very different concluſions; the ſmalleſt deviation from the requiſite point of the compaſs, will in a ſhort time ſteer the veſſel into an improper latitude.

In the proſecution of our Analyſis under this Second Claſs, or in tracing the Paſſions and Affections which belong to the *ſocial* Principle, I ſhall according to the plan propoſed, divide the ſubject into two Orders; the firſt belonging to the principle of *Benevolence*, in which the idea of *Good* is the more immediate and predominant idea; and the ſecond to *Diſplacency*, in which the idea of *Evil* prevails.

The *benevolent* principle may refer to *good deſires* and *diſpoſitions*, and to *good opinions*: which form two diſtinct kinds or genera. *Diſplacency* may alſo be

be divided into two kinds; *Malevolence*, properly ſo called; and disfavourable opinion, or diſplacency according to its uſual ſignification.

ORDER I.

Paſſions and Affections excited by Benevolence, in which GOOD *is the predominant Idea.*

I. Thoſe which reſpect *Benevolent Deſires* and *Diſpoſitions.*

IN our general remarks concerning *Love* as a Principle, we inevitably anticipated ſome things which properly belong to this branch of our Subject. It was then hinted, that our benevolent diſpoſitions may be directed towards thoſe who are connected with us in various degrees of relation or intimacy; to the whole human race indiſcriminately, in which it is termed *Philanthropy;* and to all beings

beings rendered capable of any portion of enjoyment; or *univerſal benevolence*, according to the moſt extenſive ſenſe of the expreſſion.

It will not be neceſſary, in the proceſs of our inveſtigation, to have the diſtinction between the two latter claſſes always in our view. The diſpoſitions towards each claſs are ſimilar; though the former, from the ſuperior importance of its objects, are uſually ſtrongeſt; and from the diverſity of their ſituations, admit of a greater variety of correſpondent affections. Both may be comprehended under the title of *general benevolence.*

It will however be neceſſary to remark, that the benevolence which reſpects our moſt intimate connections, approximates very cloſely to the principle of *Self-love.* It conſiders every thing belonging to its immediate objects, as belonging alſo to ourſelves, and thus conſtitutes one common intereſt. Of this kind are all thoſe connections which form the intimate relations of life, and create ſo large a portion of its happineſs or miſery. Such are the *conjugal*, *parental*, *filial*, *fraternal* relations, various degrees of conſanguinity, and particular friendſhips. Here the habitual attachments, and benignant diſpoſitions which the mind experiences, aſſume the character of *affections*, by way of pre-eminence. For it is in theſe relations that the kindly affections manifeſt the greateſt warmth and conſtancy. The general

general objects of our *philanthropy* may poſſeſs a portion of our *good-will*, without particular intereſt being habitually taken in their welfare. The *operation* of this principle is confined to particular caſes and ſituations, in which they may be incidentally placed. Thoſe animals to which we are the moſt ſtrongly attached, or that we may have appropriated to ourſelves, are conſidered as ſuſtaining an occaſional, and accidental connection; and where they are the moſt requiſite for our uſe and comfort, we chiefly value them as the inſtruments and means of our convenience and pleaſure. Their influence is chiefly temporary. They are transferred with little regret. The mind may become verſatile and changeable towards them, without the imputation of cruelty or injuſtice. But in the ſocial relation, the kindly affections *dwell* with the well-diſpoſed mind, and are *perpetually operative*.

Theſe ſocial affections may ariſe from various cauſes, which give them their diſtinguiſhing characteriſtics, and poſſeſs various degrees of ſtrength, which in moſt caſes is regulated by the degrees of their utility. Some are deemed inſtinctive: that is, originally implanted in the breaſt without the conſcious aid of reaſon, or reflection. The love of parents for their offſpring is adduced as an evidence of inſtinctive affection. This is obſervable in perſons, who ſeem to have eradicated every other ſocial

cial affection. They ſtill retain a ſolicitude for their young, after they have rendered themſelves ſtrangers to every other virtue; and indulge a fondneſs *here* amidſt the greateſt animoſities againſt thoſe around them. But whatever ideas we may affix to the word *inſtinct*, ſelf-love ſeems to form its baſis. Parents manifeſtly contemplate their children as *ſcions* from the ſtem; and the ſelfiſh affections accompany them not only as being their own repreſentatives, but as *ſecond ſelves*. The ſuperior ſtrength of affection natural to the female breaſt, which receives a daily increaſe by unremitted habits of care and attention, gives the appearance of a much ſtronger inſtinct to the *maternal*, than to the *paternal* affections.

Some of the ſocial affections ariſe from the perception or perſuaſion of amiable qualities perſonal or mental, for which a ſtrong predilection is formed; as in the *conjugal* relation. This predelictiion having alſo a *ſexual* influence, may become a *paſſion* the moſt impetuous and ungovernable. The ſexual paſſion is rendered remarkable for its contrarieties. It may be conſidered as the moſt generous and the moſt ſelfiſh; at once the moſt intereſted, and the moſt diſintereſted. It is ready to ſacrifice every thing, even life itſelf for the beloved object; but is anxious to appropriate the beloved object entirely to itſelf.

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Where the impetuoſity of paſſion is not ſucceeded by indifference, it gives place to the milder and more permanent joys of *conjugal* affection.

Filial affections, if they do not originate from, are cloſely connected with an early ſenſe of ſuperiority; united with a perception that this ſuperiority is exerciſed in perpetual cares and acts of kindneſs.

Fraternal affection owes much of its ſtrength to the cloſeſt habits of intimacy, the perception of one common intereſt, and an impreſſive ſenſe of the ineſtimable value of domeſtic harmony.

The *friendly affections* are inſpired by the contemplation of pleaſing qualities, and the perception of a ſimilarity in diſpoſitions. They are always cheriſhed by reciprocal acts of kindneſs.

All theſe connections may be ſaid to relate moſt intimately to *Self*. They manifeſt an *adoption* of others into our hearts. They blend and intermix intereſts ſo completely, that the ardent deſire of good towards the particular objects of theſe affections is not conſidered as a branch of *diſintereſted* benevolence. All the Paſſions and Affections which have been enumerated under the preceding Claſs, as primarily belonging to the *ſelfiſh* principle, may be excited by the ſtate and ſituation of thoſe we love, with equal, and ſometimes with ſuperior vigour. In events incidental to them,

Joy, deſire, hope, ſorrow, fear, anger, become as quick and impetuous as in caſes where our own intereſts are excluſively concerned: and wherever the Univerſal Parent has conſtituted us the agents or the guardians of the good fortune of others, we enjoy the affections of ſatisfaction, contentment, complacency, &c. according to the degrees of their proſperity, or the value of circumſtances contributing to it, as if this good immediately pertained to *ourſelves*.

To the good-will which extends itſelf beyond the circle of perſonal attachments, and with which our own permanent welfare is not ſo intimately connected; to the good-will which is often exerciſed towards *ſtrangers*, and which is ſometimes exerciſed by generous minds towards *enemies*, is the title of *Benevolence* uſually applied. Becauſe it is here that the innate benignity of diſpoſition appears the moſt conſpicuouſly. In theſe inſtances of good-will nothing *ſelfiſh* appears. The benevolence acquires the character of being *pure* and *diſintereſted*.

Conſidering this benevolence as a principle conſtituting a prediſpoſition, or a readineſs of temper to act in a manner correſpondent to the particular ſituation of the object, the direct operation of this principle will manifeſt itſelf by emotions and affections

tions to which the term SYMPATHY ſeems to be peculiarly applicable.

According to the obſervations already made upon *Sympathy*, it may be conſidered as an inward feeling, which is excited by the particular and extraordinary ſituation of another; or which harmonizes with the condition and feelings of its object. Sympathy indicates a mind attuned to correſpondent vibrations, whether they be of the pleaſing or diſpleaſing kind. Conſequently it operates with various degrees of ſtrength, according to the degrees of danger to which its objects may be expoſed; to the miſery they ſuffer, and the aggravating circumſtances attending it; to the good fortune with which they are ſurpriſed and delighted; and to their capacities of receiving good. It alſo diſpoſes the mind to accommodate itſelf to the taſtes, diſpoſitions, and manners of others in the ſocial intercourſes of life.

In this enlarged ſenſe of the term may ſympathy be conſidered as a *paſſion*, an *affection*, and a *diſpoſition*.

In ſome urgent and extraordinary caſes, ſympathy riſes into an emotion, which yields not in ſtrength and exertions to the moſt violent of the *ſelfiſh* paſſions. When its object is ſuddenly expoſed to ſome inſtantaneous and tremendous danger which demands immediate aid, the whole ſoul is devoted

voted to the ſufferer. *Danger* and *relief* are the thoughts which occupy the mind, to the total excluſion of every other. Impelled by this irreſiſtible emotion, the ſympathizer plunges into the ocean and braves its billows, or ruſhes into the midſt of flames to ſnatch a wretched victim from deſtruction. He is inſenſible to perſonal danger where it is the greateſt. I will not ſay that he does not liſten to the ſuggeſtions of prudence, as prudential thoughts are not ſuggeſted. There is no paſſion, excepting anger approaching to madneſs, which reſembles the heedleſs impetuoſity of this emotion. Rage, eager to puniſh an offence or revenge an inſult, will alſo ruſh into danger, and expoſe its own life in order to glut its paſſion; but its pallid countenance and the tremour of its limbs, indicate that *Self* is by no means forgotten. The impulſe of ſympathy renders the generous mind completely courageous. It is a ſtranger to *perſonal* fear; all its anxieties are transferred to the perils of the object.

When the evil is leſs ſudden and alarming; when it is apparently of a permanent nature, ſympathy with diſtreſs becomes an *affection*.

Sympathetic affections are diſtinguiſhed into various ſpecies, and diſcriminated by various appellations, according to the peculiarities attendant upon their cauſe, or the particular ſtate of their object.

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They may be divided into thoſe which reſpect *Diſtreſs*, *Proſperity*, and *Imitation*.

Of thoſe which reſpect *Diſtreſs*, the following are the principal.

Compaſſion. Compaſſion is that ſpecies of affection, which is excited either by the actual diſtreſs of its object, or by ſome impending calamity which appears inevitable. It is a benevolent ſorrow at their ſufferings or approaching miſery. The etymology of the word expreſſes this idea with ſtrict propriety; as it ſignifies *ſuffering with the object.*

Compaſſion is always connected with a diſpoſition to relieve, and will always prompt to vigorous exertions, wherever there is a poſſibility of ſucceſs; unleſs ſome important conſiderations ſhould render the endeavour improper or unjuſt.

Compaſſion has no neceſſary connection with the *character* of its objects. Their *diſtreſs* is a ſufficient excitement. It is frequently exerciſed upon the unworthy, whoſe reiterated imprudences or vicious conduct, may have been the cauſe of their wretchedneſs. From the great extent and univerſality of this affection, it may juſtly be conſidered as a generic name, comprehending ſeveral other affections which have a more ſpecific application; as *Mercy*, *Commiſeration*, *Pity*, *&c.*

Mercy is the moſt exalted branch of compaſſion. It particularly refers to that ſtate of mind, which induces us to exerciſe our compaſſion upon perſons whoſe fate is in ſome reſpect at our diſpoſal. It induces us to relinquiſh demands, which, if enforced to the utmoſt, would render us the immediate agents of miſery. It is peculiarly applicable to unworthy or criminal behaviour towards ourſelves, which would inevitably involve the offender in diſtreſs were we to be tenacious of our rights. In a word, it is that dignified compaſſion which induces us to ſuppreſs reſentment, to pardon offences, or mitigate puniſhments as far as diſcretion may admit.

Commiſeration. Although this term ſeems ſynonymous with the preceding, yet in its general uſe it is ſomewhat different. It is always preferred when we wiſh to expreſs our ſympathy for misfortunes, which it is not in our power to remove; or for which there is no apparent remedy. Commiſeration ruminates upon the ſtate and ſufferings of others, which induces a permanent concern. In ſuch caſes it may be ſaid that we *commiſerate* the unfortunate ſufferer, rather than that we have compaſſion with him. But although this is a more helpleſs, it is not an uſeleſs affection. It ſooths the mind of the afflicted, and greatly alleviates their ſorrows, when every other conſolation fails. *Condolence* is the expreſſion of our commiſeration.

Pity

Pity is alſo ſimilar to the two preceding affections; but it is more frequently applied to particular circumſtances in the ſtate and ſituation of the object, rather than his immediate *feelings*. Thus we often pity thoſe who have no pity upon themſelves; whoſe diſpoſitions and conduct are leading them into evils, of which they entertain no apprehenſions, or concerning which they are not ſolicitous. The decrepit and infirm alſo are the objects of our pity, though they may ſuſtain their infirmities with an enviable cheerfulneſs. Children rendered deſtitute of worthy and affectionate parents, and expoſed to future calamities of which they are unconſcious, are deemed peculiar objects of pity. Nay their ignorance of their misfortunes augments the force of our ſympathetic feelings.

Generoſity is the diſpoſition which prompts us to beſtow favours, which are not the purchaſe of any particular merit. It has not, like mercy, any immediate relation either to imprudences or criminality. It is compounded of benevolence with a degree of ſympathy with ſome peculiarities in the ſtate or circumſtances of another, which demand our aid, either in the remiſſion of pecuniary claims, in voluntary grants, or in donations and benefactions to aſſiſt their indigence. It generally relates to ſome conceſſions, ſacrifices, or peculiar exertions that have been made in the exerciſe of the benevolent

nevolent principle. The extent of generoſity is meaſured by the advantages and pleaſures which have been relinquiſhed in favour of another; or according to the troubles and difficulties which have been encountered by the benefactor on the one hand, and the ſlender pretenſions of the object to theſe benevolent offices, on the other.

Liberality has ſometimes a ſimilar import with generoſity. Sometimes it has a particular reference to the largeneſs of pecuniary or other donations. In the preſent day it is frequently applied to *ſentiments* reſpecting another. It is uſed in oppoſition to a narrow contracted mode of thinking, or to a cenſorious diſpoſition inſpired by a difference of opinion. It expreſſes a freedom from the bias of prejudice or partiality. The man who is diſpoſed to think well of, and act with kindneſs towards perſons whoſe religious or political creed differs materially from his own, is deemed *liberal-minded*.

Thus may liberality be conſidered as a ſpecies of generoſity, which uſage chiefly applies to free donations, or to ſubduing unfavourable prepoſſeſſions reſpecting the opinions of another. It is a liberation from the confined manner of acting, or thinking, which characterizes either the parſimonious, or the bigot.

Charity in its original import is ſynonymous with Love. In its application it is ſometimes uſed to expreſs

expreſs a diſpoſition to entertain a favourable opinion of the moral character or conduct of others, in oppoſition to unfavourable reports, until the ſtrongeſt evidences implant conviction. At other times it ſignifies giving of alms, and doing good to inferiors. Benevolent interference in behalf of the wretched, or the oppreſſed, are deemed acts of charity.

Condeſcenſion is that ſpecies of benevolence, which deſignedly waves the ſuppoſed advantages of birth, title, or ſtation, in order to accommodate ourſelves to the ſtate of an inferior, and diminiſh that reſtraint which the apparent diſtance is calculated to produce in him. It greatly enhances the value of every other ſpecies of benevolence.

From the above Analyſis we perceive that Mercy, Commiſeration, Pity, Liberality, &c. are different branches of Compaſſion adapted to the peculiar ſituation and exigencies of its objects. While compaſſion relates to diſtreſs in general without minute diſtinctions, its ramifications reſpect *criminality* of character or conduct, the *permanency* of diſtreſs, *ſtates* and *ſituations* which ſtrike us as peculiarly unfortunate, *minuter exigencies*, *reputation*, and *inferiority* of ſtation. It is not always requiſite to give to each ſpecies of compaſſion its appropriate term; yet the diverſity of misfortunes, and the diverſe

verſe alleviations of each, have imperceptibly introduced a correſpondent phraſeology, which in particular caſes, manifeſts its peculiar propriety.

Another important branch of Benevolence conſiſts in partaking of the *good fortune* of others; in the participation of their joy, upon the acceſſion of good, or liberation from evil.

If the term ſympathy be employed in this connection, it will denote a pleaſurable ſenſation excited within us, ſimilar to that enjoyed by the primary participant of good.

It is obſervable that no particular terms are appropriated to this ſpecies of ſympathy. There are no nice diſcriminations which indicate the different kinds of good, or the circumſtances relative to it, in a manner correſpondent with thoſe which have been traced under ſympathetic ſorrow. Freedom from diſtreſs, or the increaſe of actual enjoyment, produce, as it were, one ſimple effect upon the mind of the benevolent ſympathizer, without thoſe various and more complicated ſenſations which a diverſity in misfortunes may occaſion. Theſe pleaſing ſenſations can only be expreſſed by the general terms of *joy*, *gladneſs*, *happineſs*, *&c.* We *rejoice* at the fortunate event which has made another happy; we are *glad* to hear of their ſucceſs; are *happy* to be informed of their welfare, &c.

In

In ſome inſtances this ſpecies of benevolence becomes a very lively emotion, and the ſudden impulſe of joy may emulate that inſpired by our own good fortune, although the object ſhould be almoſt a ſtranger to us. When, for example, our minds have been previouſly and deeply affected with the knowledge of his diſtreſs; when a proſperous change has *ſuddenly* taken place; and particularly when this change has been accompliſhed by the triumph of the party over cruelty and oppreſſion. In ſuch caſes, we enjoy this ſudden tranſition from painful to pleaſing ſympathy, and we participate in that exultation over tyranny or injuſtice, to which every man entertains an hatred, unleſs it be his own act.

But excepting upon extraordinary occaſions of this nature, our ſympathies with the good fortune of others, are much inferior in ſtrength to thoſe we experience from their diſtreſs. Various reaſons may be aſſigned for this difference. The influence of many bleſſings newly acquired may not be ſo extenſive and important, as the influence of a ſingle calamity.—It is ſcarcely poſſible for any one to be elevated to the pinnacle of happineſs, in ſo rapid a manner as he may be plunged into the depth of diſtreſs.—Good fortune, to whatever ſtate or circumſtances we may apply the term, is generally of ſlower progreſs, is accumulated by almoſt imperceptible

ble degrees, and therefore is not calculated to make a vivid impreſſion at any one period of its progreſs.—The object may be more deeply afflicted in his relative and ſocial connections by the misfortunes or irregular conduct of an individual, than he could feel himſelf benefited by their proſperity; conſequently were we to ſympathize with him in a manner correſpondent with his own feelings, joyful events could not make an impreſſion upon us equal to his afflictions.—Again; thoſe diſtreſſes which call forth our ſympathy of ſorrow are generally promulgated to a conſiderable extent, while their recent acquiſitions of good, with all the ſtriking circumſtances attending them, are moſtly confined to the narrow circle of their relatives and friends.—To theſe incidental cauſes, we may juſtly add the wiſe conſtitution of our natures as the *final* cauſe. Sympathy with the diſtreſſes of another is infinitely more uſeful than rejoicing in his proſperity. It is an incentive to adminiſter relief, to annihilate this diſtreſs, and to reſtore the ſufferer to the priſtine ſtate of eaſe and comfort; and therefore is it rendered, by the Great Source of Benevolence, more powerful in its influence and operations, than the ſympathy of joy in their welfare; which cannot be productive of equal good. The different kinds of ſympathetic ſorrow are admirably adapted to the particular ſtate of its objects, in order that each may

may receive its correſpondent benefit. Theſe conſiderations will explain the reaſon why an inſenſibility to the misfortunes of any one, is much more opprobrious than an indifference to his actual enjoyments.

The immediate *expreſſions* of our joy are termed *Congratulations*.

All the affections excited by the contemplation of good or evil which relate to others, are manifeſtly compound. Sympathy with ſufferings, is compoſed of benevolence and *ſorrow;* and cordial congratulations are the effuſions of benevolence and *joy*.

It is obſervable that in the benevolence we are now contemplating, the affection of Love is not neceſſarily placed upon the object perſonally, on account of any excellence of character, or peculiar amiableneſs of diſpoſition. It loves the welfare of another, unconnected with his virtues. The capacity of enjoyment is a ſufficient motive for attempting to impart it ; and a ſtate of diſtreſs is a ſufficient incitement to attempt relief. In its nobleſt exertions benevolence indicates itſelf by the communication of good, in oppoſition to evil deſerts, and in a ſtrong propenſity to protect from miſery, which the bad conduct of the party has not been able to ſubdue.

ſubdue. It becomes a deſire of promoting happineſs too ardent to be extinguiſhed, by injury itſelf.

Sympathy is alſo applicable to the ſociableneſs of the human character; to the nature of man as formed to live in ſociety. This is manifeſted by the reciprocal pleaſure and ſatisfaction we experience in our daily intercourſe; by the eagerneſs with which we receive and communicate tidings that intereſt our fellow-men; by the love of imitation, and the readineſs with which we conform to the cuſtom, manners, and diſpoſitions, and acquieſce in the opinions of others, without attention to the higher authority of propriety or impropriety, or weighing motives and arguments in the balance of reaſon. In ſhort, it reſpects every act, habit, and ſentiment, of which to participate in common is gratifying to our natures, and conſtitutes ſo large a portion of the enjoyments and ſeductions of life.

This ſympathetic imitation brings us by imperceptible degrees to our Second Diviſion.

II. The Affections derived from *Good Opinion.*

In

In this Claſs of Social Affections the operations of the Benevolent Principle are not ſo immediate. Though benevolence is aſſociated, it is not the primary agent: it is rather a conſequence than a cauſe. Theſe affections are inſpired by an impreſſive ſenſe of ſome ſpecies of excellence in character; and they may be placed upon objects, whoſe ſituations do not require either our ſympathetic joys or ſorrows. Theſe are moſt properly expreſſed by *complacential regards;* as they conſiſt both in the approbation of the mind, and feelings of the heart; as they relate to conduct and qualities, concerning which our judgment pronounces that they poſſeſs merit, while they are rendered intereſting by virtue of our ſocial connections.

The nature of complacency, as it refers either to ourſelves, or to our moſt intimate connections, has already been conſidered.* I ſhall only obſerve in this place, that when we are rendered participants of good from thoſe qualities which are the proper objects of complacency; or when we contemplate peculiar marks of mental or moral excellencies in others with whom we are converſant, our *approbation* is accompanied with various degrees of affection for them, although they may not be within the ſphere of our intimacy.

* See Page 66, paſſim.

Of

Of theſe affections the following are the moſt conſpicuous.

Gratitude. Gratitude is a pleaſant affection excited by a lively ſenſe of benefits received or intended, or even by the deſire of being beneficial. In its ſtrength it is the powerful re-action of a well-diſpoſed mind, upon whom benevolence has conferred ſome important good. It is always connected with an impreſſive ſenſe of the amiable diſpoſition of the perſon by whom the benefit is conferred, and it immediately produces a perſonal affection towards him. When the affection operates according to the natural courſe of influence, it will be correſpondent to the importance of the good obtained, the diſtance in ſtation between the recipient and his benefactor, the ſmallneſs of his claims, perhaps the conſciouſneſs of deſerving very oppoſite treatment. Theſe circumſtances unite to warm the heart into raptures. The grateful mind is impatient of a ſilent and paſſive reception of the bleſſing. It cannot be reſtrained from acknowledging its obligations, either by expreſſions or deeds. It conſiders every return in its power as an act of the ſtricteſt juſtice; nor is it deterred by difficulties or dangers from making the attempt. The term moſt familiarly employed was originally ſuggeſted by this idea. The *obligation* is perceived, and felt; and the perſon benefited conſiders himſelf as *bound* in honour and

and juſtice, either to repay or acknowledge the debt, by a bond that cannot be cancelled.

We ſhall not wonder at the peculiar ſtrength and energy of this affection, when we conſider that it is compounded of *love* placed upon the good communicated, *affection* for the donor, and *joy* at the reception. Thus it has goodneſs for its object, and the moſt pleaſing, perhaps *unexpected* exertions of goodneſs for its immediate cauſe.

Thankfulneſs refers to verbal expreſſions of gratitude.

Admiration. Although there is ſcarcely a word in more familiar uſe than the term *admiration*, yet much ambiguity attends its preciſe ſignification: nor have authors of the greateſt celebrity been uniform in the ſenſe they have affixed to it. Sometimes it has been deemed ſynonymous with ſurpriſe, ſometimes it is uſed to expreſs wonder; ſometimes it is applied to ſubjects, as a mark of degradation; at others, as expreſſive of excellencies.

In Milton's Paradiſe Loſt, it is more than once employed to denote *wonder*.

> ——Let none *admire*
> That riches grow in *hell*.——
>
> BOOK I. L. 690.

In the following paſſage of Shakeſpear, it obvi-

ouſly ſignifies *wonder* and *aſtoniſhment*. Lady Macbeth ſays to her huſband, terrified at the ſight of Banquo's Ghoſt,

You have diſplac'd the mirth, broke the good meeting, with moſt *admired* diſorder.

MACBETH.

Mr. Pope has uſed it to expreſs the indiſcriminating applauſe of ignorance :

For FOOLS *admire*, but Men of Senſe *approve*.

Mr. Grove defines admiration to be "that ſud-"den ſurpriſe at the novelty of an object, by "which the ſoul is faſtened down to the contem-"plation of it." He alſo aſſerts that "according "to the different character of its object, it is called "*eſteem* or *contempt*."

Theſe ſignifications have doubtleſs been given in conformity to the Latin words *miror* and *admiratio*, which are equally expreſſive of ſurpriſe, wonder, aſtoniſhment, and that vivid pleaſure which the ſudden perception of ſome ſpecies of excellency is calculated to produce in the mind.

But in the moſt pertinent and appropriate uſe of the terms to *admire* and *admiration*, they are manifeſtly deviating from a generic to a ſpecific ſenſe; and in proportion to our advances in preciſion and accuracy.

accuracy, we feel not only the advantage but the *neceſſity* of applying them to ſome kind of *excellency* excluſively; otherwiſe we ſhall be deſtitute of words to diſcriminate the fineſt feelings of the ſoul, from thoſe which are common to the moſt ignorant and uncultivated. Even idiots may be ſurpriſed, the moſt ignorant may wonder, and frequently do wonder the moſt; but neither of them are ſuſceptible of that impreſſion which is beſt expreſſed by *admiration.*

If we adhere ſtedfaſtly to the rule, that no two words are perfectly ſynonymous which cannot be uſed with equal propriety in every poſſible connection; we ſhall find that admiration is as ſuperior to ſurpriſe and wonder ſimply conſidered, as knowledge is ſuperior to ignorance: for its appropriate ſignification is that act of the mind, by which we diſcover, approve, and enjoy ſome unuſual ſpecies of excellence.

The authority of Poets is of little weight, when we aim at philoſophical preciſion. Their object is to produce ſome ſtriking effect; and this muſt be accompliſhed by other means than by dividing and ſubdividing ideas into their component parts. Their ſubjects frequently borrow ſtrength from auxiliary thoughts, and they claim a licenſe to preſs ſuch expreſſions into their ſervice, which are moſt conducive to their purpoſe, though ſtrictly ſpeak-

ing they are of foreign import. As the ancient Poets, by the perſonification of attributes and characters, have peopled both Worlds with innumerable deities, which reaſon has found it very difficult to expel; thus have Poets in general by the uſe of tropes and figures, by availing themſelves of reſemblances and affinities, given energy to their thoughts at the expence of preciſion. They have repreſented things which *are not*, as if they *were*; and thus impoſed a taſk upon philoſophy, to diſcriminate the differences which they have confounded.

Our beſt proſe writers, whoſe ſubject demands an attention to juſt diſtinctions, generally apply admiration to ſome degree of excellency.

"When we have thoſe elevated ideas of nature," ſays Mr. Dryden, "the reſult of that view is *admi-*
"*ration*, which is always the cauſe of pleaſure." Mr. Addiſon obſerves, that "neither Virgil nor "Horace would have gained ſo great reputation "had they not been friends, and *admirers* of each "other." In the following paſſage, Archbiſhop Tillotſon gives a full and ſatisfactory explanation of the term. "There is a pleaſure in admiration, "and this is that which properly cauſes admiration, "when we diſcover a great deal in an object which "we underſtand to be excellent: and yet we ſee "we know not how much more beyond that which

"our

" our underſtandings cannot fully reach and com-
" prehend." (See Note *Q*.)

That excellence which is the ſubject of admiration, may either conſiſt in the intellectual powers of mind, or diſpoſitions of the heart. Admiration may be excited by the contemplation of greatneſs and extent of genius, by indications of ſuperior talents, by plans and projects which diſcover great ingenuity in contrivance and invention, or unuſual ſkill in the execution. It is often excited by extraordinary exertions of benevolence ; ſuch as dangers encountered to protect and ſave a friend, a ſtranger, or an enemy ; the greatneſs of the ſacrifice made to miſery, and the compaſſion that excites to extraordinary acts of mercy. In ſhort the objective cauſe of admiration is whatever indicates a ſuperior degree of wiſdom, ingenuity, good ſenſe, or benevolence. To ſuch qualities it is properly confined. *Power* abſtractedly conſidered is not the object of admiration ; though the dignified or benevolent exertions of power to the production of good, may excite the higheſt degree of admiration, and render it a very ſtrong emotion.

It is obvious that the range of admiration is from the ſimpler approbation of the mind up to the moſt lively ſenſation, according to our conceptions of the extent of excellence, and alſo the degrees of our intereſt in its effects. It is alſo blended with

various other emotions according to different circumſtances attendant upon the paſſion. It is frequently introduced by *ſurpriſe;* when for example, the diſcovery of theſe excellencies is ſudden and unexpected; and then it becomes a vivid emotion. It is generally connected with ſome degree of *wonder;* as we are ſo frequently ignorant of the cauſes which enabled any one greatly to excel ourſelves or others: but as it is always excited by the real *diſcovery* of ſome qualities, it is not to be confounded with an emotion that proceeds from ignorance and embarraſſment, previous to the diſcovery. When the evidences of wiſdom or goodneſs exceed our utmoſt comprehenſion, or proceed far beyond the uſual extent of excellence itſelf, they may excite aſtoniſhment.

Whatever is good, or productive of good is the proper object of love; excellence muſt of conſequence be peculiarly calculated to excite the affection in a ſuperior degree; hence the pleaſing and intimate connection between love and admiration. When theſe are united with gratitude, they conſtitute the happieſt and ſublimeſt affections of the ſoul. When the object manifeſts extraordinary benevolence; when immeaſurable extent of wiſdom and goodneſs direct power to execute their purpoſe; and incalculable advantages are the iſſue of their united operations, admiration ſwells into delectable aſtoniſh-

aſtoniſhment, and our conſcious incapacity to fathom is an augmentation of enjoyment.

Eſteem is the value we place upon ſome degree of worth. It is higher than ſimple *approbation*, which is a deciſion of the judgment. Eſteem is the commencement of affection. It is a degree of love entertained for others on account of their pleaſing qualities, though they ſhould not immediately intereſt ourſelves; by which it is diſtinguiſhed from *gratitude*. The term is peculiarly applicable to virtuous and amiable diſpoſitions of the heart, ſuch as honeſty, integrity, patience, kindneſs, gentleneſs, &c. which have no neceſſary connection with the underſtanding. It is alſo applicable to thoſe of whom we have ſome knowledge, but who are at a remote diſtance from our intimacy. Thus we eſteem the character of a perſon merely from the report of his good qualities.

Reſpect is that favourable impreſſion which the goodneſs of a character has made upon the perſon contemplating it, united with a ſhare of *good ſenſe*. An union of both theſe qualities is requiſite. Goodneſs alone is not ſufficient to create reſpect. For ſhould it be ſeated in a mind that indicates extreme imbecillity, it cannot be deemed reſpectable. On the other hand, ſuperior ſenſe in a mind deſtitute of goodneſs, will not inſpire reſpect. It will either

waſte itſelf in idle ſpeculations, which renders it indifferent to us; or it may degenerate into low cunning, which renders it hateful. Should it be connected with power in a wicked and perverſe mind, it will excite horror and diſmay; which are very remote from reſpect.

This affection is always connected with a cautious diſpoſition not to diſoblige its objects; inſpiring a ſolicitude to obtain their good-will.

Veneration is a higher degree of reſpect, in which the mind ſeems to be more forcibly ſtruck with *wiſdom*, connected with the ſterner virtues. Hence we ſpeak of characters which are more *venerable* than amiable. The term is chiefly applicable to wiſdom matured by years; or connected with ſome peculiar dignity of title or office, and indicated by integrity and uprightneſs. Thus we ſpeak of venerable anceſtors, venerable parents, magiſtrates, &c. from a preſumption of their ſuperiority in wiſdom.

Awe is the impreſſion made upon us by the lively idea of power; a power which would inſpire diſtreſſing fear or terror, were it not modified by other circumſtances and qualities ſuggeſting the idea of ſafety. It may be inſpired by things inanimate, where the perception of irreſiſtible power is united with a confidence of ſafety. Thus lofty mountains, ſteep precipices, deep caverns, the tempeſtuous ocean

ocean inſpire the mind with awe in ſituations where they cannot injure us. When the emotion is inſpired by *character*, it acknowledges a power reſtrained from pernicious exertions either by juſtice or benevolence.

Reverence is the veneration paid to ſuperior ſanctity, intermixed with a certain degree of awe. It is the high reſpect paid to the ſacred character of its object, attended with a conſcious inferiority in moral worth. Eſteem and reſpect may be inſpired by the qualities obſervable in our *equals*, and the former more particularly in our *inferiors*; but veneration, awe, and reverence imply various degrees of *ſuperiority* in their objects.

It is manifeſt from the above Analyſis, that the qualities which influence our favourable opinions, are various degrees and modifications of *goodneſs*, *wiſdom*, and *power*; that ſome of our complacential affections are inſpired by the predominance of one, ſome by the predominance of another; and in ſome there is almoſt an indiſtinguiſhable union. Gratitude refers to goodneſs indicated by our reception of benefits. *Eſteem* refers to goodneſs in its feebleſt indications, and therefore it is that we frequently expreſs our eſteem for the good qualities of the heart in any one, more than for the ſoundneſs of his underſtanding. Reſpect and veneration refer

ſer to various degrees of wiſdom, or intellectual power united with goodneſs; and awe may relate either to phyſical or intellectual power, which becomes impreſſive without inſpiring dread.

Reverence relates to ſuperiority in moral endowments, connected with awe at intellectual powers, and a conſciouſneſs of our own deficiencies upon a comparative view. *Admiration* may refer to an unuſual diſplay of either of theſe qualities, ſeparately; or to the union of them in an extraordinary degree.

As ſelf-complacency has its counterfeit in pride and vanity, thus are the complacential affections liable to abuſe, and give riſe to the following imperfections.

Fondneſs. Though this affection is frequently pardonable, and ſometimes amiable, yet it is an acknowledged weakneſs. It indicates an attachment to whatever belongs to us, or is immediately connected with us, far beyond its intrinſic merit. Sometimes it is inſpired ſimply by the idea of its being our own property; ſometimes it is contracted or ſtrengthened by habit; ſometimes it is the exceſs of love, where love is moſt natural, which indicates itſelf by infantile manners, or culpable indulgences; and ſometimes it is the degree of affection manifeſted

ed to inferior animals, to which their ſuperiors have a much better claim.

Partiality. This is ſuch an exceſs of perſonal attachment as obſcures the judgment, or corrupts the heart. It inclines to a favourable opinion of the motives, conduct, and general merit of its object that is inconſiſtent with the juſtice due to others.

When any of the ſocial and ſympathetic affections are very ſtrong they riſe to emotions, and produce ſome correſpondent tokens in the countenance. Complacency indicates itſelf by ineffable ſmiles; the countenance becomes animated, and the eyes ſparkle with delight. Sympathetic joy manifeſts itſelf by the indications characteriſtic of joy. Sympathy with diſtreſs retains ſomething of the benignant ſmile, mixed with marks of dejection, of deep concern, or inward anguiſh. When admiration riſes into tranſport, all the ſymptoms peculiar to ſurpriſe are ſometimes mixed with marks of complacential love, and ſometimes checked by veneration and awe, in which ſome portion of fearful apprehenſion free from abſolute dread becomes an ingredient.

In all theſe ſympathetic affections, the eye is the moſt expreſſive. It is properly termed the *Index of the Soul.* Particular attitudes and geſtures, and the various forms and plaits of the features may be coun-

counterfeited by the unfeeling heart. But it cannot ſo eaſily imitate the briſk ſuffuſions of joy, the ſympathetic tear, the deep veneration and awe, and the eager admiration, which real feelings tranſmit immediately from the heart into that wonderful organ.

ORDER II.

Paſſions and Affections excited by Diſplacency, in which EVIL *is the predominant Idea.*

THE reaſon for preferring the word *Diſplacency* to *Malevolence* as a generic term, has already been given. Malevolence is rejected as not being ſo applicable to every branch of that diſpleaſure we may poſſibly indulge againſt others; whereas *diſplacency* comprehends thoſe various kinds of diſcontent to which we are expoſed in our ſocial intercourſe. Diſplacency may indicate itſelf by diſpoſitions exceedingly inimical to its objects, or it may conſiſt in

in warm diſapprobation of their conduct. In the firſt ſenſe, it is oppoſed to the operations of the benevolent principle; and in the other, it is the reverſe of complacency, which indicates various degrees of affectionate approbation.

I believe that the word diſplacency is ſolely applicable to our intercourſe with the human ſpecies, and is not employed to expreſs diſcontent or uneaſineſs from any other ſource.

Diſplacency divides itſelf alſo into two kinds. It may be indicated by *malevolent deſires* and *diſpoſitions* towards the object; or by *unfavourable opinions* and *diſapprobations*, without any mixture of malevolence.

I. The diſplacency which is indicated by *malevolent deſires* and *diſpoſitions*.

Theſe may either be of a permanent nature, or merely occaſional. The former relates to that malevolence or ill-will which is conſtant and uniform in its influence; the other to the paſſion of anger, and its various modifications which have ſome particular acts of an unpleaſing and irritating nature for their immediate objects.

The

The firſt ſpecies of malevolence is a branch of that general principle of hatred, which has already occupied our attention. (See Ch. I. Sect. III.) It originates from various incidental cauſes, ſuch as reiterated injuries, and vexations; from juſt or exaggerated repreſentations of the temper, deſigns, motives, conduct of another, which are unpleaſant or pernicious; from the partialities ſo intimately connected with our ſocial intimacies, and affections, which give riſe to violent prejudices againſt thoſe who appear inimical to their intereſts; from a ſpirit of envy and jealouſy, which connects hatred of the perſon with repining at their good fortune. Clans and claſſes of enmity may thus be formed, which augmented by the power of ſocial ſympathy will finally become inveterate and implacable. Malevolence therefore commences with ſome idea of evil, belonging to and connected with the object; and ſettles into a permanent hatred of his perſon, and of every thing relative to him.

The principle thus formed gives riſe to the following malevolent affections.

Malignancy or *Malignity.* Both theſe words expreſs a diſpoſition that cheriſhes inveterate hatreds, and maintains implacable war againſt its object. A diſpoſition which deliberately plans ſchemes of miſchief,

chief, and employs every means that power, mental or phyſical, can furniſh to the prejudice of another. Theſe words are nearly ſynonymous. In ſome connections *malignity* ſeems rather more pertinently applied to a radical depravity of nature, and *malignancy* to *indications* of this depravity in temper and conduct, in particular inſtances.

Both may be manifeſted by the perverſion of power, whether phyſical or intellectual; and our dread of the diſpoſition will be proportioned to our conceptions of the magnitude of this power. Hence the terror inſpired by the idea of demons and wicked ſpirits, or beings of an higher order, who are ſuppoſed to be devoid of every thing that is good, and replete with every thing that is evil. So that

> To do ought good never can be their taſk,
> But ever to do ill, their ſole delight.
>
> MILTON.

To ſuch beings we aſcribe malignancy to an infinite extent.

Malice on the other hand is more frequently employed to expreſs the diſpoſitions of inferior minds to execute every purpoſe of miſchief, within the more limited circle of their abilities. It often ſhews itſelf by little incidents, by thwarting the favourite purpoſes of another; by refuſing the good that might be communicated without perſonal injury; by encouraging

couraging unfavourable reports; by raiſing unjuſt ſuſpicions; by perverſe miſrepreſentations, &c. This temper is ſometimes expreſſed by *ſpite*, or by *having a ſpite* againſt any one. In a word, if we aſcribe malignancy to beings of a ſuperior order by way of pre-eminence, *malice* and a *malicious* diſpoſition, may with peculiar propriety be reſerved for the minor agents of miſchief, whoſe power of doing evil is not proportionate to their diſpoſitions.

Envy. This is a painful ſenſation excited by the view of ſomething deſirable in the ſtate and ſituation of another, which ſelf-love wiſhes to appropriate. To envy, is to repine at the good conferred upon another or poſſeſſed by him. Thus it is a perfect contraſt to the ſympathy which rejoices at their welfare. Envy entertains a degree of *ſorrow* that the good contemplated ſhould eſcape ourſelves, and of *anger* that it ſhould fall to the ſhare of another. The inordinate ſelf-love which excites to envy, naturally induces the envious perſon to imagine that he is more deſerving than the party who has been favoured. He contemplates his own ſuppoſed merit, in oppoſition to the ſuppoſed demerit of the more happy object, until he becomes fully convinced in his own prejudiced judgment of the injuſtice of the diſtribution; and feels a ſpirit of reſentment ariſing againſt the poſſeſſor, and every cauſe of his enjoyment.

Thus

Thus is envy that ſpecies of malevolence, which is inſpired by the conjoined influence of pride, ſorrow, and anger.

Envy is denominated a paſſion, together with many other of the malevolent affections; partly becauſe it may be very ſtrongly excited by particular incidents, and partly in conſequence of that ſingular law of uſage which aſſigns the word *Affections* to the benevolent feelings, and *Paſſions* to the powerful influence of vicious diſpoſitions. (See Ch. 1. Page 3.)

Rancour is that degree of malice which preys upon the poſſeſſor. His heart is torn with vexation when he contemplates the happineſs of another, or when he is foiled in his evil purpoſes towards him.

Cruelty. A *cruel* diſpoſition reſpects the particular temper manifeſted in the contemplation or infliction of abſolute miſery. It has various degrees. Sometimes it is expreſſive of that hardneſs of heart, which is able to look upon extreme diſtreſs without any ſenſations of humanity. Sometimes cruelty is indicated by the voluntary and unneceſſary infliction of miſery: and in its higheſt ſtate it rejoices and triumphs in the diffuſion of horrors; in the wanton ſhedding of blood, and ſpreading deſolation. It is gratified with the convulſions of agony; groans and lamentations are muſic in its ears.

This fiend-like temper may proceed from a natu-

ral inſenſibility, ſtrengthened by a perverſe education; from envy; from a ſpirit of revenge for ſuppoſed injuries; from cowardice, reſenting the panic it feels; or from inſatiable ambition, which wades through torrents of blood, and renders the mangled bodies of the ſlain ſtepping-ſtones to that pre-eminence of ſtation after which it aſpires.

Cenſoriouſneſs is a diſpoſition to find fault with the conduct, ſentiments, or diſpoſitions of another, deeming every action improper, or aſcribing it to improper motives.

Prejudice is the reverſe of *partiality*. This inclines to the *favourable* ſide in judging or vindicating of conduct more than reaſon, or charity demands. *Prejudice*, on the contrary, is that degree of malevolence which diſpoſes us to *pre-judge* the character, conduct, or motives of another to his *diſadvantage*, without having the proper evidences before us. It is obvious that the partiality indulged for one perſon may excite, or greatly increaſe our prejudice againſt another.

It is obſervable that the common uſe of each of theſe terms is not entirely correſpondent with their original import. Partiality properly ſignifying a partial and imperfect view of the evidence, is in itſelf applicable to an undue bias of opinion or diſpoſition whether it be *favourable* or *diſfavourable* to the party; and *prejudice* as it originally ſignifies *pre-judging*,

pre-judging, is in itſelf equally applicable to a precipitate deciſion *for* or *againſt* any one. But cuſtom applies the term *partiality* to a diſpoſition in *favour*, and *prejudice*, without an expletive, to a diſpoſition *againſt* another.

There is a perſonal hatred, which has no ſpecific name. It conſiſts of an habitual diſlike againſt ſome particular object, without being connected with *ill-will*, or a deſire of his being unhappy. It avoids ſocial intercourſe with the party, or renders ſocial intercourſe irkſome. It is ſometimes the reſidue of anger which *forgives*, as it is frequently expreſſed, but does not *forget*. It is ſometimes inſpired by unfavourable reports and miſrepreſentations, conſtituting inſufferable prejudices; and not unfrequently, by ſome very diſagreeable peculiarity of manners.

Ingratitude cannot be termed either an affection, or a diſpoſition. It is the negative of a virtue, which a feeling heart places among the firſt of obligations. It is an inſenſibility to benefits received, either ariſing from ſtupidity, culpable inattention, or innate pride, that annihilates the idea of a favour, and conſiders every ſervice rendered, as the diſcharge of a debt.

Apathy is a ſingular ſtagnation of all the ſocial feelings. It profeſſes neither to love nor to hate. It affects an indifference to which it cannot poſſibly attain, as it terminates in a diſguſt of life and all its

objects. It is a kind of gangrene affecting the ſocial principle, which like a mortified limb in the corporeal ſyſtem, is an incumberance to the patient, and a nuiſance to others.

It is granted that neither diſlike, ingratitude, nor apathy are abſolutely chargeable with *malevolence;* but as they are the diſgraceful negatives of every ſocial affection, and are much more prepared to hate than to love, this ſeems to be their proper department.

The ſecond ſpecies of malevolence relates to thoſe occaſional and more tranſient fits of ill-will, which are excited by particular provocations, and which are not totally repugnant to the benevolent affections. Theſe are indicated by anger, and its various modifications.

Anger has already been conſidered as the paſſion which is excited by a quick ſenſe of injury; and it has been deſcribed as having a double relation; the one immediately reſpecting *ourſelves*, the other reſpecting the *offender*. To the firſt we directed our thoughts under the *ſelfiſh* paſſions; where the influence of anger upon our perſonal feelings, and effects upon the corporeal ſyſtem were particularly conſidered. We ſhall now confine our attention to the changes produced in our minds reſpecting its *object*.

As

As long as we are under the influence of anger, conſidered either as a paſſion or an affection, we experience a temporary ſuſpenſion of our uſual complacency, and even of our good-will and general benevolence towards the object of our diſpleaſure. Under the impulſe of the firſt emotion, we are conſcious of a deſire that the offender ſhould ſuffer in ſome degree proportionate to this recent inſtance of his demerit; we are prompted to imagine that juſtice itſelf demands a puniſhment adequate to the offence; we feel ourſelves much inclined to become the miniſters of juſtice, and are impatient of delay in the execution of her commands.

When the provocation ariſes from the conduct of any one with whom we are intimately connected, our habitual love of their perſons and regard for their welfare, may reſtrain the paſſion within the bounds of juſtice, and the exploſion which gave vent to the paſſion may reſtore the calm. When it ariſes from the miſconduct of any one for whom we are particularly intereſted, and when this miſconduct endangers his welfare, the very principle of benevolence converts our complacency into its contrary. In this caſe, anger being ſuch an expreſſive indication of our diſpleaſure as to inſpire terror, it is admirably calculated to ſtrike the offender with awe, and reclaim his conduct. As ſoon as paſſion

is able to attend to the united voices of reaſon and affection, they will frequently join to palliate the offence, by aſcribing it to ſome incidental cauſe, to the common frailties of our nature, to the ſtrong impulſe of particular circumſtances, &c. and the offender becomes re-inſtated in our favourable regards. But reiterated provocations being indubitable marks of culpable inattention, diſreſpect, or depravity of diſpoſition, will entirely change our opinion of character, and inſpire us with indifference or permanent diſpleaſure againſt the cauſe.

Rage has been deſcribed as the *madneſs* of anger.

Revenge is an inſatiable deſire to ſacrifice every conſideration of pity and humanity to the principle of vindictive juſtice. It renders the demands of that terrific giant paramount to every other claim. It is a propenſity to retaliate evil too fervent to be cooled by time, too deep and inveterate to be obliterated by conceſſions and entreaties. It anticipates joy in the contemplation of ſighs and groans, and the only moment of tranſport is the inſtant of inflicting miſery.

We ſee that this diſpoſition approaches very near to permanent malevolence of the moſt deſpicable character. The abſtract idea of juſtice however forms a partition between them; for to this malevolence has no rightful claim. But its more honour-

honourable diſtinction conſiſts in that repentance which humanity excites in the mind that is not totally obdurate, after the gratification of this dreadful paſſion. The avenger feels too late that he has ſacrificed realities to a phantom; and that to inflict miſery, is in no caſe the path to happineſs.

Wrath is a deep and irritating ſenſe of an injury. It is deliberate anger; being chiefly inſpired by the contemplation of various aggravating circumſtances attendant upon the offence. The deſire of retaliation is not a conſtituent part of it; by this it is diſtinguiſhed from revenge. But it occaſions a ferment in the ſpirits incompatible with the indulgence of complacency.

Reſentment. This affection has been deſcribed to be a deep reflective diſpleaſure againſt the conduct of an offender. We may now obſerve that reſentment is chiefly excited by ſome perſonal offence committed againſt the laws of ſocial intercourſe, of friendſhip, or of gratitude; by ſome affront, that wounds our ſelf-love, it may be, our *pride;* by ſome reprehenſible inattention to our minuter claims; or by the want of reſpect and affection to which we imagine that the tenour of our conduct towards the object, has given us an undoubted right. It may terminate in indifference, and in weak minds in malice; but it is generally appeaſed by conceſſions and acknowledgments.

Suſpicion. This is a comfortleſs ſtate of doubt concerning the conduct and character of another. The mind is greatly embarraſſed reſpecting the degree of eſteem, cordiality, or friendſhip which is due to the object. Suſpicion may be excited by ſome kind of accuſation not ſupported by evidence ſufficient for conviction, but ſufficient to trouble the repoſe of confidence. When exerciſed towards *intimates*, it is an anxious ſuſpenſion of mind between complacency and diſplacency; between that reſpect we were accuſtomed to entertain for them, and the painful apprehenſion that they no longer deſerve it. We feel an incipient anger and reſentment which we dare not to indulge, and cannot ſuppreſs.

Jealouſy is a ſpecies of ſuſpicion that relates to conduct, which ſtill more intimately concerns ourſelves. A painful apprehenſion of rivalſhip, in caſes that are peculiarly intereſting to us. It will of conſequence increaſe in ſtrength according to the value we place upon the object, and the degrees of danger to which we imagine it may be expoſed. It is the inſeparable companion of the ambitious, who view every competitor, and every one capable of becoming a competitor, with a jealous eye. It is ſometimes engraſted upon *pride*, which is deeply wounded by appearances of neglect. It is a frequent attendant upon love; and in a milder ſenſe of

the

the term, it may be conſidered as an anxious ſolicitude leaſt we ſhould be ſupplanted in the affections of thoſe we moſt highly eſteem. The paſſion is ſometimes excited in weak minds by the very exceſs of affection; for this exceſs is prone to be perpetually upon the watch, and torment itſelf with groundleſs fears. Jealouſy in the extreme contains a complication of the moſt tremendous paſſions that can agitate the human breaſt. Though it has love for its baſis, yet it ſuffers the united torments of every painful emotion. It finds equal danger in the moſt oppoſite appearances. Every token of innocence is interpreted into proofs of guilt; and every inſtance of affection, as a mark of inſulting hypocriſy.

> It is a green-ey'd monſter, which doth *make*
> The meat it feeds on.———————
> ———————Trifles light as air
> Are to the jealous, confirmations ſtrong
> As proofs of holy writ.———————
>
> SHAKESPEAR'S OTHELLO.

Under the influence of this baneful paſſion the mind becomes at intervals the ſport of tranſporting hope, and wild deſpair; is alternately tormented by fits of rage and the depth of contrition, for exceſſes committed in its tranſports. In a word, uniting the extremes of dreadful hatred and paſſionate fondneſs,

neſs, it entertains moſt cruel ſuſpicions of the object it moſt adores; and is tempted to deſtroy that which it dreads to loſe.

The claſs of evil paſſions under permanent malevolence are indications of the depraved character and diſpoſitions of the ſubject in whom they are ſeated, not having any immediate reference to the character of their object. Thoſe which are now deſcribed as the modifications of anger, reſpect the impreſſions which occaſional deviations from the uſual tenour of conduct make upon the mind of the perſon moſt intereſted; in which, both the feelings and indications of ill-will are of a more tranſitory nature; ſo that they deſerve not to be confounded with permanent hatred.

We ſhall now proceed to conſider thoſe emotions and affections which are inſpired by the contemplation of Evil, and in which neither malevolence nor any of the ſelfiſh affections are neceſſary ingredients.

II. The Diſplacency which is indicated by *unfavourable opinions* of conduct and diſpoſition. This gives riſe to the following emotions and affections.

Horror.

Horror. Horror is that very ſtrong and painful emotion excited by the view or contemplation of ſomething peculiarly atrocious in the conduct of another; by ſome vice which exceeds the uſual extravagance of vice; enormities that ſurpaſs the bounds of common depravity;—ſuch as impurities too groſs to be named, profligacies too ſhocking to be repeated, and cruelties that make us ſhudder at the recital. It may alſo be excited by the extremes of agony mental or corporeal, by ſufferings and puniſhments at which our natures recoil.

This paſſion may be deemed the antipode of admiration. The one is inſpired by the contemplation of ſurpaſſing excellency; the other by the exceſs of vice and wretchedneſs. As that is one of the moſt pleaſing ſenſations we can poſſibly enjoy, this is among the moſt painful we can poſſibly ſuffer. Scenes of the above deſcription excite a tremour upon the mind; a ſpecies of terror ſcarcely equalled by the moſt lively apprehenſions of danger.

Indignation expreſſes a ſtrong and elevated diſapprobation of mind, which is alſo inſpired by ſomething flagitious in the conduct of another. But it does not always ſuppoſe that exceſs of depravity which alone is capable of committing deeds of horror. Indignation always refers to culpability of conduct; and cannot like the paſſion of horror be extended to diſtreſs either of mind or body. It is produced

produced by the violation of ſome indiſpenſable obligation, connected with circumſtances peculiarly aggravating; by acts of treachery, the abuſe of confidence, baſe ingratitude, &c. which we cannot contemplate without being provoked to anger, and feeling a generous reſentment, though we ſhould not be intereſted in the conſequences of the conduct we condemn. Indignant emotions are always excited by particular incidents.

Contempt. This is a more calm and deliberate affection of the mind. It directs its chief attention to the *character* and *diſpoſition*, which is capable of committing unworthy and diſgraceful actions. Its objects are radical baſeneſs, and radical imbecility where it ought not to exiſt. Thus we deſpiſe the man who is capable of fraud, deceit, falſehood, and every ſpecies of moral depravity that indicates an extraordinary degree of meanneſs. The man who makes great pretenſions to more exalted powers and better qualities than he really poſſeſſes, renders himſelf alſo an object of contempt. He who vainly boaſts of much more than he can perform, or courts our admiration of accompliſhments of which he is deſtitute, or which he poſſeſſes in a very inferior degree.

Thus the characters which are ſunk below the common level of humanity, and thoſe which arrogantly

gantly and impotently attempt to riſe above it, are univerſally deemed the proper objects of contempt.

Both indignation and contempt are accompanied with a certain elevation of mind. The obſerver feels and enjoys a conſcious ſuperiority when he compares himſelf with the offender. This ſenſe of ſuperiority is more ſtrongly marked in *contempt*. When it riſes to a certain height it indicates,

Diſdain. Diſdain is ſuch a degree of contempt as precludes any commerce with the party deſpiſed. It conſiders him as totally unworthy of our notice; —even of our *reprehenſion*, which always ſuppoſes a poſſibility of reclaim. It feels as if there was ſomething ſo repulſive in the character of the aggreſſor, that he is no longer entitled to the rights of ſocial intercourſe.

Contempt and diſdain are often accompanied with a ſatirical ſmile, which ſtrongly inſinuates that baſeneſs and meanneſs are alſo intermixed with large portions of *folly*.

Irriſion. This term is employed to expreſs an affection inſpired by any peculiarity in ſentiment, diſpoſition, or conduct, that we deem an offence againſt ſome acknowledged law of congruity, ſome ſtandard of propriety univerſally received and reſpected; but which is not of ſufficient magnitude to excite anger, or any of its ramifications. It chiefly refers to ſomething odd, whimſical, abſurd, that is calculated

calculated to excite laughter, rather than incur our diſpleaſure. Various culpable miſtakes, and egregious blunders which indicate culpable ignorance, inattentions, and extravagances, are the proper objects of irriſion.

The above ſeem to be the principal emotions and affections that are inſpired by the contemplation of conduct and character. They are ſtrong marks of diſplacency, which does not ariſe from malevolence in our diſpoſitions, but on the contrary from the warm love of beneficent virtue. Nor are they neceſſarily connected with perſonal injuries; though a ſenſe of injuries will infallibly impart great energy to each emotion.

As anger is the guardian of our own perſonal intereſts, thus is the preſent claſs of emotions and affections deſtined to be the guardians of virtue, decency, and propriety in general. It is remarkable that the mind is affected by tranſgreſſions againſt theſe in exact proportion to the degrees of culpability obvious in the offence. *Horror* rouſes within us ſuch a degree of reſentment, as becomes the ſevereſt reproof to the enormities at which it ſhudders; and when excited by deeds of cruelty it calls up a laudable ſpirit of revenge, and renders the mildeſt and meekeſt diſpoſitions ſolicitous for a power of retaliation. *Indignation* is always directed againſt

againſt the violation of ſome ſacred law, that is reſpected by every man who is not deſtitute of virtue and honour. *Contempt* is the puniſhment directed againſt that meanneſs of character, and perverſeneſs of conduct, which ſink a man below the level of ſocial intercourſe, and diſqualify him for decent and reſpectable ſociety. *Irriſion* and *ridicule* are the protectors of order, decency, and propriety in the leſſer departments; againſt which the tranſgreſſor is thus made to feel his offence. He is taught to perceive that it is inconſiſtent with common ſenſe, and to ſuſpect that he is in danger of being ranked in the opprobrious claſs of fools.

The viſible tokens of emotion under each ſpecies of diſplacency are characteriſtic of its nature. Thoſe painful ſenſations which are peculiar to the moſt malevolent paſſions legibly inſcribe their marks upon the countenance. The deep ſunk eye, the pallid anxiety of malice and envy indicate the inward torments of the mind; and the ineffectual attempts to ſmile in tranſient gleams of ſatisfaction at miſery, only ſerve to render horror more horrid. Fear and dread have been conſidered as the moſt painful emotions inſpired by the ſelfiſh principle; and their pathological ſymptoms manifeſt an inſuperable anxiety and depreſſion. Malignity has adopted theſe feelings with their external marks; intermixing them with

with the irritations of anger; which however it attempts to repreſs from burſting forth into emotions, through the apprehenſions of detection.

The diſplacency of anger manifeſts the tokens deſcriptive of anger already noticed; which, according to the degrees of their violence, ſtrike terror into great offenders, or inſpire the thoughtleſs and inattentive with reſpect and awe.

The *horror* excited by the exceſs of wickedneſs or of miſery approaches to *terror*, both in ſenſation and in external marks. *Indignation*, *contempt*, and *diſdain* paint upon the countenance a ſingular mixture of dignified ſuperiority and deep diſapprobation. A certain elevation becoming the majeſty of inſulted virtue is united with a lively ſenſe of the depravity and meanneſs of the offender; and a contraſt is inſtantaneouſly formed between exaltedneſs of character and the ſtate of degradation into which he has fallen. The ſatirical jocularity accompanying contempt in *irriſion*, throws into the countenance marks of exultation over the imbecility or abſurdities of the perſon ridiculed. Without ſubſcribing to the hypotheſis of *Mr. Hobbes*, that pride is the efficient cauſe of laughter, it muſt be acknowledged that this ſpecies of laughter, is always accompanied with an inſulting conſciouſneſs of ſuperiority.

In the above Analyſis we have attempted to trace

trace the origin of the Paſſions, their exciting cauſes, their immediate objects, and their numerous ramifications. We have contemplated the infinite diverſity and contrariety of effects, which proceed from that one principle the *Love of Good*, in beings formed as we are, ſtationed in a world where every ſurrounding object is able to produce its own ſpecific impreſſion; beings whoſe individual, and whoſe ſocial intereſts, are ſo many, various, and complicated.

But this Analytical Survey does not terminate the hiſtory of the Paſſions. There are various other points of view in which it is proper to contemplate them, in order to increaſe our acquaintance with the rudiments of ſelf-knowledge, and enable us to draw thoſe moral and practical inferences, which may prove moſt conducive to the improvement of our natures.

Theſe are reſerved for the Second Part of our Treatiſe.

END OF PART THE FIRST.

PART II.

PHILOSOPHICAL OBSERVATIONS

AND

INQUIRIES,

Founded upon the Preceding Analysis.

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CHAP. I.

Observations respecting the Laws of Excitement.

OBSERVATION I.

Surprise the efficient Cause of PASSION.

IN different parts of our Analyſis of the Paſſions, the influence of the introductory emotions in quickening affections of the moſt oppoſite nature into a paſſion has fully appeared. It has been ſhewn, that whatever ſtrikes us in a ſudden and unexpected manner, generally makes for the inſtant, a more vivid impreſſion than things and circumſtances of much greater conſequence with which we have been familiarized, or which have been introduced

to us in a more ſlow and progreſſive manner. It has been rendered obvious, that wonder is compounded of ſurpriſe and the impreſſion made upon the mind by the idea of intricacy; and that aſtoniſhment unites the perception of *vaſtneſs* with ſurpriſe; we have remarked that theſe are by univerſal ſuffrage emphatically termed *emotions*; and we have ſeen the influence of theſe introductory emotions in paſſions of the moſt oppoſite characters.

Theſe conſiderations united make it highly probable, that the eſſential and characteriſtic difference between a *paſſion* and an *affection* depends upon the ſuperaddition of ſurpriſe to the natural effect produced by the real or ſuppoſed quality of an object; that this emotion conjoined with the ſpecific nature of its *exciting* cauſe, is virtually the *efficient* cauſe of a paſſion; the percuſſion of ſurpriſe rendering the affection viſible by characteriſtic ſigns correſpondent with its ſpecific nature.

Thus, for example, in *joy* the pleaſing part of the impreſſion owes its origin to the poſſeſſion or undoubted expectancy of ſome deſirable good. This in its loweſt influence produces ſome degree of change in the corporeal frame. It is a ſenſation, and muſt be felt ſomewhere. The vividneſs of the impreſſion occaſioned by the impetus of ſurpriſe renders this ſenſation more vivid, diffuſes its effects over the whole ſyſtem, and occaſions a delectable

and

and ungovernable flow of ſpirits, which becomes conſpicuous to every ſpectator. But as novelty is the exciting cauſe of ſurpriſe, in proportion as the *novelty* of the good ſubſides, ſurpriſe gradually diminiſhes, and leaves the mind under the influence of an *affection*, more proportionate to the real value of the object.

Thus we may ſuppoſe the *paſſion* of anger to conſiſt of that diſagreeable ſenſation which a ſenſe of injury will always occaſion, quickened by *ſurpriſe* into an ungovernable emotion. The reluctance with which we part with any thing contributing to our benefit or enjoyment, will be quickened by ſurpriſe into the *agonies of ſorrow;* which is alſo able to convert painful apprehenſions into the *exceſs of fear.*

Nor does the acknowledged fact, that our paſſions are ſometimes excited by deliberate contemplation, militate againſt this opinion. This can only take place in affairs of high importance; and in ſuch caſes the more deliberate ſurvey conſiſts in examining and reflecting upon every circumſtance relative to the nature of the exciting cauſe; which neceſſarily produces a variety of new and unexpected combinations, each of which will be attended with a proportionate degree of ſurpriſe; and although there will not be in any one circumſtance that *quantum* of novelty that ſo powerfully ſtrikes

the mind in cafes which are ſudden and totally unexpected, yet the combined influence of the aggregate number of novelties may finally produce the moſt extravagant paſſions. Thus may the mind calculate the variety of benefits accruing from ſome proſperous event, until it be *tranſported with joy;* enumerate the evils of privation until it becomes *frantic with ſorrow;* dwell upon the number and magnitude of provocations which aggravate an injury, until reſentment ſhall be converted into *rage;* and by ruminating upon the extent of danger, it may be driven into *deſpair.*

If this conjecture be admitted, it will give a beautiful ſimplicity to the theory of the Paſſions. It ſhews that they may be decompoſed into the ſimpleſt elements; while it indicates the manner by which the combination of theſe elements may be productive of ſuch an infinite variety, both in nature and ſtrength. It ſhews that the different degrees of force in the quickening agent, or of its reiterated influence, are calculated to give various degrees of momentum to each particular affection.

OBSERVATION II.

Passions and Emotions are of a transitory nature; the Affections alone are permanent.

ACCORDING to the diſtinctions which have been made between Paſſions, Emotions, and Affections, it clearly appears that the two former are in their nature tranſient, and that the affections are capable of much longer duration. The paſſions have been repreſented as vivid ſenſations paſſively or involuntarily produced by ſome ſtrong idea excited in the mind; and emotions as the external marks of theſe. But as this paſſive ſtate of mind is tranſitory, ſo are its external marks; and as both gradually ſubſide, they give place to ſome correſpondent *affection*, which remains as long as our opinion, and the intereſt we take in the object ſhall continue. It neceſſarily follows from theſe facts, that we are not to look to the paſſions and emotions either for permanent well-being, or for permanent

permanent wretchedneſs. They muſt either die away and leave no impreſſion, as in caſes where the imagination was deceived reſpecting the value or importance of the exciting cauſe; or they are the harbingers of ſome more durable affections; and it is the influence of theſe affections which has the permanent effect upon our well-being. Thus, when we give ourſelves over to the delectable tumults of joy, the joy is incidental. It is haſtily introduced by the ſudden perception or impreſſive ſenſe of ſome acquiſition, that we deem important to preſent or future welfare; of a ſomething which we expect to be more or leſs durable in its nature, or to diffuſe its beneficent influence to a conſiderable extent. Theſe advantages are concentrated as it were in the imagination at the inſtant of joy. They operate upon the mind as the ſolar rays collected in a focus dart upon the ſurface of a body; and though the pleaſures of joy are often greater than thoſe derived from its cauſes, yet we naturally expect much more than the momentary well-being introduced by the emotion itſelf.

In the firſt impulſe of ſorrow, the magnitude of the loſs is the moſt impreſſive idea. As the mind becomes more intimately acquainted with the nature and extent of the privation, the agonies of ſorrow will either ſubſide into indifference, from the perception that the loſs was not of that importance as had

had been imagined; that it has been amply ſupplied by ſome valuable and unexpected bleſſing; or the vivid impreſſion will be effaced by time, which always places before us a variety of objects new and intereſting; or finally, the tranſports of ſorrow will gradually give way to habitual grief and melancholy.

Thus fear is inſpired, and becomes agonizing from the apprehenſion of ſome ſpecies of calamity; and the influential idea, at the inſtant, is, that by the expected calamity we ſhall be laſtingly deprived of ſome good we wiſh to retain, or that it will be introductory to ſome durable evil; though the fear itſelf may be much more painful than the evil we dread. Anger is rouſed by an immediate ſenſe of injury committed or threatened; that is, by the apprehenſion of ſome robbery of the good to which we have a claim. Here again the mind, comparing the preſent with the paſt, or looking forwards to the future, perceives or apprehends a diſagreeable change of circumſtances or of ſtate; and is incenſed againſt the offending cauſe. When the firſt impulſe ſubſides, it is ſucceeded by the affections of *grief*, of *reſentment*, *indignation*, *&c.* according to the nature of the inſult ſuffered, or the aggravations of the offence; and theſe become durable as the idea or perception of the injury received.

Nor does the tranſition which is ſometimes made from affection to paſſion invalidate theſe remarks.

It

It has been obſerved, that when the object poſſeſſes many complicated and intereſting circumſtances, theſe by being placed before the memory, and diſtinctly examined, may gradually warm the imagination, and increaſe the ſtrength of the affection, until the party be worked up into violent emotion. But when the paſſions are excited in this manner, they are alſo of ſhort duration. The preternatural ſtate of mind demands too great an expenditure of animal ſpirits to render the paſſion laſting; and it ſoon relapſes into the kindred affection. In caſes deemed peculiarly intereſting, and in perſons of quick and lively feelings, ſuch guſhes and fits of paſſion may be frequently excited by the ſame cauſe, and the mind may be placed alternately under the influence of the paſſion and affection; but wherever paſſions and emotions are permanently vehement, it becomes an indication of *inſanity*, as it is a complete token that reaſon has totally loſt its controuling power.

The permanent affections therefore are to be conſidered as conſtituting that habitual ſtate of mind, into which the primary paſſion impelled it. Our ideas, and with them our affections, concerning the object are now changed. Inſtead of our former indifference, we contemplate it with ſome degree of pleaſure or pain, become habitually attached to it, or indulge an habitual averſion reſpecting it.

Thus

Thus it is obvious that none of the leading paſſions and emotions conſtitute our permanent welfare, or the contrary. They ſimply manifeſt the firſt impreſſion which the ſudden change of our ſtate has made upon us. The laſting effects, in conſequence of this change, are to be learned from the *affections*. If the good introduced by joy prove itſelf to be a laſting good, though it may be partial and incomplete, it may inſpire contentment. If it be the completion of an ardent deſire, it communicates ſatisfaction. If it meet with approbation, and be reflected upon as the reſult of a plan well-intended, wiſely formed, and ſucceſsfully executed, it becomes the ſource of complacency. Fear ſinks into permanent dread, or unmixed with any particle of hope, into laſting deſpair; ſorrow into confirmed melancholy; and anger into reſentment and diſplacency.

OBSERVATION

OBSERVATION III.

Relation of the Passions and Affections to each other.

IT has frequently been remarked, that the influence of any particular paſſion or emotion, diſpoſes the mind to be ſubjected to ſome other that is of a ſimilar nature and tendency; while it places the diſpoſition at a remote diſtance from the affections of a contrary complection. *Dr. Hartley* has obſerved, correſpondent to the grand deciſion of the paſſions which he had adopted, that "the five "*grateful* paſſions, Love, Deſire, Hope, Joy, "and pleaſing Recollection enhance each other; as "do the five *ungrateful* ones, Hatred, Averſion, "Fear, Grief, and Diſpleaſure." *Addiſon*, *Hume*, *Lord Kaims* have made ſimilar remarks, and have adduced the aſſociation of ideas as the cauſe. Whether this be the *only* cauſe or not, the fact cannot be diſputed, that the temper of mind produced by one affection,

affection, pre-diſpoſes to the affection which is moſt analogous, though it may not be immediately dependent upon it.

Thus, according to the diviſion which has been adopted in this Treatiſe, not only are gladneſs, cheerfulneſs, mirth, contentment, ſatisfaction, complacency, &c. the offsprings of joy, but while the mind is under their pleaſing influence, it is diſpoſed to every affection of the pleaſing kind, which may be inſpired by very different cauſes, or by circumſtances too trivial to excite either of theſe emotions or affections in its calm and uninfluenced ſtate of mind. Let us ſuppoſe, for example, the exciting cauſe to conſiſt in ſomething merely perſonal; yet the pleaſing ſenſation produced inclines at the moment to the affections of generoſity, charity, ſympathy, compaſſion, and mercy; nay, at ſuch ſeaſons it is diſpoſed to expand, that it may embrace all mankind: and the humbler acts of virtue, with which we might have been contented, at another period, will now appear contracted and unſatisfactory.

Upon this principle in our natures is the cuſtom manifeſtly founded of making valuable preſents to the meſſengers of welcome tidings, or rewarding them with ſome peculiar marks of complacency: a cuſtom which has been practiſed in every age and nation. The overflowings of joy inſpire a generoſity

ſity of temper, which abſolutely requires an object; and none can immediately appear more meritorious, than the perſon who has been the inſtrument, as it were, or the inſtrumental cauſe of joy. The delectable ſenſation communicated to the mind of the principal participant immediately excites in his breaſt a grateful affection for the perſon, whoſe communications have been the cauſe of it; though he may have merely acted in an official capacity; and poſſibly, contrary to his ſecret inclinations. The liberation of captives, and priſoners of various deſcriptions, upon acceſſion to the throne; the inſtitution of ſports and paſtimes, that joy may be diffuſed among the multitude upon events apparently replete with much future happineſs, as on births, marriages, and on the arrival of a young heir to the poſſeſſion of an ample fortune; the pleaſing incitements of illuminations, fire-works, diſtributing good cheer to the populace, are univerſally felt as harmonizing with the exhilarated ſtate of mind, which welcome tidings of a private and public nature are calculated to excite. In like manner does the luſtre of great actions inſpire us with a certain reſpect for thoſe moſt intimately connected with the agent, whom we conſider as the parent ſtock, productive of merit in every ramification; or as able to ſhed deſert over every connection. Under the influence of theſe grateful and liberal principles, we are induced

duced to imagine that children are entitled to ſhare the rewards due to their parents. Hence thoſe hereditary honours which too frequently irradiate the unworthy, and demonſtrate that the generous inference is not always concluſive.

From theſe aſſociating affections it proceeds that the perception of good qualities centered in the mind of any one, diſpoſes to an attachment to their perſon. Favourable impreſſions inſpire an inclination to cultivate friendſhip; and friendſhip between the ſexes has a powerful tendency to inſpire love. That love, which in delicate minds appears to be at the remoteſt diſtance from every thing ſenſual, will finally excite the ſtronger and warmer paſſions. Nor are we without many inſtances of theſe becoming moſt impetuous, from their being founded upon ſentimental refinements.

As the paſſion of Sorrow proceeds from the loſs of what we have loved, it may imperceptibly diſpoſe,—in perſons whoſe paſſions are ſtrong but very tranſient,—to the affection of love towards the object commiſerating our loſs. No one can appear ſo worthy of the transfer, as the friend who ſympathizes deeply with the affliction. The Poet has juſtly obſerved that "*Pity is akin to love.*" In theſe moments, the commiſerator forgets every fault, even where he knows that they exiſt; and brings forward every good quality, which in his

opinion renders the afflicted leſs deſerving of their ſufferings. We may alſo add that the gratitude which this pity inſpires, is accompanied with the moſt favourable ſentiments of the humane diſpoſition, and has a tendency to produce a predilection for the perſon of the ſympathizer. In ſhort, whatever gives birth to any of the kindly affections, may be productive of perſonal predilections, and terminate in love both as an affection and a paſſion. Othello ſays of Deſdemona,

> She lov'd me for the dangers I had paſs'd,
> And I lov'd her that ſhe did pity them.

Nor can the dramatic Writer be accuſed of exaggeration, who repreſents the beautiful and accompliſhed Zemira, paſſionately fond of the generous monſter Azore, whom ſhe at firſt viewed with horror and deteſtation.

To this pleaſing aſſociation is it alſo to be aſcribed, that we are ſo prone to be blind to the faults of thoſe we love. We are eager to repreſent to ourſelves thoſe perſons who have taken poſſeſſion of our eſteem, as being entirely worthy of it. We dwell upon every good quality; forget, or diſcover apologies for every defect.

It has been remarked more than once, that whenever an amorous temper has taken a religious turn,

it

it excels in the warmth and fervour of its devotion. We might urge in its vindication, that what appears excellent can alone be the object of love; and where the mind is peculiarly ſuſceptible of excellence, it will evince the warmth and ſtrength of its affection, whether it be placed on our own ſpecies, or on beings of a ſuperior order.

Theſe two cauſes united may ſerve to explain a fact which has been noted by *Rouſſeau* and many others, that the language of religion and of love is ſo very ſimilar. The lover alſo has his *idol*, *adores* her perfections, calls her *angelic*, talks of *altars*, *proſtrations*, *vows*, *ſacrifices*, *&c.* That is, what is *human*, in the warmth of his affection he contemplates as *divine;* and ſhe that has ſome ſtriking accompliſhments, he pronounces to be perfection itſelf.

The connection between the diſagreeable paſſions and affections is no leſs obvious. The various affections originating from the idea of evil, whether it be paſt, preſent, or apprehended, are ſo cloſely united that they can ſcarcely be conſidered as illuſtrations of the ſubject. We are, for example, diſpoſed to be angry at whatever occaſions ſorrow, and there is a vindictiveneſs in fear, which may render it dangerous to its moſt innocent cauſe. But pre-diſpoſitions to the indulgence of unpleaſant af-

fections are generated, in cafes where the connection is not fo immediate. Difagreeable feelings produced by their proper object, are productive of other difagreeable affections where ftrictly fpeaking there is no proper object. Whatever irritates, renders the mind impatient, peeviſh, quarrelſome; diſpoſes it to magnify trifles into real grievances, and to imagine a juſt cauſe of offence where perhaps approbation has been merited; it engenders ſuſpicions, jealouſies; and diſpoſes to envy the peace, tranquillity, or good fortune of another. In this ſtate of mind a tranſition is alſo made from things to perſons, and ſome degree of guilt is imputed to the latter in conſequence of the evil paſſions ſtirred up by the former. It is upon this principle that tyrants have been known to ſacrifice, in the impetuoſity of their vexation and rage, the innocent meſſengers of evil tidings. Thus has Homer, that faithful hiſtorian of nature, repreſented Agamemnon as pouring out a torrent of invectives againſt the harmleſs and venerable prieſt, who was compelled by virtue of his office to utter unwelcome truths.

The Prophet ſpoke; when with a gloomy frown,
The monarch ſtarted from his ſhining throne;
Black choler filled his breaſt that boil'd with ire,
And from his eye-balls flaſh'd the living fire.

Augur

Augur accurſt ! denouncing miſchief ſtill,
Prophet of plagues, for ever boding ill !
Still muſt that tongue ſome wounding meſſage bring,
And ſtill thy prieſtly pride provoke thy King ?
POPE'S HOMER. IL. I. L. 127.

It is thus that not only the "*Genus Irritabile Va-*"*tum*," but controverſial authors of all deſcriptions have been ſo prone, in defence of their particular ſentiments againſt their opponents, to deſcend to perſonalities. Theologians in particular have been accuſtomed to evince their zeal for ſacred truths, by the moſt unchriſtian hatred againſt the imagined ſupporters of error; and they have not failed to aſcribe unworthy motives, or depravity of heart to thoſe who remain unconvinced by the force of their arguments. This is the latent cauſe of all religious perſecutions, which have deluged the world, and diſgraced humanity.

As in the tranſports of gratitude we are diſpoſed to imagine virtues where they do not exiſt, thus in the tranſports of reſentment we are prone to the contrary extreme. A ſingle cauſe of enmity blackens the whole character of our antagoniſt; and the man who has been guilty of one fault that touches us to the quick, becomes to an heated imagination the vileſt of miſcreants. The friends and connections of the aggreſſor are alſo conſidered as participants in his crimes. Nay, the adherents and de-

pendants upon the grand offender are contaminated by his guilt. Thus have towns and countries been laid waſte without remorſe, murder and rapine have been deemed laudable, and the ſacrifice of thouſands in reſentment of the vices and diſorders of a few, has been frequently celebrated, as an heroic diſplay of vindictive juſtice! Hence it is that the diſgrace of character is unjuſtly ſpread over a whole family, on account of the ill conduct or ignominious puniſhment of one of its members. Even the unconſcious inſtruments of miſchief, according to this propenſity of our nature, are frequently treated as guilty or as participants in the crime. Imprudent parents have thus nouriſhed a ſpirit of revenge in their children, by encouraging them to beat the play-things which have accidentally given them pain, or the ground againſt which they have fallen.

It is recorded of the celebrated Cranmer, who flouriſhed in the reign of Queen Mary, that having repented of his impiety in yielding to the ſolicitations of the prieſthood, and ſeductive promiſes of the Court, and ſigned an acknowledgment of the Pope's ſupremacy; when he was brought to the infernal ſtake, he reſolutely held the offending hand in the flames till it was conſumed, from a ſpirit of reſentment at its having been the inſtrument of his apoſtacy. In this ſingular inſtance of imputed guilt, our ſympathy with the ſufferings of this unfortunate

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man, our admiration of his magnanimity, and our ſurpriſe at the ſtrange manner in which he indicated a pious indignation of his former conduct, furniſhes an apology for an act which under other circumſtances muſt have been contemplated as the exceſs of childiſh cruelty. (See Hume's Hiſtory of England, Vol. IV. P. 431.)—For the ſame reaſon we admire the undaunted courage of Mucius Sævola, who as we are informed by *Florus* thruſt his hand into the fire, becauſe it had not ſucceeded in its attempt to ſtrike the King of *Etruria*. But had he cauſed a dependant to be puniſhed in this manner for a ſimilar failure, he would have been held forth to execration.

Conformable with theſe principles do the ſtrong impreſſions of fear or of ſorrow change the appearance of every thing around us. Every triſle becomes the cauſe of terror; and every object loſes its power to charm, unleſs indeed it ſhould adminiſter to our melancholy. Sorrow naturally diſpoſes to impatience, diſcontent, and fearful apprehenſion, in caſes which have no connection with the primitive cauſe. Heavy diſappointment where expectation was ill-founded, forbids us to indulge hope where the encouragement is the greateſt. Fear and dread diſpoſe to cruelty, to treachery, and ſometimes to acts of deſperation which reſemble courage.

As the paſſions and affections which are moſt analogous to each other, ſo readily blend together, or ſucceed in an eaſy currency, it is natural to ſuppoſe that thoſe which are of an oppoſite nature and tendency muſt be repulſive; as joy and ſorrow, hope and fear, love and hatred. For although complicated circumſtances may place the mind under their influence at the ſame period, yet the one is calculated to oppoſe and check the other; each exerting its characteriſtic influence. Thus when the ſucceſs of any deſired event is partial, ſorrow may accompany joy. The effects of glad tidings are rendered incomplete by the addition of ſome mournful cataſtrophe; when victory, for example, is purchaſed by the death of a friend, or of a favourite general. In ſuch chequered incidents the mind paſſes over from one event to the other, and feels the influence of each ſeparately and alternately. In caſes of a dubious nature, the mind is ſometimes ſtagnated, or ſuſpended between hope and fear; and ſometimes agitated by each paſſion by turns. In this manner may love have ſome intercourſe with anger; as in parents whoſe reſentment at the improper conduct of their children may even be inſpired by the warmeſt affection; and the lover may be tormented by the caprices of his miſtreſs, whom he cannot reſolve to hate. In ſuch caſes, the oppoſite paſſions and affections are excited by differ-

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ent and oppoſite circumſtances, reſiding in the ſame exciting cauſe; each producing its own characteriſtic effect.

Fearful anxiety and joy in the extreme are ſo diametrically oppoſite, and their pathological effects upon the ſyſtem ſo contrary, that an immediate tranſition from the one to the other is extremely difficult, if not impoſſible; and by the violence committed upon our natures, it might be productive of fatal conſequences. It is obſervable that in ſuch caſes the ſalutary tranſition is made through the medium of the pathological effects, which are the uſual indications of ſorrow. Tears and joyful lamentations are the firſt tokens of the removal of exceſſive fear. A ſudden relaxation as it were ſucceeds to the agonizing conſtriction which accompanies that paſſion, and this prepares the mind for that pleaſing vivacity which is the natural character of joy. Every medical practitioner, as often as he has aſſiſted at any painful and dangerous operation, that has proved ſucceſsful, muſt have obſerved theſe effects produced upon the ſympathizing attendants; and every affectionate Female will recollect theſe ſingular emotions upon the happy delivery of her friend, whom ſhe has ſuppoſed to have been in imminent danger. This ſingularity may perhaps be explained in the following manner. Previous to the happy iſſue, ſorrow and anxious fears reſpecting

ing the diſtreſſed object were intimately blended together; while the pathological tokens of the latter, ſuppreſſed thoſe of the former. Upon the ſudden removal of fear, its characteriſtic reſtrictions are removed, the reſidue of ſorrow becomes apparent, and the agitated ſpirits are tranquillized by the effuſion of tears.

A melancholy ſtate of mind is moſt ſoothed at the commencement, by what ſeems to feed its melancholy. The exceſs of grief will liſten to nothing that is not ſomewhat in uniſon with it. It may afterwards be alleviated by a degree of cheerfulneſs in a friend who has wept for their diſtreſs, and whoſe ſympathy has thus inſpired a confidence. But no greater violence can be committed upon perſons in the anguiſh of ſorrow, than an attempt at gaiety, or the propoſition of frivolous amuſements.

Nothing ſo effectually ſubdues the violence of anger, as the fortunate ſuggeſtion of ludicrous ideas. Whatever excites a ſmile or a laugh, excites a ſenſation totally incompatible with rage, or with deep reſentment. It has often happened that a ſomething ridiculous in the ideas or conduct of the offender has averted the puniſhment due to his careleſſneſs and inadvertency; or that ſome gay and cheerful thought has at once obliterated reſentment againſt a conduct

conduct not entirely trivial. We are told by ancient fabuliſts, that when Apollo was about to ſhoot Mercury diſguiſed as an herdſman, incenſed at this thieviſh deity for having ſtolen ſome cattle which Apollo was deſtined to watch, he applied to his quiver for an arrow that he might revenge the offence; but diſcovering that the arch thief had prevented the effects of his anger by previouſly ſtealing all the arrows, he was ſo diverted at the jeſt that his anger immediately ſubſided. *Iracundiam voluptate ſuperante.*

In the quarrel between Jupiter and Juno, Homer repreſents the Queen of Heaven terrified into ſilence, and attempting to ſuppreſs the ſigns of a reſentment which ſhe could not ſubdue. But he informs us that it was the jeſt of Vulcan in taking upon him an office, for which he was ſo ill qualified, and becoming cup-bearer, which effectually reſtored mirth and good-humour among the Celeſtials.

> Vulcan with aukward grace, his office plies;
> And unextinguiſhed laughter ſhakes the ſkies.
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> POPE.

OBSERVATION

OBSERVATION IV.

On the Seat of the Passions.

IT is usual for Writers on the Passions to speculate concerning their *Seat*, whether it be in the *spiritual*, or in the animated *material part* of Man. Some philosophers place the passions solely in the corporeal system. Among these was the celebrated *Des Cartes*. *Mr. Grove*, on the contrary, defines the passions to be "the affections attended with peculiar and extraordinary motions of the animal spirits;" and in opposition to the sentiments of *Des Cartes*, he says, "I am inclined to think that a sensation of the soul generally precedes a change in the spirits; external objects not being able to raise a ferment in the spirits till they have first struck the mind with an idea of something noble, frightful, amiable, &c."

Others again ascribe some of the affections to the *animal* principle, and some to the *rational*. *Dr. Reid*

Reid is in doubt whether "the principle of *eſteem*, "as well as *gratitude* ought to be reckoned in the "order of animal principles, or if they ought not "rather to be placed in a higher order." He has finally, however, placed the eſteem of the wiſe and good in the order of *animal* principles; not from any perſuaſion that it is to be found in brute animals, but becauſe it appears in the moſt unimproved, and the moſt degenerate part of our ſpecies, even in thoſe in whom we hardly perceive any exertion either of reaſon or of virtue.

But what is ſtill more ſingular, the *ſame* affection is ſometimes placed by this philoſopher under the *animal*, and ſometimes under the *rational* principle. Speaking of reſentment he obſerves, "that "*ſudden* or *inſtinctive* reſentment is an *animal* prin-"ciple, common to us with brute animals; but "that reſentment, which ſome authors call *delibe-"rate*, muſt fall under the claſs of *rational* princi-"ples." He alſo excludes "the parental affection "from the rational principle, becauſe it is not "grounded on an opinion of merit in the object." (See Reid's Eſſays on the active powers of Man. Es. III. Ch. 4.)

This contrariety of opinions among philoſophers themſelves; the vague conjectures and arbitrary poſitions they have advanced, too plainly evince that we are not prepared for diſquiſitions of this kind.

kind. They prove that it will be impoſſible to arrange the paſſions and affections with any preciſion under theſe two heads, until we ſhall have obtained more accurate ideas of the nature of the rational and ſpiritual part of man on the one hand, and of the vivified matter which is ſuppoſed to conſtitute his animal nature on the other.

Thoſe who place the paſſions, or any of the affections in the body, confeſs that it muſt be an *animated* body: but they do not explain to us the *cauſe* of this animation; or what is that vivifying principle which ſo wonderfully changes the properties of dead, inſenſible, inactive matter. When we ſhall know the cauſe of ſenſation or of perception in its loweſt ſtage; and when we ſhall have diſcovered what that is which thinks, reaſons, and wills, we may be better qualified to decide concerning the ſeat of the paſſions and emotions.

The reaſon which induced Des Cartes and others, to make all the affections *ſenſual* is obvious. It is eaſy to perceive that we cannot aſcribe *affections* to the ſpiritual part of man, without admitting the *paſſions* alſo; nor theſe, without being perplexed with the *appetites;* which although confeſſedly ſenſual, frequently excite thoſe emotions and paſſions, which muſt be aſcribed to the Spirit if it be ſuſceptible of emotions. But this combination, or reciprocal influence, they deem to be totally inconſiſtent with

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thoſe intellectual honours they are ſolicitous of aſcribing excluſively to our ſpiritual natures.

Dr. Reid's embarraſſment ſeems to be founded on the expectation that the rational principle muſt always act rationally; which leads him to infer that whenever the paſſions and affections do not receive the ſanction of reaſon, they are to be aſſigned over to the animal principle. But this hypotheſis will tempt us to doubt of the very exiſtence of the rational principle in numbers of our ſpecies; it leads us to conclude that the two natures deemed ſo diametrically oppoſite to each other, poſſeſs powers ſo perfectly ſimilar, that it is difficult for the keeneſt diſcernment to diſtinguiſh between their operations; and it compels us to infer, that whenever ſome of our affections become conformable to reaſon, they have changed their ſeat from the animal to the rational principle.

Philoſophers and Divines, who diſtinguiſh Man into the three ſeparate parts of Body, Soul, and Spirit, which notwithſtanding the intimacy of their union, they ſuppoſe to be different in their natures; aſcribe the appetites to the body, the paſſions and affections to the ſoul, and to the ſpirit thoſe intellectual powers which ſeem remote from paſſions or emotions of any kind. By ſuch an arrangement they mean to compliment the ſpirit with the moſt exalted ſtation; but the honour, like many other projects

projects of ambition, is entirely at the expence of its happineſs. If the affections pertain to the ſoul excluſively, that alone is capable of *enjoying*; the ſpirit is deprived of every motive for ſpeculation: and ſince it ſometimes happens that ſpeculations of the moſt abſtruſe kind excite pleaſing ſenſations, the ſpirit muſt certainly *perceive*, though it has no faculties to *lament* its hard lot, as often as it is conſcious that theſe delightful ſenſations, which are its own work, are transferred to the ſoul.

Without entering therefore into inquiries of this nature, which for want of *data* muſt be conjectural and unſatisfactory, it will be more correſpondent with my plan, ſimply to ſtate intereſting facts, and leave it to the metaphyſician to draw ſuch conſequences as he may deem moſt legitimate.

It muſt be admitted that every paſſion, emotion, and affection proceeds from certain impreſſions or ideas excited concerning the nature, or ſtate, or quality, or agency of the exciting cauſe. Theſe ideas have undoubtedly their ſeat in that part of man we diſtinguiſh by the appellation of *mind*. The exciting cauſe therefore changes the ſtate of the mind reſpecting the particular object. From total indifference it becomes ſome way or other *intereſted*. This new impreſſion, if it be poſſeſſed of a certain

certain degree of ſtrength produces a correſpondent change upon the body. Univerſal obſervation, and univerſal phraſeology, which is doubtleſs founded upon this obſervation, unite to evince that a very perceptible influence of every ſtrong emotion is directed towards the *heart*. The heart experiences various kinds of ſenſation, pleaſant or unpleaſant, over which it has no controul; and from thence the influence of agitated ſpirits ſeems to be diffuſed over the body. Their more gentle effects are not viſible to the ſpectator; nay, the ſubject himſelf is not conſcious perhaps of any thing more than either a change of ſentiment, or the perception of the ſtronger influence of a former ſentiment united with ſomething agreeable or diſagreeable in this perception; a ſomething which attaches more ſtrongly to the object, or creates ſome degree of repugnance. This ſtate of mind is ſtyled an affection, and it appears to be totally mental; but ſtronger influences produce ſuch changes, that the inward diſpoſition becomes obvious to the ſpectators through the medium of the corporeal frame. It is now called an *emotion*, and this may increaſe in ſtrength until the whole ſyſtem becomes agitated and convulſed.

From this ſtatement it appears inconteſtible, that the affections and paſſions have their origin in the mind; while emotions are corporeal indications of

what paſſes within; according to the conjecture expreſſed by Mr. Grove.

It alſo proves that the diſpoſition which ſome have indulged, to confine the affections to the mind, and refer the paſſions to the animal principle, is to theorize in oppoſition to facts. For numerous inſtances have preſented themſelves in the courſe of our Analyſis, which indicate that the difference between the gentleſt affection and the moſt turbulent paſſions conſiſts in *degree*, not in *nature*. Whatever produces ſilent ſatisfaction in its mildeſt influence, will produce the extravagance of joy in its ſtrongeſt. Fearful apprehenſion, in its exceſs, is *terror;* and diſpleaſure in its moſt inordinate exertions is *rage*. When the gentleſt affections are rendered conſpicuous, their exiſtence is known by ſome viſible change produced in the countenance, through the medium of the nervous ſyſtem; while the moſt violent agitations of the mind operating upon the ſame nervous ſyſtem, produce ungovernable tranſports. Hence it is rational to infer, that the fineſt affections and the ſtrongeſt paſſions are equally ſenſitive, or equally ſpiritual in their natures.

It is natural for thoſe who favour the hypotheſis, that man conſiſts of "different natures marvellouſ-"ly mixt," to aſcribe the *appetites* ſolely to the corporeal ſyſtem, or to the animal nature of man, and

and to call them *carnal* becauſe the immediate objects of the appetites relate to the wants and gratifications of the body. But do they recollect that theſe appetites are frequently awakened by the attention paid by the mind to their particular objects, exciting concupiſcence, which is always attributed to the mind? When the deſires conſidered as carnal are excited by a particular ſtate of the body, that is by certain changes made in the corporeal ſyſtem, which generate particular wants, as in the ſenſations of hunger and thirſt; the mental part of our natures is immediately conſcious of theſe uneaſy ſenſations, wills to remove them, expects gratification in attending to the demands of appetite. Thus the whole man becomes intereſted, without the poſſibility of placing a barrier, to arreſt the operations of the mind, and render the appetite purely corporeal.

When the power of immediate gratification is poſſeſſed, none of the acceſſary paſſions and emotions are called forth, and in ſome caſes we are unconſcious of mental exertions. But if the gratification cannot be immediate; if it be uncertain; if any formidable impediments preſent themſelves, then the whole ſoul is powerfully arouſed: hopes and fears are excited concerning the event; anger and jealouſies are indulged againſt rivals and cauſes of impediments; ſorrows, and vexations at our diſ-

apppointment. Theſe betray the intereſt which the mind has taken in pleaſures which are deemed ſenſual. Where the indulgence has been illicit, repentance alſo and remorſe conſeſs that the ſoul feels itſelf reſponſible for gratifications which are deemed merely carnal.

On the other hand, the finer affections of love, ſuch as the filial, the parental, the ſocial; and benevolence in its more tranquil exertions, being ſo much exalted above the appearance of every thing *ſelfiſh*, and having no immediate perſonal gratification for their object, are generally attributed to the higher principle in our natures. But the love of beauty and of attractive qualifications between the ſexes, becoming ſexual, may create deſires denominated carnal; and benevolence becoming ſympathy and compaſſion with deep diſtreſs, produces the corporeal effects of agonizing grief or fear, and is virtually as ſenſual or carnal as any of the appetites; though uſage is offended at ſuch an application of the terms.

Thus it appears that the grand principles of love and hatred, deſire and averſion, produce their effects upon the whole ſyſtem when they operate, with a certain degree of force: though for the ſake of diſcrimination we give different names to theſe effects; and to manifeſt our ſenſe of the ſuperiority

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of one claſs of our deſires and affections when compared with another, we annex various degrees of reſpectability to thoſe which are moſt remote from the gratification of corporeal wants.

When the affections of love and deſire are placed upon objects deemed the moſt ſenſual, they are called *appetites;* and they are ſtigmatized with the epithet of *carnal* appetites, becauſe they begin and terminate in gratifications which do not call forth one amiable quality or reſpectable exertion of the mind, and which are peculiarly liable to the groſſeſt abuſe. When indulged within the limits permitted, they are void of merit; if illegitimate, or indulged to exceſs, they are accounted ignominious. In this ſingular predicament are thoſe gratifications, which have for their final cauſe, the ſupport or produce of life, excluſively placed.

The finer ſpecies of *corporeal* enjoyments reject the degrading epithets of ſenſual and carnal with diſdain. No one is ſaid to be carnally diſpoſed, when his ears are gratified with the charms of muſic; when his eye ſurveys the beauties of nature. He is not charged with having an inſatiable appetite for paintings, or condemned for inordinate concupiſcence though he ſhould expend his fortune in making purchaſes, or exhauſt his health by inceſſant application to the art. For though his ſenſes are equally gratified, as in the other inſtances, yet the

enjoyment is furniſhed by objects more dignified in their nature, which have been the reſult of ſkill and ingenuity. It is here that *merit* commences both in the power of enjoyment, and in the power of execution; and language diſtinguiſhes gratifications from theſe ſources by the more elevated appellation of *taſte*. This very term, by the way, is an indication of the power of the object of our purſuit to elevate our ideas reſpecting the expreſſions employed. The word *taſte*, although it is a metaphor borrowed from one of the carnal ſenſations, loſes the groſſneſs of its original meaning in the new mode of its application. It is ennobled by its object, till we forget that it is of a plebeian origin.

The pleaſure derived from agreeable odours being as it were the medium between the groſſer appetites, and the pleaſure inſpired by harmonious ſounds or the objects of viſion, neither expoſed to the diſgrace of the former, nor poſſeſſing the merit of the latter, has no epithet either of contempt or reſpectability.

When love and deſire are placed upon nobler objects than any of the preceding; ſuch as knowledge, virtue, or any other mental qualification, the ſuperior dignity of theſe purſuits, and their elevation above every thing deemed ſenſual, and above the gratification of a refined taſte, confers a dignity upon the affections themſelves until they

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ſeem to be of an higher origin, and emulate every thing we can conceive of the moſt exalted ſpirits. For we cannot entertain more elevated ſentiments of immaterial created intelligences, than that they poſſeſs an ardent love of knowledge, wiſdom, and moral obligation.

Nor have we any reaſon to aſcribe thoſe powers of the mind, which by way of pre-eminence we denominate *intellectual* to any other principle than that which is the ſource of the affections, and is intereſted in the cravings of the appetites. The ſtate of mind, and its conſcious perceptions muſt vary according to the kind of employment in which it is engaged. When its occupation is ſimply to inveſtigate truths of any kind, to examine, deliberate, judge, and reſolve; it is in a very different ſtate, than when it is forcibly ſtruck with the *beneficial* or *pernicious* nature and tendency of theſe truths, or of any influential quality with which it is become acquainted. It contemplates abſtract ideas which may have a diſtant reference to utility, in a mood very different from that it experiences when very *attractive* or very *alarming* properties preſent themſelves to the imagination, whoſe influence upon our *well-being* ſeems to be direct and immediate.

Yet in the calmer exerciſe of the mind, in ſpeculations the moſt abſtruſe, there is a ſpecies of permanent pleaſure of which it is conſcious, and which is

preferred by the philoſopher to the ſtrongeſt emotions which are as tranſient as they are violent; until by ſome new and intereſting diſcovery he is ſurpriſed into joy, or intricacies occur which diſturb and irritate. He then experiences that paſſions and emotions will ſometimes intrude themſelves into the apartment where the door ſeems to be moſt obſtinately ſhut againſt them. Nor can his more tranquil pleaſures be aſcribed to any other cauſe than to a ſtrong *predilection* for the ſtudy which moſt occupies his attention, to his *love* of knowledge, to the *gratification* of his curioſity, to the *ſatisfaction* derived from the enlargement of his ideas and improvement of his underſtanding, to his ardent *deſire* of diſcovering ſomething which may extend his fame or prove beneficial to humanity; that is, to honourable, noble, and uſeful affections.

The Reader will perceive that theſe remarks have not the moſt diſtant reference to the grand queſtion concerning the materiality or immateriality of our natures. They are ſimply oppoſed to thoſe unfounded hypotheſes, and vague conjectures which inſtead of explaining any one phenomenon, render our ideas more embarraſſed. They indicate that we ought not to multiply principles, until we are qualified to aſſign to them their diſtinct offices without encroachments or confuſion. What can be more unſatisfactory

unſatisfactory than to ſuppoſe the exiſtence of principles totally oppoſite in their natures, in order to explain the contrarieties obſervable in human character and conduct; and yet to allow that in ſome inſtances their operations are ſo ſimilar, that philoſophers themſelves cannot aſcertain the diſtinct province of each? Or what can be more ſuperfluous than to imagine the exiſtence of theſe diſtinct principles, merely to confer honour upon the one, and load the other with diſgrace, when the nature of the object purſued and the diſpoſitions towards it will ſolve every difficulty; will indicate an exalted or a depraved ſtate of the *mind*, without ſuggeſting a ſingle doubt whether the ſpiritual man ought in any reſpect, to become reſponſible for the diſgraceful propenſities of the carnal man with whom he is compelled to cohabit?

It has been alleged that during the impetus of paſſion, the ſoul is in a ſtate of much greater activity than at any other period. In moſt inſtances this is probably the caſe. Yet we ſhould recollect that during the excitements of paſſion, the ſoul muſt neceſſarily *manifeſt* the greateſt activity to the ſpectator, from its peculiar exertions upon the corporeal ſyſtem. Whereas in the exerciſe of deep thought, the activity of the ſoul is concentrated within. Of conſequence when the mind is abſorbed

ed in profound meditation, inſtead of indicating more activity than uſual, the external appearance will indicate leſs. Hence it is that deep thinkers are ſo frequently confounded by thoſe who are not deep thinkers, with the ſtupid. In ſuch caſes, the activity of the ſoul can only diſcover itſelf by the reſult of its labours; or by the injuries which intenſe application may have committed upon the conſtitution. Inſtances have exiſted in which mental occupation has produced an inſenſibility to every foreign impreſſion. The ſubject has remained unmoved in the midſt of ſcenes calculated to excite the moſt horrid tumults of ſoul. When the Philoſopher of Syracuſe was ſo wrapt in contemplation as to be inſenſible to all the horrors of a ſiege, his mind could not be leſs active than theirs who were the moſt agitated by the ſcenes of complicated diſtreſs which ſurrounded them.

CHAP. II.

CHAP. II.

Cauſes which create a Diverſity in our Affections enumerated.

IT may ſeem natural to expect that men, formed with ſimilar, and often with equal powers of diſcriminating the nature of objects; in whom the ſenſations of pleaſure and pain, happineſs or miſery are ſo ſimilar; who are expoſed to ſimilar cauſes of excitement, ſhould indicate a correſpondent ſimilarity in their affections, inſtead of ſuch a diverſity which is ſo conſpicuous not only in different perſons, but frequently in themſelves. It is well known that the predilections of individuals for the ſuppoſed means of happineſs are extremely various; that one man will purſue with ardour what another will contemplate with indifference, or with diſapprobation and diſguſt. Nor is there any perſon who entertains invariably the ſame diſpoſition towards the ſame object. At one inſtant

inſtant he will not only feel a much ſtronger affection for it than he did at the preceding, but he may to-day contemplate with contempt and abhorrence that which yeſterday may have excited raptures.

It is of conſiderable moment to trace the principal cauſes of this diverſity, or to point out ſome of thoſe circumſtances which have a very powerful influence over our minds. The number and extent of theſe enjoin brevity upon us, and will permit little more than an enumeration.

§ 1. *The Influence of Experience.*

Theſe diverſities and changes may in many caſes be aſcribed to the difference obſervable between the ſuggeſtions of a lively imagination, and the more faithful reports of experience. Our preconceptions are ſeldom accurate. If they be not entirely falſe, or totally oppoſite to the nature of the ſubject, they are almoſt ſure to err on the ſide of exceſs, or of defect. Experience in numberleſs inſtances corrects theſe errors, and teaches us to eſtimate the qualities of objects as they really exiſt, and not according to a prejudiced conception or an heated imagination. This will of conſequence teach us highly to prize many things which we had before

before neglected or deſpiſed, and to diſmiſs with indifference and contempt many things in which a deluded imagination had placed our ſupreme happineſs. Such changes will take place in every individual in his paſſage through life. Their nature, and the uſes made of them conſtitute the difference between the wiſe man and the fool.

But there are many other cauſes which act more uniformly upon whole claſſes and bodies of people, and give to each claſs a certain caſt of character. Some of theſe are very ſimilar in their effects; others diſſimilar, irregular, and capricious.

Among thoſe which are more uniform in their influence may be placed the diſtinctions in character and diſpoſitions obſervable in the

§ 2. *Difference of Sex.*

In moſt animals of the inferior order there is a manifeſt difference between the male and female both in external appearance, and in inſtinctive properties. The former being in general of a ſtronger make than the latter, and excepting at the moments when the powers of the female are called forth to the protection of their young, more courageous in diſpoſition.

Similar laws manifeſtly prevail in the human ſpecies.

cies. The very form and conſtitution of the man indicate that he is rendered capable of more robuſt employments; and his ſtronger contexture is generally ſpeaking connected with a diſpoſition to greater exertions: whereas the ſuperior delicacy of contexture which diſtinguiſhes the female, is moſtly accompanied with a much greater delicacy of character. Her diſpoſitions to ſtrong and vigorous exertions either of body or of mind are not ſo univerſal, and ſhe generally places her affections upon objects and duties which are more confined and domeſticated.

Nor do the cuſtoms prevalent in ſavage or leſs poliſhed nations invalidate the above remarks. In thoſe countries where bodily labour, or the fatigues of huſbandry, are wholly conſigned to the females, while their huſbands appear indolent and inactive; this indolence is merely the repoſe enjoyed in the interval of ſtill greater exertions. War, or the chace, are excluſively their province, and when engaged in theſe, the men endure much greater fatigues and hardſhips than thoſe allotted to their partners.

It is readily acknowledged that theſe peculiarities of make and of character are not ſo uniform as to reſiſt the influence of cauſes which have a tendency to counteract them. Singularity of temperament, the force of cuſtom and education, particular ſituations in life, may place individuals of each ſex out of their

their proper ſphere, and induce a peculiarity of individual character. But this change ſeldom meets with the approbation of either ſex. An effeminate man is deſpiſed, and a maſculine female has little power to charm.

An eſſential difference is alſo obſervable in ſexual predilections. The female prefers the ſtrong, the bold and couragcous, the ſpirited and enterprizing. Her ideas of beauty and comelineſs are inſtinctively ſuch as correſpond the leaſt with the delicacy of her own perſon. Men in general are moſt enamoured with thoſe qualities and diſpoſitions that indicate a contrary character. They talk of the amiable ſoftneſs of the ſex, and delicacy of form. They think that the milder virtues ſit with peculiar grace upon the female; ſuch as gentleneſs, patience, compaſſion, and tenderneſs. It is expected that ſhe ſhould excel in piety, in faith, hope, reſignation. Men contemplate a female atheiſt with more diſguſt and horror, than if ſhe poſſeſſed the hardeſt features emboſſed with carbuncles. They excuſe, and many are diſpoſed to be pleaſed with ſuch foibles as proceed from delicacy of frame, or greater ſenſibility of mind; while they expreſs their diſapprobation of a bold forward temper, though it ſhould be accompanied with a great ſuperiority of talents. Although moral obligation, as referring to the grand ſtandard of virtuous conduct, may be the ſame;

yet

yet the rougher vices of oaths and intoxication are appropriated by men; while the ſly, evaſive ones of artifice, &c. are deemed leſs opprobrious in the female.

It is maintained that men are moſt impetuous, but that females are moſt deeply affected with the tender paſſion: that if they have not a ſpeedy recourſe to the piſtol or the rope, they will probably ſurvive the agonies of diſappointment, under which the ſofter ſex will gradually pine and die. Theſe facts have induced a French author to remark, that women conſider love as the ſerious buſineſs of life, and men render it ſubordinate to many others. It is however univerſally deemed to be the province of man firſt to declare his paſſion; and it is univerſally expected that the female ſhould receive the declaration with a modeſt coyneſs, and experience ſome degree of ſtruggle with her delicacy before ſhe acknowledges the paſſion to be reciprocal. The female has in general a ſtronger affection for every thing ſhe purſues than men, who are more frequently impelled to act from neceſſity. She always follows her inclination in the diſcharge of her ſocial and domeſtic duties, as well as in the purſuits of pleaſure, elegant accompliſhments, or of literature: and thoſe who are of a ſcientific turn compenſate for any defect in extent of erudition, or depth of inveſtigation, with which they are ſometimes charged,

ed, by brilliancy of language and beauty of ſentiment, which ſo frequently pervade and embelliſh their writings. They are ſuppoſed to be much fonder of ornaments than thoſe of the other ſex who are not reputed fops; and it is ſaid that they more deeply reſent any neglect or ſlight of their perſons. They are warmer in their friendſhips, and their ſtrong attachments can ſcarcely be weakened by any thing but rivalſhips. If ſlighter incidents more eaſily diſcompoſe their tempers, this is abundantly recompenſed by their ſuperior patience under ſeverer trials. In caſes of extreme danger and difficulty, they have not only been equal to the ſupport of their own ſpirits, but they have ſet an example of heroic courage to their deſponding lords. But it is alſo allowed, that when the female mind becomes thoroughly depraved, it greatly ſurpaſſes the other ſex in cruelty, revenge, and every enormity; which is juſtly ſuppoſed to elucidate the common proverb, "*Corruptio optimi, eſt peſſima.*"

In giving the above epitome, either of facts or opinions, the author has purpoſely avoided entering into the controverſy relative to *rights* and *powers*, or to equality or ſuperiority of capacities. He does not wiſh to draw a compariſon between the luſtre of the reſpective virtues, or nicely to balance the reſpective vices of each ſex. His concern is with *differences alone*. If theſe exiſt; if characteriſtic

riſtic differences commencing with early childhood, when the little Miſs delights in her doll, and arranges her domeſtic play-things, while her more hardy brother is driving a hoop or whipping a top; and runs through every period of life, it is of no moment to the ſubject under conſideration whether theſe differences are to be aſcribed to natural and phyſical, or to artificial or incidental cauſes; or *which* has a preponderancy of excellence. (See Note *S.*)

This manifeſt diverſity, and in ſome reſpects total contrariety, in diſpoſition and character is neceſſarily connected with an equal diverſity and contrariety of taſtes and affections; or in other words, the former originate from the latter: the character being itſelf both formed and indicated by a ſeries of predilections and averſions. If therefore each ſex has its diſtinguiſhing characteriſtics, if their taſtes and inclinations be not preciſely ſimilar, ſexual difference muſt be productive of different ideas of the qualities of objects, and create the moſt oppoſite affections reſpecting them: ſo that objects and circumſtances perfectly the ſame, ſhall to each ſex appear in different points of view. That which makes little or no impreſſion on the one, being calculated to produce ſtrong emotions in the other; becoming the ſource of pleaſure or diſpleaſure, of enjoyment or of infelicity.

Another

Another cauſe which operates in a ſimilar manner is

§ 3. *Diverſity of Temperament.*

Without entering into the phyſiological characteriſtic of each temperament, concerning which phyſiologiſts themſelves are not agreed; it has never been diſputed, that there is ſuch a diverſity in the original conſtitution of individuals of each ſex, as may not only influence the mental powers, but alſo the affections of the mind; which may pre-diſpoſe one perſon to be affected by ſcenes and circumſtances in a manner very different from another.

Some are naturally more irritable in their tempers, others more placid: that is, one will perceive and feel cauſes of provocation in ſituations or conduct, which excite no emotions in the mind of another. Some are naturally of a melancholy caſt; which ſpreads a gloom over every object, and prevents them from obſerving and enjoying thoſe qualities which excite cheerful ideas, and communicate pleaſurable ſenſations to another. This man is naturally ſanguine in his diſpoſition: he forms a thouſand projects, and is full of hopes reſpecting

each: he is highly delighted with ſuch proſpects as are inviſible to others; and is charmed with ideal properties, which never entered into the imagination of thoſe who are not under the agreeable deluſion. The diſappointments to which ſuch a temper is inevitably expoſed, become plentiful ſources of vexation, which the leſs ſanguine fortunately eſcape. The timid, on the contrary, ruminate over every poſſibility of evil. They dare not to indulge hope through fear of diſappointment. They ſee and magnify pernicious tendencies, which were totally overlooked by perſons of the contrary diſpoſition. Some are naturally indolent; and this indolence of temper prevents them from perceiving thoſe qualities in objects which arouſe the attention of the more active; and it induces them to give the preference to their beloved eaſe. Some are of a ſocial caſt; and they diſcover a thouſand joys in ſocieties, which appear indifferent or inſipid to the lover of retirement.

Thus is there a natural and habitual diſpoſition to be differently affected by the ſame objects; to each of which the imagination gives a colouring correſponding with the permanent and characteriſtic ſtate of mind.

Another cauſe invariably produces a change in our ideas and diſpoſitions towards particular objects in

in a manner equally uniform and characteriſtic; and that is

§ 4. *The Regular Progress of our Natures from Infancy to advanced Age.*

The changes which take place in our affections and purſuits from this cauſe are inconteſtibly marked by the hand of Nature herſelf, and they maintain a degree of uniformity in every perſon, of every nation and age, whoſe longevity carries him through each period.

The ſtrong deſires of the infant are at firſt confined to its natural wants. No part of nature is known to him, excepting that which ſerves to ſatisfy the cravings of appetite, and the nurſe who adminiſters it. During this ſtate, agonies of grief and ecſtaſies of joy are inſtantaneouſly excited, and as inſtantaneouſly ſubſide. In advancing childhood curioſity begins to awake, and increaſed attention is paid to every thing around us. Our purſuits, our pleaſures, our pains become daily more numerous and complicated. With growing powers the love of action accompanies this inquiſitive diſpoſition. The healthy and vigorous chiefly delight in thoſe amuſements which occupy the attention, in-

creaſe corporeal ſtrength and addreſs, and imperceptibly enlarge the ſtock of ideas. At this period, a thouſand guſhes of paſſion and varied affections engage and agitate the breaſt by turns. Hopes and fears, quarrels and reconciliations, eager purſuits and quick ſatiety occupy every hour.

Upon advancing towards manhood, new paſſions and deſires are implanted. Social connections acquire ſtrength and permanency. Sexual affections ariſe, and the multitudinous paſſions which ſurround them. Ambition is rouſed, and means are purſued productive of important ends. Intereſting objects crowd upon the attention, which increaſe the ardour of the mind, and call forth the moſt vigorous exertions. Gay and lively imagination gilds every ſcene with delight, and to enjoy ſeems to be the whole object of our exiſtence.

Parental affections, cares, ſolicitudes, hopes and diſappointments, joys and griefs, of a more durable and ſerious nature ſucceed to the thoughtleſſneſs of younger years. The ſocial affections which ſeemed at an early period to be inſtinctive, ripen into a laſting and benevolent concern for the good of others; theſe manifeſt themſelves in ſome characters, by directing the attention to plans and projects of public utility; while in others, inordinate ſelf-love and inſatiable ambition become the firſt ſprings of action.

A placid ſtate of mind and love of eaſe naturally form the habitual diſpoſition of the aged. Their other affections moſtly derive their complexion from the ſcenes of their preceding years. Repeated injuries, confidence abuſed, and various diſappointments united with their growing infirmities, are apt to inſpire a peeviſh humour, and render ſuſpicion and the exceſs of caution the prevailing diſpoſition. Long habits of frugal induſtry, joined with repeated obſervations, or with their perſonal experience of the dependent and neglected ſtate of the needy, will often create an inordinate love of wealth, which, a conviction that it cannot be long enjoyed is not able to ſubdue. A deſire of eaſe and tranquillity, which now conſtitute their principal enjoyment, is apt to render them vexed and irritated at the ſmalleſt interruptions. Some aged perſons on the other hand acquire a placid cheerfulneſs, by the recollection both of difficulties ſurmounted, and of arduous duties performed, which are never to recur. Conſcious of having filled the various connections and relations of life with propriety and uſefulneſs, they have treaſured up a fund of complacency and lively hope to conſole the decline of life. Even the difficulties with which they ſtruggled, and the dangers they have eſcaped, now become the ſources of ſatisfaction.

Thus has every period of life its characteriſtic

influence upon our ideas and our affections; placing new objects before the mind, and repreſenting the former ones in very different ſhapes and colours from thoſe which firſt occupied the imagination.

§ 5. *National Cuſtoms.*

National cuſtoms, however widely they may differ from each other, have alſo a very powerful and permanent hold on the affections. For theſe the inhabitants of every country imbibe a pre-poſſeſſion from the earlieſt infancy. Early habits ſeem to be propagated with the ſpecies; ſo intimately are they formed and moulded into the growing frame! and theſe early propenſities are every day ſtrengthened and confirmed by univerſal example! Cuſtom and habits reconcile whole nations to climates the moſt unfriendly, and to occupations the moſt arduous and ſervile.

> What ſofter natures ſtart at with affright,
> The hard inhabitant contends is right.

The hiſtory of the manners and cuſtoms of different nations fully demonſtrates that they are divided into large maſſes of predilections and prejudices, ſtrong attachments and ſtrong averſions! It evinces the feeble

feeble influence of the rational faculties either in forming or correcting cuſtoms, the moſt beneficial, or the moſt pernicious. Nay ſhould experience itſelf begin to ſuggeſt better principles to ſome ſuperior and reflecting minds, ages may roll before any one will venture out of the common courſe, and attempt to reduce them to action; and his beſt endeavours will probably be rewarded with ridicule, contempt, and general deteſtation! Though cauſes merely incidental may have conſpired to introduce a peculiarity of manners and to form national characters; yet being once formed, they become the ſovereign rule of thought and action: they are diffuſed over the moſt extenſive communities; and unleſs freedom of intercourſe be held with neighbouring nations, not an individual can eſcape the impreſſion. Thus it is that the inhabitants of one diſtrict contemplate thoſe things as eſſential to well-being, which others hold in abhorrence; that one claſs of people reveres as incumbent duties, obſervances which others contemplate as the greateſt abſurdities; that ſome are inſpired with invincible attachments to rites, which thoſe who are not under the influence of the ſame pre-poſſeſſions, juſtly conſider as a diſgrace to humanity.

Whether cuſtom ſhould influence opinion, or opinion introduce cuſtom, they both operate upon the affections, and generally manifeſt the plenitude

tude of their power by the number and magnitude of the abſurdities they render familiar and acceptable to the mind. Theſe have for ſucceſſive generations eſtabliſhed the empire of imaginary beings; and the affections of reverence, love, and gratitude have been thrown away upon ideal objects. Theſe have ſanctioned the moſt inveterate hatreds; have conſecrated immoralities, and dignified theft, proſtitution, and murder; have rendered the auſterities of Brachmen and Monks venerable to the multitude; have loaded the Gentoo Female with inſufferable diſgrace who refuſes to expire in torments from affection to her deceaſed huſband; and in the moſt enlightened countries they enjoin it upon the Man of Honour to murder his beſt friend for a haſty expreſſion, or ſome other indiſcretion of a momentary tranſport. Opinion has clothed a frail mortal with infallibility, or communicated that excluſive attribute of Deity to councils and ſynods, and bowed the necks of myriads to the empire of their decrees. It has elevated the worthleſs into the character of ſaints, and thoſe who have moſt deſerved the Divine indignation have been invoked as the moſt prevalent interceſſors. It has repreſented the Univerſal Parent as the tyrant inſtead of the benevolent friend of mankind; conducted to the torture thoſe who preſumed to think more worthily of him,

him, and it now threatens a total abnegation of his exiſtence.

But the diverſities of opinions and manners, with their correſpondent predilections and averſions, exceed enumeration. It is theſe diverſities which furniſh the amuſement derived from the peruſal of travels; and as no two nations on the globe correſpond in every inſtance, the peculiarities of each illuſtrate in a ſtriking manner the truth of our obſervation. They indicate the inconceivable variety of ſentiments and affections which incidentally take place among beings of the ſame ſpecies, inhabitants of the ſame ſublunary ſyſtem, converſant with ſimilar objects, and poſſeſſing ſimilar powers of mind.

§ 6. *The Force of Habit.*

Similar to the cuſtoms which pervade large bodies of men, is the power of habit over individuals. The mind frequently acquires a ſtrong and invincible attachment to whatever has been familiar to it for any length of time. Habits primarily introduced by accident or by neceſſity, will inſpire an affection for peculiarities which have the reverſe of intrinſic merit to recommend them. Theſe become,

come, as it were, assimilated to our natures; we contemplate them as belonging to ourselves so intimately, that we feel an irksome vacuity in their absence, and enjoy a great degree of satisfaction in their being replaced; merely because we have been habituated to them. How frequently does it happen that the most trifling circumstances, in early life, will decide the lot of our future years; creating affections and aversions, which have the most lasting influence! It is this cause which so frequently inspires a preference for one trade, pursuit, or profession, rather than another! Thus we perceive that children sometimes make choice of the employments of their parents or their neighbours, because it had agreeably engaged the attention of their juvenile hours. They love to imitate and play the man, till an affection is acquired for the occupation itself. This is generally the case where the occupation is of an active nature, and most adapted to the vivacity of youth. If, on the other hand, their minds are strongly impressed with the confinement, slavery, or any other disagreeable circumstance attending the employment to which they are daily witnesses, they are inclined to the contrary extreme, contract an aversion, and give the preference to any other pursuit, the inconveniences of which are unknown to them.

It is needless to enlarge farther upon these particulars;

culars; as every individual muſt be conſcious of their truth. There is no one who does not feel the force of habit, both as the ſource of pleaſure and of diſpleaſure. It is experienced in every ſtation and connection in life; it is experienced in what we eat, or drink, or wherewith we are clothed; in our habitations and their furniture; and in our own characteriſtic peculiarities.

§ 7. *Principle of Self-Love.*

The influence of this principle has frequently ſhewn itſelf in the courſe of our Analyſis. Its tendency to magnify the good or evil which relates to ourſelves is perpetually felt. But we ſhall now confine our attention to the effects of *appropriation;* or the attachment generated, and the affections indulged reſpecting every thing we call *our own.*

Mr. Hume has collected together many ſtriking inſtances of the effect of this principle. (See Diſſertation on the Paſſions.) He attributes it to *pride;* but then he defines pride to be a *certain ſatisfaction in ourſelves on account of ſome accompliſhment or poſſeſſion which we enjoy.* Without examining the propriety of this definition at preſent,

(See

(See Note *H.*) the influence of *Self*, reſpecting appropriation muſt be univerſally admitted. "It "is always," ſays he, "*our* knowledge, *our* ſenſe, "beauty, poſſeſſions, family on which we value "ourſelves.—We found vanity upon houſes, gar- "dens, equipage, and other external objects; as "well as upon perſonal merit and accompliſhments. "—Men are vain of the beauty either of *their* "country, or *their* county, or even of *their* pa- "riſh; of the happy temperature of the climate, in "which they are born; of the fertility of their native "ſoil; of the goodneſs of the wines, fruits, or "victuals produced by it; &c." "Every thing be- "longing to a vain man, is the beſt that is any "where to be found. His houſes, equipage, fur- "niture, clothes, horſes, hounds, excel all others "in his conceit, &c."

Theſe and many other inſtances that might be enumerated indicate an innate propenſity to value whatever we poſſeſs, merely from the incidental circumſtances of its being *our own*. That this diſpoſition frequently gives riſe to the exceſs of vanity is not to be diſputed: but the diſpoſition itſelf is ſo important that it cannot be diſpenſed with, notwithſtanding that it has ſo unfavourable an appearance. The ſtrong attachment to whatever is our own *becauſe* it is our own, is one of the happieſt propenſities of our natures. It is the recompence of all

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our deſires, purſuits, and exertions. Without this principle, every object in life would appear unintereſting and inſipid; and the majority of our habitual affections would be annihilated. It is this which forms that intimate and pleaſing connection with every thing around us; and enables trifles themſelves greatly to adminiſter to our comfort and ſatisfaction.

But the diverſity which it creates in our individual affections is no leſs obvious. Every man has his own diſtinct atmoſphere of good. A circle which is his own. Every particle compoſing it, is viewed by another with eyes of indifference; but by himſelf with complacency and delight.

§ 8. *The Influence of Education.*

By education in this place is underſtood any attempt to enlarge the ideas and improve the mind by the acquiſition of general knowledge, or proficiency in any particular branch. Education introduces to an intimate acquaintance with numberleſs objects which are totally unknown to the ignorant; and every object poſſeſſes ſome quality of a pleaſant or unpleaſant nature, proportionably multiplying or diverſifying our agreeable or diſagreeable ſenſations.

ſenſations. With the ignorant, objects are comparatively few. Scenes before them are of no great extent; and even theſe are overlooked by the majority, whoſe years paſs away in a kind of ſenſitive indolence without apathy or affection.

Sometimes however a natural acuteneſs of underſtanding is obſervable among the moſt illiterate, accompanied with lively ſenſations and very ſtrong affections; and when they are once arouſed by objects that appear intereſting, their paſſions are moſt violent. What they know can alone appear important to them, and the very little they poſſeſs is their all. Their whole ſouls are concentrated in that which gives pleaſure, and all the powers of body and mind are exerted to repel whatever gives pain. This will indicate the cauſe of that remarkable ſtrength of paſſions and affections, both of the benevolent and malevolent kind, ſo obſervable in ſavage nations; and the impetuoſity of character ſo often to be met with among the active and uninformed in every nation.

The cultivated mind, by increaſing its acquaintance with innumerable ſubjects, will inevitably diſcover ſome pleaſing quality in every object of its purſuit: of conſequence both attention and affections are divided and ſubdivided into innumerable ramifications; and thus, although enjoyment may upon the whole be augmented by aggregate numbers,

numbers, yet each individual quality poſſeſſes but a moderate ſhare of influence.

The young and inexperienced are generally affected by ſimple objects. The cauſes of their joy or anger, ſorrow or fear are ſeldom complex. As the powers of the mind are more enlarged, the affections are both more diverſified and rendered more complicated! Thus upon the perception of favours and obligations, the joy from good becomes united with *gratitude* to the author of that good; with *love*, *veneration*, *reſpect*, for his character; with *admiration* at the extent of the good, or at ſome peculiarity in the delicacy and liberality with which it was conferred. Experience introduces the paſſions of hope and fear, by teaching us the knowledge of good worth poſſeſſing, on the one hand, and the accidents to which it is liable on the other.

It is obſervable further that the young and inexperienced, whoſe habits are not yet formed, and to whom every thing is new, are moſt apt to be influenced by the introductory emotions of *ſurpriſe* and *wonder*. This inexperience renders things and events, which are familiar to others, new and ſtrange to them. They are prone to be in ecſtaſies for acquiſitions and advantages comparatively trifling, and to be agitated by ſmall or imaginary evils, becauſe their imaginations have not been corrected by

 experience.

experience. But, if theſe *paſſions* from more ſimple cauſes, are frequently ſtronger in *them* than in others, it is equally true that their *affections* are leſs permanent. A rapid ſucceſſion of novelties, and the immenſe variety which increaſed knowledge introduces, quickly efface the preceding impreſſion.

But the very extent of this ſubject alſo enjoins brevity upon me. A whole *Encyclopedia* could ſcarcely do it juſtice. The infinite diverſity of purſuits which in this age engage the attention of an awakened world, are accompanied by an equal diverſity of predilections; they preſent an infinite variety of qualities to the inquiſitive mind, which excite their correſpondent emotions and affections.

Other cauſes which influence our ideas of qualities have a very powerful, though very tranſient effect. They are merely the ephemerons of the mind; nor have they that immediate relation to the ſuppoſed merit or demerit of the object, which exerts its influence in all the preceding caſes. Theſe are the influence of *Novelty* and of *Faſhion*.

§ 9. *Influence of Novelty.*

As by the power of habit we are reconciled to circumſtances, and even enjoy complacency in ſituations,

tuations, merely becauſe we are accuſtomed to them; thus will the novelty of an object frequently render it intereſting for the moment, and give it a temporary pre-eminence to many things which we know to poſſeſs intrinſic merit. Novelty is in itſelf the moſt tranſient of all qualities, being ſolely adapted to that inſtinctive curioſity, which may be conſidered as an appetite for knowledge. Novel objects will at firſt excite a degree of wonder and admiration; from their being ſuppoſed to poſſeſs ſomething ſtrange, rare, or peculiar: but as theſe are relative qualities alone, and as this relation refers ſolely to our ignorance and inexperience, their effects are evaneſcent; for when the ſubject is no longer novel to us, it does not ſeem any longer to poſſeſs them. When novelty is no more, we ſhall either reject them with indifference or diſpleaſure; or they may continue to attract our attention by our perception of other and more permanent qualities.

The love of novelty may in ſome minds be conſidered as a diſeaſe; as a falſe appetite which craves more than it can digeſt, and ſeeks a variety of viands, from whence it derives but very little nouriſhment. This paſſion, though it renders us perpetually inquiſitive, perpetually impels us to ſee objects through a falſe medium. At firſt, they are rendered peculiarly attractive through the adventitious colouring which the imagination has given

them. They appear inſipid when their novelty is gone, or beeome depreciated beyond their deſerts from the diſappointment of our expectations concerning them. This fondneſs for novelty, when carried to an exceſs, renders a perſon whimſical in his choice, and unſteady in his purſuits. Momentary pleaſures terminate in ſatiety and diſappointment, which are inſuperable impediments to that deliberate inveſtigation and habitual experience, which alone can enable us to judge of the real nature and intrinſic qualities of the objects around us.

But no cauſe whatever is ſo whimſically verſatile and tyrannical, in exciting predilections and averſions, as the

§ 10. *Power of Fashion.*

This power is an ideal influenza that ſpreads with the utmoſt rapidity, infecting a whole community where it commenced, and ſometimes extending to diſtant nations; and it acquires ſuch ſtrength in its progreſs that nothing can reſiſt its force! It does not poſſeſs the degree of merit attendant upon the exceſſive love of novelty, which always imagines the object to poſſeſs ſome degree of worth; a circumſtance this, by no means eſſential to the influ-

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ence of faſhion ; whoſe authority is in general derived from things known to be idle and inſignificant. Faſhion gives abſolute ſway to modes, forms, colours, &c. wantonly introduced by the whim of an individual, with whom the majority have not the moſt diſtant connection, concerning whom they are totally ignorant unleſs circumſtances and ſituations of notoriety ſhould render their characters either *equivocal*, or *unequivocal*. It is capable of inſtantaneouſly altering our opinion of the nature and qualities of things, without demanding any painful exertions of the underſtanding, or requiring the ſlow proceſs of inveſtigation. With the quickneſs of a magic wand, it in a moment ſubverts all thoſe ideas of beauty, elegance, and propriety, we had before cheriſhed. It makes us reject as odious what we lately contemplated as moſt deſirable ; and raptures are inſpired by qualities, we had juſt conſidered as pernicious and deformed. There are ſome inſtances indeed, in which we endeavour to juſtify our novel affections. We are aſſiduous to find out ſome peculiar excellence or advantage, in whatever becomes the idol of the day ; and to diſcover ſome inſufferable defect in the divinity we have diſcarded. That which was once deemed grand and majeſtic in ſize or form, will now ſtrike the eye as inſupportably clumſy ; and the regularity we once admired, now renders an object ſtiff, preciſe, and

formal. Colours, which were yeſterday ſo delicately elegant, will appear to-day faint, faded, and lifeleſs; and thoſe which were lately much too ſtrong and glaring for our weak optics, become in an inſtant bright, glowing, and majeſtic. Faſhion will render that particular garb which we lately thought ſo warm and comfortable, intolerably ſultry; and it makes the ſlighteſt covering, contrary to its priſtine nature, remarkably pleaſant in the depth of winter. The flowing hair, or adjuſted ringlets, ſhall at one period be conſidered as becoming and elegant; at another, be rejected as an inſufferable mark of effeminacy, and as demanding a culpable waſte of our moſt precious time; while their cloſe amputation is deemed both manly and commodious. Faſhion has power to influence our ideas of graceful proportions; it elongates or contracts the form of the leg in one ſex, or of the waiſt in the other. At one period it imperiouſly orders the tighteſt ligatures to encircle the neck; as if the ſeparation of ſome excreſcence were intended: at another it recommends the large and ſwoln cravat, as if it thought a poultice were neceſſary to aſſuage the irritation occaſioned by the preceding mode; and it benevolently permits the chin to partake of the ſoothing warmth. It directs decency to excite a bluſh, at being detected without any other headdreſs than that ordained by nature; and it is able to

ſuppreſs

ſuppreſs the bluſh of female delicacy at expoſures, which ſcarcely leave any room for the exerciſe of the moſt licentious imagination!

§ 11. *Love of Singularity.*

This is the direct oppoſite of the former; and though the love of ſingularity cannot in its own nature be ſo extenſive as the power of faſhion, yet it is very operative where it does exiſt. It conſtitutes the motive and the pleaſure of thoſe, who are bold enough to deviate from the accuſtomed modes of thinking and acting, in order to attract the public attention. As the ſervile imitators of faſhion are *aſhamed* of being ſingular, theſe on the other hand, *glory* in ſingularity. They diſdain to be placed in the line with common men, and think that they ſhall be reſpected as *commanding officers*, by ſtarting out of the ranks. This diſpoſition indicates itſelf in thoſe who are the firſt introducers of faſhions, which the multitude ſo eagerly follow. But it has its influence in more important caſes. It has eventually a powerful ſway over the public at large, who ſeem ready to enliſt themſelves under ſome chief, without being choice about either the nature of the ſervice, or of the recompence. Speculative philo-

ſophy, politics, and religion are the three provinces in which the influence of this diſpoſition is remarkably conſpicuous. It is often the ſource of new theories, which ſometimes inſtruct, ſometimes aſtoniſh, and ſometimes infatuate the world. It is always diſcontented with whatever *is*, and is ſtimulated to ſeek ſomething different, though with varied ſucceſs. In *politics*, it is inimical to monarchy, ariſtocracy, or democracy, according as either of them is the eſtabliſhed form of government. In *religion* it deviates from the popular creed, whatever that may be. It is juſtly called free *thinking*, not free *inquiry;* and it propoſes *private* opinion as the only counterpoiſe to the *public* opinion, without paying any reſpect to the *weight of evidence*, on either ſide. This love of ſingularity has too often a pernicious effect in diſputing ſocieties, and ſometimes in ſeminaries of learning; and it is highly prejudicial to that inveſtigation of truth, which is the profeſſed object of theſe inſtitutions. The diſputant oppoſes opinions generally received, from the love of diſputation, or from the deſire of exerciſing and diſplaying his talents. He directs all his attention to the arguments which appear to be the moſt novel, ſpecious, and embarraſſing. Thus he not only excites doubts in the minds of others, and triumphs in his ſucceſs; but being habituated to ſearch arguments of *oppoſition*, without attending impartially

impartially to the force of evidence, he is finally caught in the web of his own ſophiſtry. He ſeriouſly imagines that truth is on the ſide he at firſt ſupported from vanity; and he rejects as errors ſentiments he ſecretly revered, when he wantonly began to combat them. Thus does he experience a total revolution in his manner of thinking and acting. He conſiders thoſe things as indifferent, abſurd, and pernicious, which he once thought of the higheſt importance; and this ſtate of mind is neceſſarily productive of a change in his affections and diſpoſitions towards them.

§ 12. *Popular Prejudices.*

As whole communities ſometimes entertain an uniformity in ſentiments, with correſpondent predilections and averſions; thus are they not unfrequently divided and ſubdivided into ſects and parties, each of which is rigidly tenacious of his own ideas, contracts very ſtrong attachments for the individuals of his own party, and thinks himſelf authorized to treat thoſe of the oppoſite with contempt and hatred. Philoſophy, religion, and politics manifeſt alſo in a thouſand inſtances the influence of this principle. The two former are diſtinguiſhed into a diverſity of *ſchools* and *ſects*, which

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cheriſh the flattering idea that they are the ſole ſupporters of truth. Their zealous attachment to particular ſentiments is not always the reſult of an impartial examination; but it is ſometimes the conſequence of an early education, and ſometimes it proceeds from an implicit confidence in the virtues, talents, and ſuperior judgment of their chief; or ſome other incidental circumſtance, which has caſt the mind in the mould of particular opinions, and made an impreſſion upon it too deep ever to be obliterated.

Nor does this principle ceaſe to operate in countries that deem themſelves the moſt remote from ſervile attachments or unfounded prejudices. The rancorous ſpirit which too frequently prevails in every conteſted election, will avouch the truth of this aſſertion. Candidates for ſome particular office, profeſſedly of high importance to the intereſts of the community, at once ſtart forth from obſcurity; they are immediately idolized by one party as the mirrors of every excellence, and ſtigmatized by the other, as totally devoid of merit, and unworthy the name of man. Social intercourſe is interrupted; intimate friends become implacable enemies; and during this wretched ferment a total ſuſpenſion takes place of all the principles of honour and integrity, while all the ſluices of ſcandal and abuſe

abuſe are thrown open without reſerve and without remorſe. Partiality and prejudice act and re-act like the waves of the troubled ſea, until they are worked up into a tremendous ſtorm. At theſe periods ſuch phrenſies have been known to diſturb the brain, that the wanton ſhouts of a mob have been productive of outrage and murder, and the colour of a ribband has excited convulſions, as violent as thoſe produced by the ſight of water in the canine madneſs.

To this principle alſo may we not aſcribe a phenomenon, which appears otherwiſe inexplicable? Perſons, who in their individual characters are highly reſpectable, both for ſenſe and integrity, will frequently in their *political* capacities, purſue a conduct the moſt inconſiſtent with either; uniformly act on the extravagant idea, that the exiſtent Miniſter, whoever he may be, is uniformly right in his principles, perfectly diſintereſted in all his actions, and infallible in his plans: or, on the contrary, they regularly and inceſſantly oppoſe him as a compound of depravity and ignorance; whoſe every plan is big with miſchief, and every exertion of power the application of the ſtrength of a Sampſon, to the overthrow of the pillars of the conſtitution.

§ 13.

§ 13. *Associated Ideas.*

The influence of association in suggesting of thoughts, has frequently engaged the attention of philosophers; and the power of trivial incidents to recall former ideas is universally confessed. But their power is perhaps equally extensive over the *affections.*

As one passion or affection pre-disposes the mind to the indulgence of that which most nearly resembles it, thus every passion or affection which has been indulged to a considerable degree, seems to change the complexion of every surrounding object. Places in which we have been happy, strike us as if they had been both witnesses and participants of our bliss; and distress invariably diffuses a gloom over locality itself, and every circumstance that reminds us of what we have felt. Nor can we call to our recollection any place in which we have enjoyed peculiar satisfaction, without feeling an affection for that spot; or recollect scenes of unhappiness, without feeling something like resentment against the theatre of our sufferings. The traveller, who has been made happy in a foreign country, contracts a partiality for every thing belonging

longing to it, both in conſequence of that quick tranſition which ſo frequently accompanies our affections, and its being calculated to recall ſeaſons of pleaſure; if he has been ill received and ill treated, the gayeſt ſcenes and moſt advantageous circumſtances belonging to that country, upon recollection inſpire him with diſguſt and horror.

This principle is alſo very extenſive in its influence. It is this which renders the ſpot where the lover enjoys the company of his miſtreſs, a paradiſe in his ſight, however different its aſpect may be to another. The ſlighteſt preſent as a token of affection inſpires exquiſite delight; a trinket, or a lock of hair are to him of more worth than a kingdom. It is this principle which enſtamps an ineſtimable value upon the relicts of ſaints and martyrs, and empowers fragments of their garments, their very teeth and nails, to work miracles in the opinion of the devotee. In its more moderate exertions, it inſpires a ſtrong attachment to every thing which was once our friend's. It is this principle of aſſociation, which ſo eaſily implants in the religious and devout mind a veneration for the place deſtined to the offices of religion; and inſcribes holineſs upon the edifice devoted to ſacred purpoſes.

The ſame principle renders innumerable circumſtances in common life of conſiderable importance; and in conjunction with habit, enables us to derive comfort

comfort from peculiarities of ſtate and ſituation, that do not poſſeſs any intrinſic advantage. Every thing around us becomes as it were congenial to our natures; and the pleaſures of yeſterday are revived in the objects of to-day.

It extends its influence to the article of dreſs, and inſpires a degree of reſpectability, or the contrary, according to the ſhape of a coat, or the cock of a hat. In the days of our anceſtors this principle was reduced to a regular ſyſtem, and occaſioned that claſſification in dreſs which diſtinguiſhed individuals in the three profeſſions, and in the departments of juſtice, from the vulgar herd. In thoſe days the venerable wig, the robe, and the band invariably excited the ideas of ſuperior ſkill, gravity, piety, and equity. They were venerated as *emblems*, until they were ſo frequently employed as *ſubſtitutes*, that the charm was finally diſpelled.

But although this kind of aſſociation has by no means ſo extenſive an effect as in former days, yet it is not entirely deſtroyed. It is felt in our navies and armies, where the raw recruit is deſpiſed, and often very roughly treated by his more veteran aſſociates, until they have loſt ſight of his ignorance and inexperience in the uniformity of dreſs. It is felt by every actor, who cannot fully enter into the ſpirit of his part, until he has aſſumed the character

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in his external appearance. It is invariably felt by thoſe diſtinguiſhed for their attachment to ornaments, who ſo frequently miſtake the elegance of their garb, and the value of their jewels, for their own perſonal accompliſhments. It is at times felt by every one in a greater or leſs degree; for his mind experiences ſomething of a conformity with the ſtate of his dreſs; and the remark of *Sterne*, that a propenſity to meanneſs is increaſed by the want of clean linen, poſſeſſes a portion of philoſophy as well as of humour.

This principle of aſſociation exerts its influence in more important matters. It inſpires a diſpoſition to ſubſtitute one thing for another, becauſe of ſome points of ſimilarity; however they may differ in more eſſential articles. Thus it frequently ſubſtitutes the means for the end. In *religion* it confounds the obſervance of rites and ceremonies with the ſpirit of true devotion; and a punctual attendance upon the means of improvement is deemed equivalent to *progreſs* in improvement. In *morals*, it ſometimes reſpects a vice that is contiguous to a virtue; and it degrades a virtue, that is contiguous to a vice. Thus becauſe a generous man is liberal in his donations, the *Prodigal* who ſquanders in thoughtleſs profuſion his own property and that of others, boaſts of his *liberality*. Becauſe *œconomy* is a virtue, *avarice* aſſumes the title. The *raſh*

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and *impetuous* give the character of cowardice to *caution;* and the *coward* confounds genuine courage with unpardonable *raſhneſs.*

In like manner are degrees of atrocity calculated, not by the innate baſeneſs of an act, or the quantity of miſery it diffuſes, but according to the nature of the puniſhment inflicted by human laws; or the quantity of reputation that is in danger by the commiſſion. Thus ſome have imagined that they reſpect virtue, becauſe they deteſt diſgrace. Theſe pay peculiar attention to mere *appellations*, and *modes of expreſſion*, deſignedly adopted to conceal the enormities of guilt. The man, who in his ſocial habits apparently ſcorns to be unjuſt, will not ſcruple to ruin his beſt friends by raſh and adventurous projects; and he ſimply calls the iſſue, an unfortunate *ſpeculation.* The ruin of female honour, to the deſtruction of the peace and happineſs of reſpectable relatives, being termed an *act of gallantry*, is ſcarcely deemed inconſiſtent with the character of a man of honour.

Theſe few ſpecimens ſhew the nature and extent of the aſſociating principle. They indicate that it ſometimes operates as a *remembrancer*, ſometimes as an *emblem* or *repreſentative*, and ſometimes as a *ſubſtitute;* that it may be the handmaid of innocent and virtuous affections, the ſource of bigotry and ſuperſtition,

ſuperſtition, and an apology for the deepeſt depravity.

When our ideas of the qualities of objects, and diſpoſitions towards them, are not under the influence of theſe adventitious circumſtances; when they are the moſt correſpondent with their real natures, yet the impreſſions they make upon our feelings are extremely different at different ſeaſons. Sometimes we perceive that they exiſt, but we contemplate them without either emotion or affection; at other times they acquire ſuch an irreſiſtible influence, that they will not ſuffer a competitor. The novelty of an object, where its real qualities are immediately apparent, and the ſudden manner in which it is preſented to our notice, have, as we have already obſerved, a very powerful influence over our affections; there are many other adventitious circumſtances, which from their ſtriking effects upon the mind, deſerve to be enumerated. For example:

§ 14. *The Manner in which Information is conveyed to us.*

It is natural to expect that a full conviction of the truth of any intereſting particulars, would at all times be attended with an impreſſion proportionate to the importance of the facts. But this is not the caſe: much depends upon the *manner* in which ſuch intereſting ſcenes are preſented to the mind. The information obtained by *reading* a plain and ſimple ſtatement of events, for example, is the weakeſt in its influence. A narrative of the ſame events from an *eye witneſs*, whoſe credit may not be ſuperior to that of the hiſtorian, brings us as it were nearer to the object, and makes a much more vivid impreſſion. Both of theſe are feeble compared with the influence of *ſight*. It is through the organs of ſight alone, that the moſt vivid and moſt permanent impreſſions remain. Every minute circumſtance is now placed before us, and each exerts its own impreſſive influence at the ſame inſtant. The information is complete and indubitable, without any mixture of obſcurity in the mode of repreſentation, or remains of incredulity on our parts; which ſeems to weaken the evidence of what we conſider

ſider authentic hiſtory, more than is generally ſuſpected. We are *our own* evidence, and we muſt give credit to ourſelves. Hence we ſpeak of *ocular demonſtration*, and agree that *ſeeing is believing*.

Whether the above reaſons ſuggeſted be ſatisfactory or not, it is a ſingular fact, that in reading the moſt terrible events with which the pages of hiſtory are filled, we not only *bear* to read, but *take delight* in the peruſal of thoſe incidents which would be too affecting were they immediately deſcribed to us by an eye witneſs; and would excite inſufferable anguiſh were we ourſelves ſpectators of the ſcenes. The cool narration of thoſe vices, follies, intrigues, cruelties, oppreſſions, of which the hiſtory of ſtates and kingdoms is chiefly compoſed, is juſt ſufficient to awaken within us that degree of horror, indignation, and ſympathy, which is not inconſiſtent with the pleaſure we take in the gratification of curioſity; while it inſpires ſelf-approbation, which is far from being unpleaſant, in the perception that we are always intereſted in the cauſe of the innocent, the weak, and the oppreſſed; that we can deteſt vice, and rejoice in the triumphs of virtue.

Nor does the profeſſed hiſtorian deſcend to thoſe *minutiæ*, which in ſcenes of this kind have the ſtrongeſt hold upon the mind. His narrative con-

ſiſts in a general repreſentation of facts. He tells us of thouſands and tens of thouſands that were deſtroyed, or led into captivity, or reduced to extreme diſtreſs by peſtilence and famine, without expatiating upon minuter circumſtances, which are abſolutely neceſſary to compoſe an intereſting picture. Thus are we much more affected with the parting of *Hector* from *Andromache*, than with the conflagration of Troy; and we ſympathize more deeply with the fate of this hero, when his lifeleſs body was dragged at the chariot-wheels of his proud conqueror, than with all the real diſtreſſes of the Trojan war. We ſuffer more from the ſimple ſtory of *Le Fevre*, than from the reports of an hoſpital; and the countryman's pathetic lamentations over his dead aſs, have called forth tears of commiſeration, which much more extenſive diſtreſs will not always produce.

This leads us to other cauſes, which have alſo a powerful influence in exciting or directing our affections; and have ſome relation both with the ſympathy of our natures, and with the aſſociation of ideas already noticed: and theſe are

§ 15.

§ 15. *Imitative Tones and Representations.*

We are ſo conſtituted as to be ſtrongly affected by any *repreſentation* of particular ſtates and ſituations, notwithſtanding we are convinced that they are imaginary or artificial. Mere tones, attitudes, geſtures, imitating or reſembling any of thoſe produced by one or other of the paſſions and affections, are calculated to excite emotions and correſpondent feelings in ſuſceptible minds. Like muſical inſtruments attuned to the ſame key, our feelings are made to vibrate with the vibrations of ſurrounding objects. Even the voice and accents of inferior animals, expreſſive either of fear, or pain, or lamentation, or joy, or affection, have a tendency to render us apprehenſive, cheerful, melancholy, or ſympathizing. Rude and harſh ſounds not only create unpleaſant ſenſations, but ſuggeſt unpleaſant and forboding ideas, in all thoſe who have not corrected their ſenſations by their reaſon. It is from this kind of aſſociation probably, that the croaking of the raven and the ſcream of the night-owl are ſo univerſally deemed *ominous of miſchief* by the ignorant. The ſprightly muſic of the feathered ſongſters inſpires an exhilarating vivacity. The ſolitary and melodious notes of the nightingale, the cooing

of the turtle-dove, &c. have always furniſhed imagery for Poets in their deſcription of the tender paſſion of love, or ſympathetic ſorrow. The bleating of the ſheep, and lowing of the kine, &c. although they poſſeſs no real melody in themſelves, yet as they denote the affection of the dam for its offspring, they univerſally inſpire a pleaſing ſympathetic tenderneſs.

The principal charms of the muſic which aims at a higher character, than that of difficult or rapid execution, conſiſt in the imitation of thoſe tones and movements which are moſt intimately connected with the paſſions and affections of the ſoul; which exhilarate the ſpirits, and excite to the ſprightly or graceful dance, arouſe and animate, induce a bewitching melancholy, or diffuſe a pleaſing ſerenity over the mind; which charm by diſplaying ſomething like the power of perſuaſive eloquence without words, holding a kind of converſation without ideas, and exciting whatever diſpoſition the artiſt pleaſes, without ſuggeſting a motive.

It has been occaſionally remarked in our Analyſis, that the powerful influence of any exciting cauſe manifeſts itſelf by emotions correſpondent to the nature of the paſſions; to ſeize theſe external appearances, or to imitate the expreſſive looks, attitudes, and geſtures peculiar to each, is the profeſ-

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ſed object of the ſtatuary and hiſtoric painter: and to do juſtice to the characteriſtic emotions, conſtitutes the difficulty and excellence of their art. It is the profeſſed deſign of theſe to excite ſome emotion, or call forth ſome particular affection correſpondent to the nature of their object. Although the power of the ſculptor is confined to forms and attitudes principally, yet how intereſting may theſe be rendered to the ſpectator! Who can contemplate the *Apollo Belvedere*, the *Venus de Medicis*, without admiring the human ſhape in its characteriſtic beauties? or the *dancing Fawns*, without partaking of their vivacity? Or the *Farneſe Hercules*, without a degree of awe? or the *Laocoon* and his ſons, without a mixture of compaſſion and horror? Or any of theſe, without being aſtoniſhed at the ſkill, ingenuity, or ſublimity of the artiſt? The enthuſiaſtic encomiums beſtowed upon the paintings of celebrated maſters; the eagerneſs with which their labours are purchaſed; the wealth and renown which the moſt diſtinguiſhed of them enjoy; and the reſpect paid to their memories, demonſtrate the amazing effect of their performances upon the mind; the ſtrength of our ſympathy with every repreſentation of paſſion; and the ſurpriſe we experience that theſe powerful effects are produced by the mere diſtribution of colours, or of lights and ſhades, upon board or canvas!

§ 16. *Rhetoric, Oratory, Eloquence.*

If mere tones and repreſentations ſo warmly intereſt the affections, though they are not able to convey information or ſuggeſt any ideas to the mind, perfectly novel; much deeper impreſſions are to be expected from thoſe means, whoſe profeſſed object it is, to increaſe our knowledge of particular ſubjects, extend our views, enlarge our conceptions, and to employ all the force of language and all the power of ſympathy to give them weight and energy; which is the province of *Rhetoric* and *Oratory*.

Rhetoric is generally conſidered as the art of perſuaſion. It attempts to inſpire conviction concerning ſome particular object, that it may influence the will to determine in a manner correſpondent. It ſeeks to arouſe the mind to ſome particular exertion, or to diſſuade it from acting upon any reſolutions already taken, or that are in contemplation. Its immediate employment is not to ſearch after truth, but to render acknowledged or ſuppoſed truths influential. It leaves to logic the province of cool inveſtigation, and of drawing legitimate concluſions from admitted premiſes, without any

any regard to *motives*. The rhetorician is ſolicitous to effect ſome particular purpoſe, and calls in the aid of reaſon merely as an auxiliary. He attempts to influence the will by reaſoning with the *affections*; knowing that if they be gained over to the party eſpouſed, the *will* is ready to follow. He therefore artfully conceals or ſlightly paſſes over every circumſtance which is not favourable to his views, brings forward and largely expatiates upon thoſe which are. He ſuggeſts motives of pleaſure, utility, ſafety, honour, pity, &c. as the ſubject admits. He not only pre-ſuppoſes the object in view of the firſt importance, but he employs every method to implant this conviction in the minds of thoſe he endeavours to perſuade.

Theſe attempts are moſt ſucceſsful, by a cloſe imitation of that train of ideas, and thoſe modes of expreſſion which any particular paſſion or affection is prone to ſuggeſt. If the deſign be to excite anger and reſentment, rhetoric imitates the language of anger. It places the ſuppoſed offence in the ſtrongeſt point of view, and deſcribes it in the moſt vivid colours. It aſſiduouſly collects and expatiates upon every circumſtance which contributes to the aggravation of the crime. It is indignant againſt that ſpiritleſs tranquillity which can patiently endure ſuch inſults, and attributes reluctance to revenge to mean and cowardly motives. If its object

ject be to excite *terror*, it aſſembles together every particular which has a tendency to alarm with a ſenſe of danger. It ſtigmatizes courage with the epithet of raſhneſs, and flight is dignified with the title of prudence, &c. If *compaſſion* be the object, it expatiates upon the wretched ſtate of the ſufferer; his fears, his apprehenſions, his penitence. It palliates his faults, extols his good qualities; and thus collects in one point of view all his claims to commiſeration.

The ſpecies of argument, which perſons under the influence of paſſions and ſtrong affections perpetually adopt, is rendered more efficacious by appropriate language. The rhetorician therefore ſtudies and imitates the particular language of each paſſion, either in its energy, vivacity, or diffuſeneſs. Hence he liberally employs all thoſe tropes and figures of ſpeech, which nature ſuggeſts, and art has claſſified.

Oratory adds to the rhetorical compoſition the advantages of *elocution*. It adapts the manner of delivery to the nature of the ſubject and the appropriate language. It takes the characteriſtic ſigns of each emotion for its model, as far as it dares to imitate without the imputation of mimickry; and enters into the attitudes, geſtures, tones of voice, accents, emphaſis, expreſſions of countenance, inſpired by the particular emotion, in ſuch a manner, that

that not an idea is ſuffered to loſe its proper effect by any deficiency in kind or degree of energy communicated to it; and thus it enjoys every advantage to be derived from the power of ſympathy.

Eloquence, according to the modern ideas of it, appears to be the medium between the impetuoſity which oratory admits, and which was highly characteriſtic of ancient oratory, and the ſtudied artifice of the profeſſed rhetorician. The term is ſometimes applied to *compoſition*, ſometimes to *delivery*. When applied to both it comprehends a certain degree of elegance both of diction and of manner. The want of that energy which approaches to violence, is compenſated by pertinency of language, fluency of utterance, and guarded chaſtity of addreſs. In a word, its excellency conſiſts in a pleaſing adaption of language to the ſubject, and of manner to both. It refuſes too cloſe an imitation of the turbid emotions, but it delights in animated deſcription. It ſeems rather partial to the pathetic: The elegance and graces which it loves, harmonizing moſt eaſily and ſucceſsfully, with the ſofteſt and fineſt feelings of our natures.

The power of oratorial eloquence is almoſt irreſiſtible. It penetrates into the inmoſt receſſes of the ſoul. It is able to excite or to calm the paſſions of men at will; to drive the multitude forwards

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to acts of madneſs, or to ſay to the contending paſſions, "Peace, be ſtill." It changes the whole current of our ideas concerning the nature and importance of objects; and of our obligations and advantages reſpecting them: it rouſes from pernicious indolence, and renders the ſentiments and diſpoſitions already formed moſt influential. In a word, it has made of the human ſpecies both monſters and angels, excited men to deeds of horror, and to the moſt noble and generous exertions.

§ 17. *The Drama.*

The ſucceſsful dramatic Writer catches the ideas and imitates the language of every paſſion, emotion, and affection in their different ſtages and degrees. His profeſſed object is to ſuppoſe a diverſity of characters, and to ſupport them with a correſpondent train of ideas; to inſpire them with predilections and averſions, or call forth particular paſſions and affections, according to the ſituations in which he has placed them. His hopes of ſucceſs depend upon the cloſeneſs of the imitation; and ſucceſs itſelf conſiſts in being able to intereſt the heart, by exciting affections and emotions ſimilar to thoſe which would be felt by the reader or ſpectator,

tator, were he an immediate witneſs to ſimilar ſcenes in real life.

The complete *Actor* poſſeſſes the happy talent of expreſſing by manner the ſtate of mind repreſented by his author. He adopts what modern orators reject; and attempts to give force to pertinent ideas and language by imitative tones, geſtures, and countenance, which he varies according to the verſatile ſtate of thoſe who are toſſed upon the billows of paſſion, or agitated by ſome contending emotions, or under the more permanent influence of particular affections.

In theatrical exhibitions there is a conſpiracy to delude the imagination; and all the powers of ſympathy are called forth to produce the effect. Correſpondent ſcenery points out to the ſpectator the very ſpot of action, and characteriſtic dreſſes exert their influence to aid the deception. The ſpectator leaves every idea of real life at the door of entrance, and voluntarily yields himſelf up to the pleaſing deluſion. He finds himſelf in a new world. He is tranſported in an inſtant into diſtant regions and remote ages, and feels in fiction all the force of truth. He laughs at mimic folly, ſincerely weeps at artificial miſery, is inſpired with horror and indignation at imaginary baſeneſs, and is in an ecſtaſy of joy at counterfeit happineſs!

§ 18.

§ 18. *Pre-disposing Causes.*

All the above cauſes which operate ſo powerfully upon the mind, and impreſs it with ſuch a diverſity or contrariety of ſenſations, have ſtill a degree of uniformity in their mode of action. We may ſtill ſuppoſe that the ſame individual placed under their immediate influence, would always entertain ſimilar ideas and receive ſimilar impreſſions. But this is not always the caſe. Certain circumſtances create ſuch a *pre-diſpoſition* within us, that we ſhall at different ſeaſons be very differently affected by the ſame object, both reſpecting the *kind* of paſſion or affection excited, and the degree of power it may exerciſe over us: and they conſtitute that ſtate of mind, which we frequently deſcribe by being *in the humour*, or *not in the humour*. The circumſtances to which we now refer, exert their primary effect upon the corporeal or nervous ſyſtem, render that more ſuſceptible of impreſſions at one time than another, diſpoſe it to be very differently affected by the ſame objects; and through its channel, to affect the ſtate of our minds concerning them.

Theſe obſervations relate to the power of what the medical world has termed the *non-naturals*, which

which exert as great an influence over the diſpoſitions of the mind, as they are productive of ſalutary or morbid pre-diſpoſitions reſpecting the body. All thoſe circumſtances, for example, which are calculated to invigorate the frame, and rouſe it from a ſtate of indolence and inactivity, neceſſarily communicate a correſpondent vigour to the mind, by which it becomes more adapted to receive impreſſions of a certain claſs, and to be more powerfully influenced by particular circumſtances and qualities in objects than at the preceding period. Such are the manifeſt effects of refreſhing ſleep to fatigued and exhauſted natures, of invigorating viands, of cheerful weather, &c. Whatever produces an uneaſy ſenſation in the corporeal ſyſtem, is apt to render the mind peeviſh and fretful, and diſpoſe it to be much more powerfully affected than uſual by incidents of a diſagreeable nature; ſuch as loſſes, diſappointments, the improper conduct of others, &c. It has been frequently noticed by practitioners, that patients are much more fretful and *impatient* in a ſtate of convaleſcence than during the more ſevere periods of their diſeaſe. Their returning powers of ſenſation make them feel the ſtate of the diſordered frame more minutely than during the oppreſſive ſtate of the diſeaſe; and their comfortleſs ſenſations communicate an unuſual fretfulneſs to the temper. Again, thoſe things which heat and irritate to a conſiderable

conſiderable degree, ſoſter all turbulent and irritable paſſions; while thoſe which diffuſe a pleaſing ſenſation over the ſyſtem, diſpoſe to benevolence and good-will. It is a maxim with ſome in modern days never to aſk a favour of an epicure, till after his meals; and the Ancients were not unacquainted with the *mollia tempora fandi*. Whatever chills and debilitates, diſpoſes to timidity; and local ſituations which are retired and gloomy, are moſt conducive to melancholy impreſſions. Indeed ſo dependent is the ſtate of the mind upon that of the body, that nothing can produce a conſiderable change in the latter, without exciting pre-diſpoſitions ſomewhat analogous in the former. The food which recruits the exhauſted powers of animal nature, exhilarates and invigorates the *mind*: the exceſs which burdens the body, *benumbs* the powers of the *ſoul*. The painful and comfortleſs ſenſations produced by flatulencies and indigeſtions in hypocondriac temperaments, have ſometimes produced, and ſometimes been miſtaken for an anxious ſtate of mind; and the medicines which relieve the one, will adminiſter comfort to the other. The ſenſations of hunger, cold, fatigue, &c. being diſagreeable in themſelves, induce an uneaſy reſtleſs ſtate of mind, and petulance of temper. The ſtate of the atmoſphere, peculiarities of climate, ſeaſons of the year have their mental influence; diſpoſe to a cheerful vivacity or gloomineſs

gloominefs of difpofition, induce a languor or invigorate the mental powers. The influence of narcotics upon the mind is univerfally noticed. The exhilarating effects of opiates, the extravagant wildnefs, the pleafing delirium with which they affect the brain, the Elyfian pleafures they fometimes communicate to the imagination, and the confequent torpor and debility diffufed over the whole fyftem, have been frequently remarked. Under their ftimulating influence, man has fhewn himfelf equal to undertakings which it was apparent madnefs to attempt; and the fubfequent depreffion has marked him for a coward. The effects of fpiritous and fermented liquors are no lefs obvious, as every one has too frequent an occafion to remark. Thefe effects are obferved to vary according to the quality of the liquor, the previous ftate of the fubject's mind, or the temperament of his body. Some kinds of potations have a tendency to induce a kind of pleafing ftupefaction; fo that if they do not infpire new ideas, they feem to render the Sot perfectly contented with the few he poffeffes. Thefe are the frequent effects of malt liquors, and the ingredients mixed with them. While other liquors, as the fparkling champaine, exhilarate the fpirits to an unufual degree, and promote a flow of lively and witty ideas. Tempers naturally warm and impetuous are generally very litigious and quarrelfome in their

cups. Others are rendered quarrelſome in a ſtate of intoxication, contrary to their uſual diſpoſitions, through the diſagreeable irritation diffuſed over the ſyſtem by the unuſual ſtimulus. Some perſons on the other hand, who are ſurrounded with diſtracting cares, or oppreſſed with extreme poverty, having for the inſtant drowned thought and reflection in the bewitching draught, which operates like the waters of *Lethe*, they obtain a temporary releaſe from their mental ſufferings, and enjoy an extraordinary and frantic flow of ſpirits in the oblivion of their miſery.

Inſtances ſimilar to the above are infinitely numerous; but theſe are ſufficient to illuſtrate the fact that many circumſtances by primarily affecting the body produce a correſpondent change upon the mind; ſtrengthen many of its affections, and predispoſe to paſſions and emotions, by which it would not otherwiſe have been affected. It may be remarked in general that the ſenſibility of the ſyſtem, or ſuſceptibility of impreſſion, when greatly increaſed by intoxication or any other cauſe, will render the ſame individual amorous, or generous, or courageous, or paſſionate and quarrelſome, according as occaſions and incidents favourable to one or other of theſe affections and emotions may preſent themſelves.

Thus

Thus have we enumerated the principal cauſes, which have a powerful influence over the affections; which occaſion that great diverſity obſervable in the human ſpecies, endowed with ſimilar capacities and apparently placed in ſimilar ſituations. Cauſes by the influence of which one claſs of rational beings differs ſo eſſentially from another equally rational; individuals from individuals in each claſs, and individuals ſo frequently from themſelves.

Our remarks have been extended far beyond the limits propoſed: but we have been imperceptibly carried forwards both by the ſingularity and importance of the ſubject; which would require volumes to do it juſtice, and which volumes could ſcarcely exhauſt.

CHAP. III.

Particular Effects resulting from the Operation of the Paſſions and Affections, conſidered.

EVERY Part of our Analytical Inquiries has manifeſted the powerful influence of the paſſions and ſtronger affections upon the whole ſyſtem. The ſudden changes made in the ſtate of the mind reſpecting particular objects, and the effects as inſtantaneouſly communicated to the corporeal ſyſtem, according to the nature and force of the impreſſion, have been repeatedly conſidered. We have alſo remarked, that as the exciting cauſes are of very different and oppoſite natures, they poſſeſs various degrees of merit and demerit; and that ſome of them being of a pleaſant, others of an unpleaſant nature, they excite correſpondent ſenſations within us as long as we remain under their immediate influence. Theſe peculiarities are productive of certain effects and characteriſtic ſtates, dif-

ferent from the primary object of the paſſion, although they are ſo intimately connected with it. Theſe effects may be placed under the following heads. The *phyſical*, or medical influence of the paſſions, their *metaphyſical*, or influence upon the train of our ideas, correſpondent language, &c. their *moral*, or influence upon character and happineſs. Theſe remain to be briefly conſidered.

SECTION I.

Medical Influence of the Passions.

IF we advert to the ſtrong effects of every violent emotion upon the corporeal ſyſtem, we ſhall not be ſurpriſed that the ſudden and powerful changes produced ſhould, under certain circumſtances, exert a medical influence, in common with many other cauſes that act powerfully upon the body. Accordingly have the paſſions and affections of the mind uniformly had a place given them among the *non-naturals*, as they are termed, or thoſe incidental

incidental cauſes which may occaſionally induce either a ſalutary or morbid effect upon the animal ſyſtem; ſuch as air, exerciſe, reſt, watchings, medicaments, food, heat, cold, &c.

To enter minutely into this ſubject, to enumerate the various facts, upon which our obſervations and aſſertions are founded, to advance and defend any particular theory would be totally foreign from the nature and deſign of this treatiſe, and become tedious to the claſs of Readers for whom it is principally deſigned. Yet ſome obſervations upon the influence of the paſſions in this department neceſſarily belong to a general hiſtory of the paſſions.

In what manner ſalutary or pernicious effects are produced by the inſtrumentality of theſe, it is not agreed. Without adopting any particular hypotheſis, it will be ſufficient for our purpoſe to remark that the phyſicians of the preſent day generally aſcribe the primary changes produced, to their influence upon the nervous power or grand principle of vitality, by which animated bodies are rendered ſuſceptible of an infinite variety of impreſſions. In conſequence of which influence, either the ſyſtem in general, or ſome particular organ is made to deviate from the exerciſe of thoſe functions on which health depends; or is reſtored to its priſtine office after ſuch deviations have taken place.

Not to inquire farther into the laws of phyſiology and pathology, I ſhall only add, that ſuch bodies or ſuch circumſtances as are able to effectuate any important changes produce theſe effects, either by temperating every inordinate and irregular action, by infuſing a ſalutary vigour in oppoſition to languor and inactivity, by exciting to ſome exceſs through the power of their ſtimulus, by inducing a temporary torpor, or permanently debilitating the frame. Properties theſe, which perfectly correſpond with effects produced by the different paſſions and affections of the mind: ſome of which manifeſtly elevate and invigorate the ſyſtem; others greatly depreſs; ſome of them violently irritate, others induce a torpid languor, and others an incurable atonia. A few inſtances will illuſtrate theſe remarks.

But as both deviation and reſtoration refer to ſome ſtandard, we muſt firſt ſuggeſt that the lively, yet temperate action of the vital influence through every part of the ſyſtem, conſtitutes the perfection of health. The mind, undiſturbed by any violent emotions, agitations, or depreſſions of a corporeal nature, is in a ſtate to exerciſe its nobleſt powers with a tranquil vigour. The body continues in the exerciſe of its proper functions, without the leaſt ſenſation of difficulty and embarraſſment. Reſpiration is free and eaſy, neither requiring conſcious exertion,

exertion, nor even a thought. The action of the heart and arteries, with the conſequent circulation of the blood, are regular and placid; neither too rapid nor too indolent, neither laboured nor oppreſſed. Perſpiration is neither checked nor exceſſive. Aliments are ſought with appetite, enjoyed with a reliſh, and digeſted with facility. Every ſecretion and excretion is duly performed. The body is perfectly free from pain, oppreſſion, hebetude, and every ſpecies of uneaſineſs; and a certain vivacity and vigour, not to be deſcribed, reign through the ſyſtem.

Hope.

The effects of that cordial, *Hope*, are peculiarly favourable to this envied ſtate. In its more temperate exerciſe, it communicates a mild but delectable ſenſation to the heart. It elevates and invigorates both mind and body. Its grateful ſtimulus produces a pleaſing and ſalutary flow of the animal ſpirits, and diffuſes a temperate vivacity over the ſyſtem, directing a due degree of energy to every part. In ſhort, it is the only paſſion or affection which unites moderation with vigour, checks every violent

violent impetus, and removes every ſpecies of morbid languor.

By comparing the effects peculiar to the paſſion of hope, with the above deſcription of perfect health, the cloſeſt analogy will immediately become obvious. Its characteriſtic is to produce a ſalutary medium between every exceſs and defect of operation in every function. Conſequently it has a tendency to calm the troubled action of the veſſels, to check and ſoothe the violent and irregular impetus of the nervous ſyſtem, and adminiſter a beneficial ſtimulus to the oppreſſed and debilitated powers of nature. Hence it has been the conſtant practice of phyſicians to ſupport the hopes of their patients in the moſt alarming diſeaſes of almoſt every deſcription. But it is peculiarly beneficial in thoſe diſorders which proceed from fear, ſorrow, and every ſpecies of anxiety, or which occaſion a great proſtration of ſtrength, and dejection of ſpirits. In intermittent, and peſtilential fevers, various chronic complaints, the moſt efficacious remedies have proved inert if adminiſtered to perſons deſtitute of hope; while an unmeaning farrago, which could ſcarcely be deemed innocent, taken with a confidence of ſucceſs, have exceeded in their efficacy the utmoſt efforts of the moſt ſkilful practitioner.

Hope therefore demands a place among the medicaments

dicaments which are the mildeſt and moſt grateful in their operation, and exhilarating in their effects.

Joy.

The medicinal influence of *Joy* is very ſimilar to that of hope. But in its general effect, it is a much more powerful ſtimulant. Joy diffuſes a much greater vivacity over the whole ſyſtem. It quickens the circulation of the blood, and in its firſt impulſe it frequently excites violent palpitations of the heart. It renders the eyes peculiarly lively and animated, and ſometimes when the mind has been previouſly in a ſtate of anxious fear, it ſtimulates the lachrymal gland to the ſecretion of tears, accompanied with redneſs, and a ſenſation of warmth in the countenance. Both mind and body become ſo alert, that they cannot refrain from ſome lively manifeſtation of feeling, either by loud acclamations, or extravagant geſtures.

All that has been ſaid of hope is applicable to this paſſion under its more moderate influence. But as it is in general a much more powerful ſtimulus, in many caſes it is ſtill more efficacious. In all thoſe diſeaſes where the powers of nature are particularly oppreſſed and impeded, it is a potent remedy.

remedy. In lenchophlegmatic habits, where languid circulation, hebetude, chillineſs, &c. are prevalent, the grateful cordial of joy acts like a charm. Pervading the whole ſyſtem it inſtantaneouſly produces univerſal vigour, imparts vivacity to the moſt indolent, and paints the moſt pallid cheek with the glow of health. We are alſo aſſured that by its penetrating, exciting, and exhilarating power, it has cured paralytics, and reſtored to their ſenſes thoſe who had been rendered inſane through the exceſs of melancholy.

But as every thing which poſſeſſes great energy may in ſome circumſtances prove injurious, either by its own exceſs, or by co-operating with other cauſes; thus have the tranſports of joy, though in their nature ſo ſalutary, ſometimes induced diſeaſes, and ſometimes rendered them more ſevere. They have increaſed the paroxyſms of acute fevers, aggravated inflammatory ſymptoms; and in plethoric habits, have been productive of apoplexies. Immoderate and ungovernable tranſports of joy have ſometimes induced *epilepſies*, *catalepſies*, *paralyſis*, and that claſs of maladies which ariſe from too great agitation of the animal ſpirits in delicate and ſuſceptible frames.

There are many inſtances upon record of ſudden death having been occaſioned by the haſty communication of very joyful tidings. Like a ſtroke of electricity

electricity indiſcreetly directed, the violent percuſſion has probably produced a paralyſis of the heart, by the exceſs of its ſtimulus. Theſe incidents are moſt likely to take place in ſubjects who were at the inſtant deeply oppreſſed with the oppoſite paſſions of fear and anxiety; by which the natural and ſalutary action of the heart and arteries was greatly impeded. This of conſequence will create a reſiſtance to the impulſe, and render it more liable to deſtroy the tone of that ſenſible organ. In moſt of the inſtances recorded, the perſons who have fallen a ſacrifice to the exceſs of joy were in this particular ſituation; nor was there an opportunity given to ſoften the agony of fear by a cautious manner of communicating the tidings. (See Note *T.*)

Cheerfulneſs, *hilarity*, and *ſocial mirth* are in their effects ſo ſimilar to hope and moderate joy, that their medical powers may be collected from what has been obſerved concerning theſe. Operating alſo by the laws of ſocial ſympathy, they promote a delectable flow of ſpirits, which affords a temporary relief from the oppreſſive and pernicious influence of cares and ſolicitudes, refreſhes and exhilarates after the fatigues of labour either corporeal or mental; and thus by renovating the man, inſpire him with freſh vigour to diſcharge the arduous duties which his ſtation in life may require.

Love.

Love.

Love has been conſidered in the former part of this Treatiſe, both as an affection and a paſſion. As an affection, in which complacency and good-will are the principal ingredients, it places the corporeal frame in a ſtate of pleaſing tranquillity; in the ſalutary medium between languor and inertneſs on the one ſide, or of violent incitement on the other. Its influence therefore is too mild to be at any time prejudicial; and it is calculated to temperate the effects which each extreme is capable of producing. General benevolence has alſo a ſimilar tendency. It eſcapes the rude effects of all the irritating paſſions, and diffuſes a ſalutary placidneſs over the whole ſyſtem.

Love between the ſexes, commencing with predilection and ſtealing into warm perſonal attachment, when reciprocal and unalloyed by adventitious cauſes, inſpires the mind with delight, connected with a ſatisfaction unknown to other delights. It is the reward of perſevering hope, and correſponds with that pleaſing paſſion in its beneficent effects on the corporeal ſyſtem. It is ſo inimical to the rougher paſſions and emotions, that they cannot poſſibly

ſubſiſt

ſubſiſt together. The blandiſhments of love have tamed the moſt ferocious natures, and calmed the moſt turbulent ſpirits. The paſſion riſing to deſire acts as a powerful ſtimulant; gives freſh energy to the ſyſtem, diffuſing a general warmth, and increaſing the ſenſibility of the frame.

As ſexual attachment is one of the ſtrongeſt propenſities of animal nature, and peculiarly expoſed in civil ſociety to numberleſs contrarieties, it frequently becomes the ſource of many other affections and emotions, ſuch as hope, fear, joy, ſorrow, anger, envy, jealouſy, &c.

Such various effects of love according to their complexities and degrees, muſt, it is ſelf-apparent, vary their pathological and therapeutic influence on the animal œconomy; and medical writers have accordingly given us numerous inſtances both of its ſalutary and pernicious effects. Its briſk incitements in cold and torpid temperaments have removed the various indiſpoſitions to which ſuch temperaments are expoſed. It has fortified the body againſt dangers, difficulties, and hardſhips, which appeared ſuperior to human force. It has cured intermittents; acting, it is probable, like invigorating cordials adminiſtered before the acceſs of the cold fit, by which its return is prevented, and the habit deſtroyed by which this diſeaſe is particularly governed. In its violent and impetuous energies, it has excited

excited inflammatory fevers, and the whole train of evils proceeding from exceſs of ſtimulus, which it will be needleſs to enumerate; and in conſequence of that contrariety of paſſions to which it is ſubject, it has occaſioned the moſt dangerous and obſtinate maladies; hyſterics, epilepſies, hectic fevers, the rage of madneſs, or the ſtill more pitiable ſtate of confirmed and waſting melancholy.

Anger.

The ſymptoms which indicate a violent paroxyſm of *Anger*, as ſtrongly indicate the exceſſive perturbation it occaſions throughout the ſyſtem. The fire flaſhing in the eyes, the redneſs of countenance, the ſtrong and agitated pulſe, the wonderful increaſe of muſcular ſtrength for the inſtant, manifeſt that all the powers of nature are rouſed to the moſt violent exertions. Anger acts as a ſtimulus of the moſt potent kind, upon the muſcular, vaſcular, and nervous ſyſtem. It is not ſurpriſing therefore that its pathological effects ſhould be numerous and alarming. Inflammatory and bilious fevers, hæmorrhages, apoplexies, inflammation of the brain, mania, have ariſen from the increaſed impetuoſity it has given to the vaſcular ſyſtem; as alſo

alſo ſudden death either from ruptured veſſels or the exceſs of its ſtimulating power upon the vital organs; particularly in plethoric and ſanguineous temperaments. Palſies, epilepſies, aphonia, or loſs of voice, diarrhœas, involution of the inteſtines, and thoſe diſeaſes which may be attributed to the exceſſive perturbation of the nervous ſyſtem, or to exhauſted ſtrength, have too frequently ſucceeded to its tremendous exertions. In ſhort, as there is no paſſion ſo turbulent, ſo is there none ſo immediately dangerous as exceſſive anger.

Yet even this paſſion has been occaſionally beneficial. As there are caſes in which arſenic itſelf exerts a medicinal virtue, thus are we aſſured by Writers of veracity, that there are inſtances in which the paſſion of anger, by giving unuſual energy to the ſyſtem, has cured diſeaſes which demanded a potent ſtimulus. We are told that it has cured agues, reſtored ſpeech to the dumb, and for ſeveral days arreſted the cold hand of death; that its ſtimulating power has, like the electric ſhock, proved a remedy in rheumatic affections, palſies, and various chronic complaints.

Fortitude.

The medical virtues of *Fortitude* are univerſally admitted. The determined reſolution of the mind

communicates a correſpondent energy to the body. Cheery hope is in theſe caſes a powerful auxiliary. Fortitude is not only a preſervative againſt the pathological effects of fear and grief, but it renders the body leſs ſubject to the morbid influence of putrid and contagious diſeaſes. It enables the warrior to ſupport hardſhips and fatigues which muſt otherwiſe prove fatal to him. In the hour of conflict the hopes of conqueſt, the power of ſocial ſympathy, a ſpirit of emulation, and enkindled anger againſt the foe, impel to achievements to which the powers of nature would be unequal at any other period.

Sorrow.

Whoever attends to the pathological effects of *Sorrow*, and marks its different ſtages; the ſtupefaction and horror with which the ſufferer is ſometimes ſeized upon the ſudden communication of evil tidings; the agitations which immediately ſucceed, introductory of ſubſequent languor and debility; and the deep melancholy into which the mind ſubſides after the firſt conflicts are paſſed, will be prepared to credit the narrations, that exceſſive ſorrow has been the cauſe of ſudden deaths, of confirmed melancholy, loſs of memory, imbecility of mind, of nervous fevers, of hypochondriac complaints; that it renders the body peculiarly ſuſceptible

tible of contagious diſorders; and that the loſs of appetite, perpetual watchfulneſs, confirmed apathy to every thing ſocial and exhilarating; the attention immutably fixed upon the cauſe of its diſtreſs, &c. have rapidly introduced the moſt terrible diſeaſes, and haſtened the diſſolution of the ſufferer.

Nor does any caſe preſent itſelf, in which the paſſion of ſorrow, or the affection of grief, have produced ſalutary effects, unleſs by their being calculated to moderate the tranſports of anger; and thus they may have prevented or removed the pathological ſymptoms, of which ſuch tranſports are productive.

Fear.

The changes inſtantly induced upon the body by abject *Fear;* the univerſal rigor, the contracted and pallid countenance, the deep ſunk eye, the quivering lip, the chilneſs, torpor, proſtration of ſtrength, inſufferable anxiety about the region of the heart, &c. are ſo perfectly analogous to the morbid influence of exceſſive cold, to the ſymptoms of typhus fevers, and the firſt ſtage of intermittents, that no one can doubt of the pernicious influence of this paſſion in pre-diſpoſing the body to the like diſeaſes, and in aggravating their ſymptoms.

toms. It is peculiarly dangerous in every ſpecies of contagion. It has inſtantaneouſly changed the complexion of wounds, and rendered them fatal. It has occaſioned gangrenes, indurations of the glands, epilepſies, the ſuppreſſion of natural or beneficial ſecretions. It has induced a permanent ſtupor on the brain; and the firſt horrors of the imagination have, in ſome caſes, made too deep an impreſſion to be effaced by the moſt favourable change of circumſtances. We have ſeen that joy itſelf, though in its nature ſo pleaſing, and in its general effect ſo ſalutary, has proved the cauſe of ſudden death: it is therefore not difficult to admit that the agonizing effects of *this* dreadful paſſion may be able to paralyze the grand organ of circulation, and like ſome peſtilential diſeaſes, inſtantaneouſly induce the torpor of death.

So pernicious are the natural and characteriſtic effects of fear! Yet in that ſtate of body where a ſedative power is requiſite, and where a conſiderable degree of torpor has a tendency to check too great incitement, even this paſſion may become beneficial. Thus it has been known to relieve agonizing fits of the gout, to have rendered maniacs calm and compoſed, and in ſome caſes it has reſtored them to the regular uſe of their faculties. The effects of fear in affording temporary relief in the tooth-ach are univerſally known; acting as ſome

ſyſtematics

ſyſtematics expreſs themſelves by its ſedative power, by which an inflammatory tenſion is appeaſed; or as others, by inducing a torpor on the nerves, and thus rendering them inſenſible to pain.

Terror, which is the agitation of fear, ſometimes produces effects upon the body common to agitation, ſimply. In ſome caſes it rouſes the energy of the ſyſtem to an unuſual degree, and in others it produces the irregular and convulſive action of the muſcular ſyſtem. Hence it is ſaid to have *cauſed* in ſome inſtances, and in others to have *cured* the attacks of capalepſies, epilepſies, and other ſpaſmodic diſorders. We read of its having cured tertian fevers induced by fear; reſtored ſpeech to the dumb, and motion to paralytic limbs; and that by agitating the vaſcular ſyſtem it has been productive of hæmorrhages: and alſo that it has been ſucceſsful in dropſical habits. Perhaps the conſtricting power of fear, united with the agitations of terror, have both conſtricted and ſtimulated the relaxed and indolent abſorbents, and enabled them to renew their office. The paſſion of terror has frequently excited languid hypochondriacs to exertions they had deemed impoſſible; and all their former maladies have been obliterated by their apprehenſions of impending danger.

Shame.

Shame is ſometimes connected with fear, ſometimes with terror; and it conſequently will in particular inſtances manifeſt ſymptoms belonging to theſe emotions. But young perſons of great ſenſibility, who are delicately ſuſceptible of honour or diſgrace, are apt to bluſh at every trifle, without violent paroxyſms either of fear or of terror. In theſe caſes where the effects of ſhame are the leaſt complicated, though they be ſtrong, they are momentary. The heart is certainly agitated, ſometimes with pleaſure, ſometimes with pain: but as the ſuffuſion chiefly manifeſts itſelf in the face, and the ſmaller veſſels ſpread over the neck and breaſt, the ſingular effects of ſhame cannot be attributed ſolely to the ſudden impetus given to the heart. The paſſion itſelf ſeems to have an influence merely local; which we know to be the caſe with ſome other ſtimulants. The modeſt bluſh, unmixed with guilt or fear, ſeems to be inert reſpecting medical effects. Nor are there any inſtances of its having been decidedly beneficial or injurious. It ſeems moſt calculated to increaſe cutaneous inflammations; but facts are wanting to confirm this idea.

Attention

Attention of Mind.

Habitual attention of mind to any particular object, ſhould it be of a pleaſing nature, and proceeding from a paſſionate fondneſs for that object, has proved pernicious to the conſtitution. The fatigue of the brain has indicated itſelf by *cephalalgias*, giddineſs, &c. The animal ſpirits have been exhauſted; the body has been rendered inſenſible to its accuſtomed ſtimuli; wearineſs, and univerſal laſſitude, proſtration of ſtrength, loſs of appetite, indigeſtions, flatulencies, &c. have enſued; and the corporeal ſyſtem has been rendered very ſuſceptible of various morbid impreſſions. Yet ſalutary effects have iſſued from an eager attention to things novel, intereſting, and myſterious. It has thus proved efficacious in diſeaſes ſubjected to periodical returns. It has prevented hyſteric and epileptic fits, and charmed away agues. By connecting the pernicious effects of habitual attention to the ſame object, with thoſe which accompany fear, anxiety, ſorrow, it is eaſy to perceive that the union of both muſt be peculiarly pernicious; that when the whole attention is employed upon things mournful, irritating, or calculated to inſpire painful apprehen-

ſions; when it is abſorbed in corroding cares and anxious fears; when it is the prey of chagrin and diſappointment, the body may be expected to fall a ſpeedy victim to the combined influence of ſuch deadly poiſons.

Imagination.

The power of *Imagination* in inducing and removing diſeaſes, has been generally acknowledged. But this imagination could only produce its effects by the ſtrong affections which accompany it; otherwiſe it would be as inert as the moſt abſtract idea. Theſe affections are indicated in the various paſſions and emotions we have been contemplating. It is moreover worthy of notice, that in every powerful exertion of the imagination, ſome change takes place in the body correſpondent with its nature. In a keen appetite, the ſalivary glands are ſtimulated to a ſecretion of ſaliva upon the thoughts of ſome favourite viand, as preparatory to deglution. We feel ourſelves collected, firm, elevated, upon the lively repreſentation of the firm, heroic, dignified conduct of another. The blood thrills in our veins, and the ſkin corrugates at the deſcription of any thing

peculiarly

peculiarly horrible : and under the ſtrong impreſſion of fictitious danger, the attitude of our bodies attempts to evade it ! Full confidence in the myſtic power of another, places the whole ſyſtem in a ſituation moſt favourable to the effects the object of his confidence undertakes to produce. This will explain much of what is genuine in the pretenſions of magnetizers ; and the exaggerating diſpoſitions of both operator and patient, will contribute to explain the reſt. (See Note *U.*)

The above ſketch, conciſe and imperfect as it is, will be ſufficient to evince, that the paſſions and emotions have a medical influence upon the body : and that each of them has its own characteriſtic influence in its general mode of acting ; though various and oppoſite effects may ſometimes be produced by incidental circumſtances. This however is preciſely the caſe with the moſt eſteemed medicaments; and alſo with every thing that is deemed noxious or beneficial in the mineral, vegetable, and animal kingdoms; and with every part of nature which poſſeſſes the power of acting upon the human frame.

In this inveſtigation the Author has ſimply endeavoured to be the hiſtorian of facts, without intending to pay any deference to theory. But as

medical

medical language has chiefly been formed by different theories which have moſt rapidly ſucceeded to each other, it is difficult to uſe terms which do not acknowledge ſome ſyſtem or other for their parent; or to expreſs ideas, without ſeeming to have a predilection for one hypotheſis in preference to others; where the ſole object is to eſtabliſh indiſputable facts. (See Note *W.*)

SECTION II.

Influence of the Paſſions on Thoughts and Language.

IT has been remarked in our Analyſis, that whenever any ſubject preſents itſelf to the mind with ſufficient force to excite a paſſion, or very ſtrong affection, all the powers of the imagination become immediately active. The whole ſoul is engaged upon its object, and the whole train of ideas is turned into

into a channel correſpondent with the view we entertain of that. The mind with wonderful facility collects together whatever has been laid up in the ſtorehouſe of the memory, or can be combined by the force of the imagination. Every thing alien is totally excluded; and it is in vain that others who are free from the impulſe, attempt to ſuggeſt ideas of a contrary tendency. Reaſon becomes impotent, nor can the attention be directed to any thing but ſuch circumſtances alone as are intimately connected with the exciting cauſe; and theſe are magnified and aggravated to the utmoſt extent. Subjects of joy appear at the inſtant to be the harbingers of eſſential and permanent bliſs. The evils we fear, the injuries we ſuffer, the loſſes we ſuſtain, ſeem to be the greateſt that could poſſibly have been endured.

This ſtate of mind not only manifeſts itſelf by geſtures, looks, and tones correſpondent with the nature of the paſſion; but it has a characteriſtic influence upon the language and expreſſions employed to *give vent* to the paſſion, as it is emphatically termed.

Upon the firſt impulſe, the thoughts are tumultuous and confuſed. A thouſand half formed ſuggeſtions and apprehenſions crowd in upon us in rapid or diſorderly ſucceſſion!

Whoever contemplates the effects of the paſ-

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ſions at this moment, will diſcover their perfect correſpondence with the nature of thoſe introductory emotions of *ſurpriſe*, *wonder*, and *aſtoniſhment*, deſcribed in the analytical part of this Treatiſe. It is manifeſtly through their influence that the mind is thus confuſed, and that every idea is embarraſſment and conjecture. The wonder and amazement ſo precipitately excited are accompanied by ſtrong, abrupt, and indefinite language. The firſt impulſe of ſurpriſe deprives the ſubject of the power of utterance; and the firſt exertions of this power conſiſt in loud exclamations, adapted both to the nature of the emotion itſelf, and to its confuſion and wonder relative to the object.

As all theſe introductory emotions are obviouſly founded on the weakneſs, ignorance, and conſcious inferiority of our natures, thus do they prompt to language which confeſſes an humiliated ſtate. Powers above us are as it were inſtinctively addreſſed, either with exclamations of gratitude, of appeal, imprecation, or invocation of aid! Incredulity itſelf becomes moſt credulous; will thank the heavens for cauſes of exceſſive joy, call aloud upon higher Beings for help in the moment of danger, mourn its *deſtiny*, or curſe its *ſtars* in the hour of vexation and diſappointment! and thoſe who in a tranquil ſtate of mind ridicule the idea of future retribution, often become the moſt extravagant in their

their benedictions or imprecations at the inſtant of tumultuous paſſion.

After the firſt impulſe of paſſion, we begin to advert to the particular ſtate in which the exciting cauſe has placed us; as a lively imagination is always diſpoſed to magnify, we deem ourſelves for the inſtant, the moſt *happy* or the moſt *wretched* of mortals; and a new train of thoughts is ſuggeſted to prove or illuſtrate the ſuppoſition.

Thus as the *paſſion* approaches ſomewhat nearer to an *affection*, the mind recovers in ſome degree its power over itſelf; yet it is ſtill carried forwards by the torrent of ideas, which this novel ſituation has inſpired, and which never would have been ſuggeſted with ſuch copiouſneſs and energy, in a more tranquil ſtate. As it ſtill continues to feel ſtrongly, ſo is it eager to do juſtice to its feelings, by the ſtrength, pertinency, and impetuoſity of its language. Common terms are too cold, or too limited to do juſtice to the energy of thought; and it perceives no exaggeration in expreſſions the moſt exaggerated! All nature is ranſacked for points of reſemblance, to ſet forth the novel ſituation in the ſtrongeſt colours. Impetuoſity equally deſpiſes preciſion or detail. It inſtinctively as it were ſeizes upon tropes and figures the moſt conciſe, and the moſt ſuited to its new conceptions!

All nature is full of analogy! Every thing that

that exiſts poſſeſſes certain qualities or properties which are not ſo peculiar to the individual, as to be deſtitute of ſome reſemblance to other things which may, in various reſpects, be eſſentially different: and many of theſe properties are poſſeſſed in an extraordinary degree, by particular objects. To theſe the mind rapidly adverts as deſcriptive of the peculiarities of its own ſituation; and as in the warmth of our ſenſations we are diſpoſed to exaggerate every thing, thus are we diſpoſed to make quick tranſitions from one property to another ſeated in the object referred to, by which a peculiar colouring, or caſt of character is given to the ſubject which intereſts us, and the deſired energy is imparted to our feelings concerning it. To this, aſſociated ideas and affections lend a very conſiderable aid. Thus it is that we not only catch the preciſe point of reſemblance, but we inſtantaneouſly elevate or debaſe a ſubject, hold it forth to admiration or contempt, render it reſpectable or ridiculous, according to the ſources from whence our alluſions are borrowed.

When paſſions and emotions give place to more permanent affections, language becomes leſs vehement and more diffuſe. Under the influence of a particular affection, the mind loves to expand itſelf upon the circumſtances which gave it exiſtence, and to dwell upon ſuch minutiæ as have a tenden-

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cy to feed its flame. Thus, under the influence of reſentment, every ſpecies of aggravation is deliberately dwelt upon; every thing in the conduct of the aggreſſor that may augment his culpability, and every part of our own demeanour, are brought forwards to manifeſt the greatneſs of the offence, and how little we deſerved it. In a ſtate of fearful apprehenſion, every poſſibility of danger is placed before us with all its horrors; every difficulty is magnified; and in every remedy or plan of ſecurity propoſed, buſy apprehenſion ſuggeſts reaſons to evince that it will be ineffectual. In ſorrow the mind delights to expatiate upon the excellent qualities of the particular object, the pleaſures and advantages of which we are now deprived; and the imagination enumerates all the evils which will probably enſue. Under the influence of love, the mind dwells upon the accompliſhments which have inſpired the affection, recalls the ſcenes of pleaſure paſt, anticipates thoſe which are to come; and in the expreſſion of theſe feelings, or in the acknowledgment of this influence it purpoſely prolongs the phraſeology, which beſt prolongs the faſcinating idea.

The addreſs of Eve to her conſort, in a ſtate where the beſt affections alone could be indulged, is ſo beautiful an illuſtration of this ſubject, that a tranſcript

tranſcript of the whole paſſage cannot appear tedious.

With thee converſing I forget all time;
All ſeaſons and their change, all pleaſe alike.
Sweet is the breath of morn, her riſing ſweet,
With charm of earlieſt birds; pleaſant the ſun,
When firſt on this delightful land he ſpreads
His orient beams, on herb, tree, fruit, and flower,
Gliſt'ring with dew: fragrant the fertile earth
After ſoft ſhowers; and ſweet the coming on
Of grateful evening mild; then ſilent night,
With this her ſolemn bird, and this fair moon,
And theſe the gems of heav'n her ſtarry train:
But neither breath of morn, when ſhe aſcends
With charms of earlieſt birds; nor riſing ſun
On this delightful land; nor herb, fruit, flower,
Gliſt'ring with dew; nor fragance after ſhowers;
Nor grateful evening mild; nor ſilent night,
With this her ſolemn bird, nor walk by noon,
Or glittering ſtar-light, without thee is ſweet.

PARADISE LOST, B. IV. L. 639.

It is obſervable, that when a paſſion or ſtrong affection is not ſuddenly raiſed, but is produced by deliberate meditation upon the ſubject, the proceſs is oppoſite to the preceding. From indifference the mind begins to conceive an affection of one kind or other; and according to the diſcovered nature,

nature, magnitude, or importance of the object, it may gradually *work itſelf up*, as the phraſe is, into paſſion and ecſtaſy. In ſuch caſes the train of thoughts will flow with increaſed velocity and force; according to the increaſed intereſt taken in the ſubject. Sterility of ſentiment and of language is ſucceeded by a rapid flow of each. Pertinent thoughts, and copious expreſſion immediately preſent themſelves, which the deepeſt ſtudy and all the powers of recollection would not have been able to produce. They are only to be inſpired by the affections. In ſuch caſes the language gradually changes its tone: from the cool didactic ſtyle, it riſes into the animated and energetic; though it ſeldom, if ever indicates the embarraſſment and confuſion of thought, which are the offspring of wonder and ſurpriſe. Exceſs of animation will indeed ſometimes check utterance, and the orator will feel a defect of language to do juſtice to the numerous ideas which crowd in upon the mind. See many excellent obſervations on this ſubject in Elements of Criticiſm, Vol. II. *Compariſons: Figures.*

If the above remarks be admitted as pertinent, they will point out the difference betwixt the language of the paſſions and affections, and that of cool diſpaſſionate reaſon. The one is the language

of *feeling*, which attempts to enforce ſome intereſting idea; the other, that of diſcrimination, which carefully marks the diſtinctions and differences which ſubſiſt in things apparently analogous. The one ſubſtitutes ſtrong expreſſions for realities, and miſtakes exaggerations for accurate ſtatements: the other analyzes and ſeparates truth from error, facts from miſrepreſentations. The language of paſſion and of ſtrong affections is always employed in pleading ſome cauſe. Aiming to give to that, the aſcendency over every other conſideration, it rapidly collects and ſets forth in glowing colours every circumſtance favourable to its object, regardleſs of whatever may be advanced in oppoſition: while the language of reaſon is that of a Judge, who compares, balances, and decides according to the force of *evidence*, without being deceived by the force of expreſſion, or ſeduced by the ſympathy of the paſſions.

In theſe characters it is that the diſtinction between rhetoric and logic indicates itſelf. The former attempts to perſuade; it is the province of the latter to convince. This employs itſelf in demonſtrations reſpecting the truth and nature of things: the other excites to feel and act according to the opinion entertained of the good or bad properties they poſſeſs, and are capable of exerting.

It may not be altogether impertinent to remark, that

that nature has accommodated the tone of voice to the character of the paſſion. It has rendered *Joy* loud and vociferous, producing ſtrong exclamations mixed with triumphant *Laughter*.

Sorrow communicates a plaintive tone to the voice, beſt adapted to wailings and lamentations.

Anger is loud and turbulent. The voice riſes with the paſſion in order to ſtrike terror and ſilence oppoſition.

Fear is oppreſſed and breathleſs, or ſcreams aloud for help.

Love is ſoft, ſoothing, inſinuating, and gentle; ſometimes aſſuming the plaintiveneſs of ſorrow, ſometimes the vivacity of joy.

The other compounds partake of mixed effects. (See Note *X*.)

The minute inveſtigation of the paſſions in which we have been engaged, preſents us with numerous obſervations of a moral and practical nature. But as the preſent Treatiſe is purpoſely confined to philoſophical reſearches, we ſhall not enter upon ſo copious a ſubject. There are two inquiries, however, which although they have an intimate relation to morals, cannot be refuſed a place in the philoſophical department. They relate to the influence of the paſſions upon *character*, and upon

happineſs; and with theſe we ſhall cloſe the ſubject.

SECTION III.

Influence of the Paſſions and Affections on Character.

THE Nature of the Paſſions and Affections indulged, of the objects by which they are excited, and the degrees of influence and permanency which they are ſuffered to exert upon us, conſtitute the moral characters of men; pointing out either their innocence, their excellencies, or defects.

By Character is generally underſtood the kind of reputation acquired by the prevalent diſpoſition and temper, which ſuggeſts almoſt every motive, and takes the lead in almoſt every action: and *moral* character refers to that prevalent temper which relates

relates to moral obligation, reſpecting either ourſelves or others. This diſpoſition conſiſts in the prevalence of *affection*; that is, by the habitual pleaſure or diſpleaſure we take in certain modes of thinking and acting; and our *opinion* of the diſpoſition is regulated by the different degrees of merit or demerit which in our judgment is annexed to it. Mankind are ſo far uniform in their opinions, that they univerſally acknowledge ſome actions and the affections that produce them, either to be innocent, or to be deſerving of various degrees of approbation or cenſure: paying due honours to characters, which appear to be formed upon the beſt of principles, and loading the oppoſite with proportionate diſgrace.

The grand diſtinctions in moral conduct they indicate by the terms *virtue* and *vice:* and the ſubordinate ones under each, they either leave unmarked, or they diſcriminate with appropriate appellations.

The cardinal affections of love and hatred, in themſelves poſſeſs neither merit nor demerit. Founded upon the ideas of good and evil, which may render our exiſtence a bleſſing or a curſe, they are as it were moulded in the very frame and conſtitution of all percipient beings. It is therefore neither a duty, nor a poſſibility to diveſt ourſelves of them. The paſſions, emotions, and affec-

tions which are immediately conſequent upon theſe, or may be deemed ſimple modifications of them, are alſo inſeparable from our natures, and are both unavoidable and innocent: ſuch as joy, ſatisfaction, contentment, hope, deſire, fear, ſorrow, anger, reſentment, &c. Theſe being derived from ſituations and circumſtances to which we are perpetually and neceſſarily expoſed, are the natural reſult of impreſſions made upon ſuſceptible beings. A virtuous or vicious character therefore depends upon the nature of our choice, and the extent to which thoſe paſſions and emotions, that are in their nature permitted, are indulged. Thus virtue requires that the affections of love and hatred be properly placed; that real, not imaginary good; real, not imaginary evil be the objects of them. It requires that we proportion the degrees of our affection to the value and importance of objects; that we be neither indifferent to eſſential worth, nor ſuffer things trifling and inſignificant to engroſs the beſt of our affections. Virtue allows the firſt impulſe of anger, where the provocation is great; as inſenſibility would invite injuries, and give to unreaſonable and wicked men a decided ſuperiority over the moderate and juſt. But virtue forbids anger to exceed the magnitude of the offence: being in every caſe a ſpecies of puniſhment, if it be exceſſive, the ſurplus becomes an injuſtice. Virtue requires

quires anger to be of ſhort duration, where offences are not permanent; ſtrictly prohibits it from ſeeking revenge, unconnected with private or public ſecurity, and from ſinking into habitual hatred and malignity. It allows and requires us to cheriſh the feelings of contempt and indignation as long as mean and atrocious vices continue; but it abſolutely commands us to pardon, where the character and conduct of the offender are changed by repentance and reformation. Virtue ſtigmatizes with peculiar diſgrace the want of thoſe affections which benefits received, and a great ſuperiority of character ought to call forth; ſuch as ingratitude to benefactors, and want of reſpect for ſuperiors in wiſdom and goodneſs. As we experience that the poſſeſſion of the good things of life contribute to our happineſs, we cannot be inſenſible to the privation of them: virtue accordingly permits a degree of ſorrow and grief correſpondent to the nature of our loſs; but it forbids the obſtinate indulgence of melancholy, as this forgets or deſtroys the benignant effects of every remaining bleſſing; and it is of conſequence chargeable with both folly and ingratitude. Virtue requires repentance as the medium of reſtoration to order and to duty; for this purpoſe it permits remorſe, but it never enjoins deſpair. It allows of fear as far as this excites to caution; and even of terror, when the mind has been ſurpriſed by ſome-

thing tremendous; but habitual fear it terms cowardice, and to terror perpetually excited by small cauſes it gives the appellation of puſillanimity. It approves of emulation which animates to worthy deeds, or to advancement in every ſpecies of excellence; nor does it forbid the ambition which is productive of general good; but it execrates the wretch that wades through ſeas of blood, and tramples upon the ſlain, to riſe above all thoſe whom its baneful ſword has ſpared. Envy, which is the antipode to benevolence, virtue knows not; and though it admits of jealous alarms upon great occaſions, and prompted by ſtrong preſumptive evidence, yet it is a ſtranger to unauthorized ſuſpicions. It permits the moderate deſire of wealth, as the means both of comfort and uſefulneſs; but it lays rapaciouſneſs and avarice under the ſevereſt interdict. It allows of ſelf-defence, and nature itſelf inſpires with ſtrength and courage for the purpoſe; but it diſdains the uſe of treacherous means of ſecurity, and the acts of cruelty which characterize the barbarian and the coward.

Theſe remarks point out another diſtinction of the paſſions and affections, as they relate to the moral character, indicating a ſcale of comparative merit and demerit. Some are innocent ſimply, as hope, joy, moderate grief. Some are laudable, as contentment, ſatisfaction, complacency. Others

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are deemed peculiarly noble. Thus the virtue of benevolence is much more dignified than any of the affections that originate and terminate in *ſelf*. In the different branches of this virtue there are alſo degrees of excellence. Warm ſympathetic emotions are in higher eſtimation than the calmer feelings and offices of charity; and mercy by ſubduing reſentment is more tranſcendent than either. Some feelings are ſo eſſential, that to be deſtitute of them enſtamps a diſgrace; as ingratitude. The angry paſſions, though they may be innocent, yet they ſtand upon the very brink of demerit, being ſo proximate to injuſtice and cruelty. Some affections and diſpoſitions are very diſgraceful, as forbid avarice, envy, malice. Theſe are deſpiſed by all who are not under their influence. Ingenuous ſhame is viewed with approbation, as it indicates a conſciouſneſs of defect, united with reverence for opinion. Guilty ſhame, though not criminal in itſelf, yet being the detection of criminality, it ſometimes expoſes the offender to the ſevereſt contempt; as when it marks the countenance of a detected hypocrite. Sometimes it will excite compaſſion, and prompt to forgiveneſs; when, for example, an offence highly diſreputable is proved to be a total deviation from the general tenour of conduct. The bluſh indicates a mind not inured to vice. It ſues

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for compaſſion, and proves that it is not totally unworthy of it.

Again: in our ſearch after happineſs, each particular deſire and purſuit is either deemed innocent, or aſſumes an honourable or ignominious character, according to the nature of the object, the eagerneſs with which it is followed, and the means employed for its attainment. Some deſires are diſcriminated by particular appellations, which ſerve to ſtigmatize, or do honour to the affections; while others, which neither mark excellence or culpability, have no terms of diſcrimination.

Several inſtances of this nature have been given under the article of deſire, by which it appears that a prevalent love of virtue and deteſtation of vice has in every caſe, where perſonal intereſt has not perverted the judgment and alienated the affections, taught all mankind without previous conſultation or conſpiracy, to invent the conciſeſt mode of teſtifying approbation or diſapprobation according to the apparent degrees of merit or demerit. Similar to the plan of an univerſal language, which ſome have deemed practicable; or to pre-concerted ſignals, and telegraphic ſigns, very complex ideas are conveyed by ſimple terms, which immediately expreſs ſatire or applauſe; crown with honour or call forth abhorrence. The numerous occaſions which inceſſantly preſent themſelves, of expreſſing our opi-

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nions of human actions, and our eagerneſs to approve or cenſure, render us impatient of paraphraſe, or circumlocution.

It is alſo obſervable that our ideas of character are invariably formed according to the habitual tendency of diſpoſition and conduct to become beneficial or pernicious, to promote or to deſtroy good! Where conduct has no immediate relation to this, it does not call forth animadverſion. In proportion as it produces and diffeminates good, makes exertions and conſents to liberal ſacrifices for this purpoſe does it meet with our applauſe and admiration. In proportion as vice diffuſes miſery, is the reſult of mean and ſelfiſh principles, indicated by pre-concerted plans and propenſities to ſacrifice the felicity of others to our own narrow perſonal gratifications it becomes deteſtable and abhorrent. Hence compaſſion meets with warmer applauſe than the ſimple love of juſtice, becauſe compaſſion is an actual participation in the ſufferings of another; while juſtice is only a due ſolicitude that they ſhall not ſuffer any unmerited injury from us. A merciful and forgiving diſpoſition is ſtill more noble, becauſe it generouſly removes a very powerful impediment which the offending party himſelf has raiſed againſt the exerciſe of our compaſſion for the diſtreſs, to which his injuſtice towards us has expoſed him. On the other ſide, treachery and cruelty

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are more deteſtable than common acts of injuſtice, becauſe the one is a groſſer abuſe of that confidence without which ſociety cannot ſubſiſt; and the other manifeſts not only inordinate ſelf-love, but the want of that natural affection which is due to every being, and ſubſtituting the affection of hatred in its place.

It is further manifeſt from the above remarks, that both virtue and vice are the offspring of paſſions and affections in themſelves innocent. The natural deſires and affections implanted in our very make are void of guilt. Virtue alone requires a proper choice, innocent purſuits, and moderation in our enjoyments. Vice conſiſts in an improper, or forbidden choice, in the exceſs or perverſion of the natural propenſity of our natures. Lawleſs ambition is the exceſs of a deſire to diſtinguiſh ourſelves, which under certain reſtrictions is a blameleſs incentive to uſeful actions. As every ſpecies of debauchery conſiſts in the irregular indulgence of the appetites in themſelves natural and innocent, thus are the moſt diſorderly and malevolent affections the abuſe of ſome affections, which in certain circumſtances may be allowable and beneficial. Envy is anger, unjuſt and pettiſh, at the good fortune of another, mixed with a very falſe idea of our ſuperior deſerts. Cruelty is the exceſs of a ſeverity which in itſelf may be juſtifiable; and malice the

the moſt inveterate is the cruelty of envy, attempting by words and actions to deſtroy or diminiſh the good we cannot participate.

Thus then it appears that character depends upon the prevalent uſe or abuſe of certain propenſities or affections of our natures. Thoſe who ſelect and cultivate the moſt beneficial are the *beſt* of characters; thoſe, who are habituated to the moſt injurious, are the *worſt*.

SECTION IV.

Influence of the Paſſions and Affections on Happiness.

THOUGH the deſire of good is in reality the efficient cauſe of every paſſion, emotion, and affection, yet the immediate effects of each on our ſenſations are correſpondent to its own ſpecific nature. To be under the influence of ſome, is productive

ductive of temporary well-being; while others are comfortleſs, irkſome, or productive of a great degree of wretchedneſs.

Love, conſidered as an affection placed upon a deſerving object, and recompenſed with reciprocal affection; joy, ecſtaſy, complacency, ſatisfaction, contentment, lively hope, theſe are decidedly the ſources of preſent enjoyment. The ſocial affections of benevolence, ſympathy, compaſſion, and mercy are alſo other ingredients of happineſs from a leſs ſelfiſh and more refined ſource than the preceding. A ſteady, uniform diſpoſition manifeſted by inceſſant endeavours to promote happineſs, is invariably rewarded with a large portion of it. Benevolence places the mind at a remote diſtance from little jealouſies and envyings: it tempers the irritative nature of anger, and teaches compaſſion to ſubdue it. Through benevolence, the good enjoyed by another becomes our own, without a robbery or privation. This divine principle harmonizes the mind with every thing around, and feels itſelf pleaſingly connected with every living being. In a word, it generates, communicates, and enjoys happineſs. When benevolence manifeſts itſelf by ſympathy, compaſſion, and mercy, ſome portion of uneaſineſs, it is acknowledged, accompanies the ſenſation congenial to its nature; but the exerciſe of

of theſe affections communicates a *pleaſing* pain. The degree of uneaſineſs is more than recompenſed by the ſatisfaction enjoyed from the relief of diſtreſs; and even from the conſciouſneſs of a diſpoſition to relieve. There is a luxury in ſympathetic ſorrow; and every tear ſhed over diſtreſs becomes a pearl of ineſtimable price. Every ſpecies of benevolence poſſeſſes the quality which our great dramatic Poet has aſcribed to a *merciful* diſpoſition.

> The quality of Mercy's not reſtrain'd:
> It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven,
> Upon the land beneath. It is twice bleſſed;
> It bleſſes him that *gives*, and him that *takes*.
>
> SHAKESPEAR.

The mildeſt of the affections that belong to the family of love diffuſe a pleaſurable tranquillity over the mind. They conſtitute the healthy ſtate of the ſoul, united with a conſciouſneſs of this health. The more lively affections invigorate and excite a delectable vivacity; and the impetuous emotions termed ecſtaſies and tranſports, infuſe a wild tumultuous pleaſure: moderation leaves the helm: the animal ſpirits uncontrouled violently agitate the corporeal frame, and confound the mental faculties in a pleaſing delirium.

In

In ſome of theſe kindly emotions, circumſtances and ſituations in themſelves diſpleaſing are rendered capable of communicating pleaſure. Thus in the ſudden poſſeſſion of good conferred by a ſuperior, Gratitude, though it is ſo cloſely connected with the idea of our own wants, and the dependency of our ſtate, riſes above theſe natural cauſes of depreſſed ſpirits. The attention is arreſted by the good received, and the heart glows with affection towards the benefactor; which is a more pleaſing ſenſation than independency itſelf could enſure. Thus in the contemplation of the unrivalled excellencies poſſeſſed by another, lively enjoyment becomes intimately connected with the deepeſt ſenſe of inferiority: as in the emotions of admiration, reverence, and awe. Nor is *Humility* ſo abject as to be devoid of dignity. It is accompanied with a ſtrong affection for the excellencies which it laments that it cannot attain: and a conſcious wiſh, to ſubdue its remaining defects, inſpires more ſatisfaction than the ſelf-ſufficiency of *arrogance* can boaſt. Even deſire itſelf, which is an eager longing for gratification, if it be not intemperate; if it be united with hope; if it be not prolonged to the wearineſs of patience, it is cheriſhed with a great degree of pleaſure. The expectancy of enjoyment more than counterpoiſes the pain created by ſuſpenſe.

Another

Another ſet of emotions and affections are of the unquiet and irritating claſs; as the whole family of anger. The exciting objects are unwelcome to the mind which contemplates them, and the ſenſations they produce are turbulent and painful. It is true, ſome degree of ſatisfaction may be inſpired by the vivid idea entertained at the inſtant of the juſtice of our cauſe, as alſo by the gratification, or even the reſolution to gratify the newly created deſire of revenge, or by the conſcious ſuperiority that accompanies contempt and diſdain: but theſe are purchaſed at the expence of the infinitely ſuperior pleaſures infuſed by the oppoſite ſpirit of love, complacency, and benevolence! The mind finds itſelf in bondage to its emotions, and feels that it is driven by their impetuoſity, not only to the greateſt diſtance from the nobler ſources of enjoyment, but to the verge of miſery itſelf! Danger is apprehended from the exceſs of paſſion while it is indulged; and the ſubject himſelf trembles leſt it ſhould be productive of irreparable evil, repentance, and remorſe!

Sorrow and grief, though they are certainly in the claſs of the moſt unpleaſant affections, yet they have ſomething ſo faſcinating in them, that the mind under their influence is arreſted, and abſorbed as it were in the contemplation of their cauſe.

The good of which we are deprived is now appretiated, perhaps for the firſt time, according to its value; perhaps beyond its value. This contemplation of qualities, which once gave delight, or which were fondly expected to give delight, mingles a pleaſure with the ſevere pain, that privation or diſappointment has occaſioned.

Even penitence and contrition, when they are inſpired by ingenuous motives; when a deteſtation of former conduct proceeds from a conviction of its baſeneſs, and ſorrow for the injury it has done, and not from the apprehenſion of puniſhment or the ſhame of detection, even penitence and contrition are not devoid of pleaſure! The penitent, in the midſt of his painful ſelf-condemnation, feels a latent ſatisfaction in the diſpoſition and reſolution to return to the paths of virtue.

The emotions and affections of fear, dread, horror, deſpair, are of the moſt horrid and tremendous claſs. They vary in degrees of wretchedneſs, according to the degrees of their intenſeneſs, whether this be increaſed by temperament, by the extreme importance or complicated nature of the exciting cauſe. Exceſſive jealouſy, envy, remorſe, deſpair, ſhame ariſing from the detection of guilt, are miſery unmixed. They render life inſufferable, and tempt the deſpondent and diſtracted mind to venture

ture upon all the horrors of an unknown ſtate, rather than ſupport the pangs of his preſent feelings.

Surpriſe, wonder, aſtoniſhment, principally receive their complexion from the ſubjects that inſpire them; and are introductory to happineſs or miſery according to the nature of the cauſe exciting them. In ſurpriſe particularly, the ſudden and unexpected arrival of an intereſting event correſpondent with the nature of the affection already indulged, will turn hope and joy into ecſtaſy, diſpleaſure into anger, and fear into terror and diſmay.

Thus in the pleaſing emotions, the idea of good neceſſarily predominates; and in the painful ones, the idea of evil. Accordingly thoſe emotions which are produced by complicated good, or by the union of ſuch cauſes as ſeparately poſſeſs the power of calling forth pleaſing emotions and affections, contribute moſt to happineſs. Thus in the pleaſing emotions of hope, ſatisfaction, and joy, when perſonal concerns are intimately connected with ſome common intereſt, and the bleſſings received have an extenſive influence, thoſe pleaſing emotions receive additional vigour, and are enjoyed with peculiar ſuavity. Social affections are now blended with ſelf-love; the two torrents which ſo frequently oppoſe each other, fortunately unite and enlarge the ſtream of enjoyment; and the moſt deſirable branch

of benevolence, rejoicing with thoſe that rejoice, is ſuperadded to the natural pleaſure we take in our own good.

Again; Gratitude unites to the joy inſpired by a benefit received, the pleaſure derived from an affectionate ſenſe of the obligation, and of love to the benefactor: and if the magnitude of the benefit, or the mode of conferring it be productive of ſurpriſe, wonder, admiration; the delectable affections of joy, gratitude, and love, will, by the operation of theſe vivid paſſions, be proportionally augmented.

Were the imagination commanded to paint the higheſt felicity to be enjoyed by created beings, it would ſurely point out the union of the following emotions and affections. Ardent *love* for an object decidedly worthy of our love, chaſtened with high *veneration*; *aſtoniſhment* inſpired by the contemplation of the number and extent of its excellencies, and at the unremitted exertion of theſe excellencies in the diffuſion of good; *admiration* at the wiſe means adapted to the accompliſhment of the intereſting purpoſe; *joy* and *gratitude* for benefits already received; lively *hope* of good incalculable in reſerve for ourſelves conjointly with others whoſe welfare we ardently deſire; accompanied with a *conſciouſneſs* that we alſo have contributed a ſomething to the general maſs of felicity according to the

extent

extent of our ability! Theſe are ingredients to conſtitute the perfection of bliſs! Love, joy, gratitude, ſurpriſe, admiration, complacency, hope, and benevolence unbounded, may thus occupy the mind in a tranſporting variety, or by exerting their united powers at the ſame inſtant occaſion inconceivable raptures! ! !

END OF PART THE SECOND.

NOTES

TO THE

PRECEDING TREATISE.

NOTES

TO THE

PRECEDING TREATISE.

Note *A.*

After, "Whether its influence be of a pleaſant, or unpleaſant nature." Page 6.

THIS opinion has the ſupport of reſpectable authorities. Dr. Watts remarks that "the word properly ſignifies receiving the action of ſome agent." (See Watts on the Paſſions.) Mr. Grove obſerves that "the mind "in certain circumſtances, and within certain degrees has "no dominion over itſelf, or the body. It is in a manner *paſſive*, can neither help the agitation of the blood "and ſpirits, nor help being itſelf affected by them." (See Syſ. of Moral Phil. Vol. I. Ch. VII.)

Seneca

Seneca alſo thus expreſſes himſelf: "Omnes motus "qui non voluntate noſtra fiunt, invicti, et inevitabiles "ſunt: ut horror frigidâ aſperſis; ad quoſdam ictus, aſ- "pernatio; ad pejores nuntios ſubriguntur pili; et ruber "ad improba verba ſuffunditur; ſequitur vertigo prærup- "ta Cernantes." (De Ira. L. 2. C. 2.)

NOTE *B.*

After "are the moſt appropriate." Page 13.

IT is acknowledged that theſe words are frequently uſed indiſcriminately, and ſometimes without manifeſt impropriety; but if they cannot be uſed at *all times*, with *equal propriety*, there muſt be a ſpecific difference between them. Now it is obſervable that the word Emotion is not frequently applied to thoſe paſſions in which the external ſigns are the leaſt violent. We ſeldom ſay that any one is under the emotion of fear; becauſe abject fear has ſomething oppreſſive in its nature; and is frequently ſilent and motionleſs. When fear is indicated by violent agitations it acquires the character of *terror*; and we feel that the phraſe *emotions* of terror is ſtrictly proper. We never apply the epithet to *hope*, diſtinctly conſidered, becauſe though it be lively and animating, it is not accompanied by external ſigns of tranſport. When theſe appear they are always aſcribed to the *joy*, which is frequently connected with hope; and we perceive a peculiar propriety

priety in the term *joyful emotions*, becauſe joy is ſo frequently indicated by ſome eccentric tokens.

Whoever attends to theſe circumſtances in addition to the principles already advanced, will be ſurpriſed at the aſſertion of Lord Kaims, that "an emotion is in its nature quieſcent, and merely a paſſive feeling." (Elements of Criticiſm, 5th Edit. Vol. 1. Page 44.) Both the etymology of the word, and almoſt every connection in which it is uſed with decided propriety, confute this ſtrange poſition. The Author was probably led into the idea by the very confined view he has taken of the paſſions in his elegant Eſſay. He chiefly conſiders them as connected with the fine Arts, and ſubjects of taſte; and as expreſſive of thoſe agreeable or diſagreeable effects which they produce, when firſt preſented to our notice. Theſe effects, it is allowed, are ſeldom ſo violent in cultivated minds, as to occaſion emotions which indicate themſelves by ſtrong and characteriſtic marks.

His Lordſhip having denied external ſigns to *emotions*, has transferred them to the *paſſions*; but in order to eſtabliſh his hypotheſis he is obliged to give a very different definition of the paſſions to any that his predeceſſors have adopted, or that either etymology or uſage will juſtify. According to his ſyſtem, a paſſion is compounded of this quieſcent emotion, and a deſire to obtain the object which occaſioned it. "An internal motion or agitation of the mind," ſays he, "when it paſſeth away without deſire, is denominated *an emotion*; when deſire follows, the motion or agitation is denominated *a paſſion*." Numerous objections might be oppoſed to the poſition. I ſhall only obſerve that according to this hypotheſis,

potheſis, the external ſigns of the paſſions would be the ſtrongeſt where *deſires* are the ſtrongeſt; which is directly oppoſite to what we perceive in the *avaritious* man;—that joy can neither be conſidered as a paſſion nor an emotion; becauſe its viſible tranſports would deſtroy its title to the latter, and its being excited, not by deſire itſelf but by the accompliſhment of a deſire, will exclude it from the former.—Nor can we diſcover what ſhould at any time excite thoſe tranſports which are ſometimes both viſible and tremendous. For emotions being quieſcent, and deſires not being of themſelves turbulent, their union, could they poſſibly exiſt together, is not likely to produce thoſe corporeal agitations ſo frequently obſervable, unleſs we were to admit a proceſs ſimilar to a chemical fermentation. But they cannot exiſt together, and conſequently an emotion can receive no aſſiſtance from deſire, by which it may be transformed into a paſſion. For according to his own ſyſtem, deſire *ſucceeds* to emotion.

His Lordſhip's embarraſſment on this ſubject, which he ingenuouſly acknowledges, manifeſtly proceeds from his not having made a fortunate ſelection of terms to diſcriminate exiſtent differences. To every ſimple *impreſſion* he has given the name of an *emotion;* and he has applied the term *paſſion* excluſively, to what is in its own nature an *affection;* and whenever it is conſidered as a paſſion, it is merely in its ſecondary ſenſe, expreſſing the captivating influence of any particular object of deſire, or of an irreſiſtible attachment to it. By admitting theſe few alterations, what he has written on the ſubject may be read with much edification and pleaſure.

NOTE

NOTE *C.*

After "It would be to annihilate misery." Page 21.

DR. HARTLEY, in establishing the doctrine of vibrations, and the hypothesis of associated ideas founded upon it, asserts that "the desire of happiness and aversion to "misery, are *not inseparable* from and essential to all in-"telligent natures."

Without venturing to oppose unnecessarily so cautious and conclusive a reasoner, I shall just observe that the above assertion is expressed in much stronger language than the principles he attempts to enforce absolutely require. It is acknowledged that his theory opposes the existence of innate ideas; and whoever admits the theory must allow, that there can be no desire after happiness or fear of misery, before we have, some way or other, been made acquainted with their natures. Therefore, when he asserts that the desire of happiness, and aversion to misery are not inseparable from and essential to all intelligent natures, he can only mean, that they are not co-existent with the power of intelligence; and that they are desires and aversions acquired by experience; not, that the *reflective* mind can at any time be totally indifferent about happiness and misery. For however we may have obtained a knowledge of either, the position remains indubitable, that no one ever tasted of happiness, or possessed the smallest degree of ease or pleasure without contracting an affection for them; or experienced misery

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and uneaſineſs, without contracting an hatred towards them.

NOTE *D.*

After "by rendering every being active in the purſuit of his own happineſs." Page 26.

IT would not only be a ſevere but an abſurd requiſition, to expect that mankind ſhould univerſally be more attentive to the welfare of others than to their own. This mode of exerciſing benevolence could not be productive of ſo much good, as the preſent conſtitution of our natures; nor would it be ſo favourable to the cauſe of benevolence as may be imagined. No mind truly generous or deſerving of attention, could poſſibly receive the gift of well-being entirely at the expence of the donor. Thus, were the ſelfiſh principle totally extinguiſhed, the reciprocal communication of good would be little more than a complimentary exchange.

NOTE *E.*

After "not always in our recollection." Page 29.

SOME Authors of great reſpectability have expreſſed themſelves in a manner which conveys ideas very different from thoſe we have attempted to eſtabliſh. Dr. Reid ſpeaks

ſpeaks of loving things for their own ſakes, and conſiders the claſs of philoſophers who ſuppoſe that the love of every object may be reſolved into its utility, to be in an error. Lord Kaims maintains that ſome affections are neither ſelfiſh nor ſocial.

Theſe opinions ſeem to receive ſupport from the ſentiment of *Cicero*, who obſerves " Eſt quiddam quod ſua vi " nos illiciat ad ſe; non emolumento captans aliquo, ſed " trahens ſua dignitate, quod genus, *virtus*, *ſcientia*, *ve-* " *ritas*."

It is ſo preſumptuous to differ from ſuch authorities, that I am reluctant to expoſe myſelf to the ſuſpicion. The doctrine is expreſſed in very ambiguous language. It is poſſible that a proper inveſtigation of the ſubject will indicate that it does not in its tenour oppoſe the ſentiments advanced in the text. If I fail in this attempt, it may ſtill appear that it has not confuted them.

When it is ſaid that we love things for their own ſakes, let us examine what ſignification can be attached to the expreſſion. We could not poſſibly love any thing totally void of qualities, were it poſſible for ſuch a thing to exiſt; becauſe there would be nothing to love. Did any thing poſſeſs qualities which commenced and terminated entirely in itſelf, it could not be the object of *our affection*. If we entertained any diſpoſitions towards it, the ſelfiſhneſs of the principle could only inſpire diſplacency. But the things which are ſpecified by theſe authors, as being in this very ſingular predicament, manifeſtly poſſeſs qualities of the higheſt utility. When therefore it is alleged that ſuch things are loved for their own ſakes, the only conſiſtent ideas we can annex to the phraſe muſt be, that

that we love them from their capacity of producing, in certain circumſtances, ſome great and extenſive good; though we ſhould not experience the good, or obſerve the application of this power in particular inſtances either in ourſelves or others. For example, it is as certain that *virtue*, *ſcience*, *truth*, are of infinite importance to the welfare of the whole intelligent creation, as that they poſſeſs the powerful attractions aſcribed to them by *Cicero*. A ſociety of *Liars* would create greater confuſion than that of Babel; nor could it exiſt for a day. *Science* diſpels pernicious ignorance; it makes us acquainted with the choiceſt qualities exiſtent; and univerſal *Virtue* would be productive of univerſal happineſs. Every man therefore whoſe mind is not upon a level with the brute creation, and who has perceived in a ſingle inſtance the beneficial effects flowing from theſe excellencies, or the baneful conſequences engendered by their contraries, muſt reſpect them. This reſpect however will be founded either upon his own experience, or his obſervation of their influence upon others. In the firſt caſe they are the reſult of perſonal love of good; and in the ſecond, of the benevolent principle. For it is very obvious that the claſs of objects of which it is aſſerted that they are loved for their own ſakes, alone attract the attention of the cultivated mind, or of ſuch as poſſeſs a conſiderable ſhare of natural benevolence.

Innumerable are the proofs that the very *capacity* of being uſeful, will inſpire an affection for many things which are permitted to remain in a dormant ſtate. The miſer loves his gold ſo intenſely, that he will not part with it in exchange for the choiceſt bleſſing it is able to purchaſe. The man of ſcience loves his library, though

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it may contain many hundred volumes which he has never conſulted. The good houſewife delights in the plate or porcelain, which is perpetually locked up in her cabinet; and the eaſtern Monarch is watchful over a ſeraglio infinitely too extenſive for his enjoyment.

Theſe inſtances point out the ſenſe in which we may be ſaid to love any thing for its own ſake. Theſe different objects are loved as powers of utility or gratification in reſerve; that is, we are ſo conſtituted that we cannot avoid approving, admiring, or loving whatever poſſeſſes in a great degree either the capacity or diſpoſition to promote what is good, or pleaſing to us.

NOTE *E**.

" After " threaten to endanger our well-being." Page 38.

MR. HUME commences his *Diſſertation on the Paſſions* in the following manner: " Some objects produce " an agreeable ſenſation, by the original ſtructure of our " organs; and are thence denominated GOOD; as others, " from immediate diſagreeable ſenſation, acquire the ap- " pellation of EVIL. Thus *moderate warmth* is agree- " able and good; exceſſive heat painful and evil.

" Some objects again, by being naturally conformable " or contrary to paſſion, excite an agreeable or painful " ſenſation, and are thence called *good* or *evil*. The pu- " niſhment of an adverſary by *gratifying revenge* is " GOOD; the ſickneſs of a companion, by affecting " friendſhip, is evil."

Will it be neceſſary to point out to any of my Readers

the pernicious ſophiſtry of this ſtatement? Is it not a wanton introduction of a chaos, I will not ſay in morals, but in the nature and character of human motives and human conduct? It gives the important appellation of *good* to the greateſt oppoſites, without diſcriminating the ſpecific natures of each; merely becauſe in ſome circumſtances, and in ſome characters, they may produce pleaſing or painful ſenſations. Thus is *moderate warmth* placed upon a level with ſentiments and diſpoſitions calculated to produce the moſt exalted felicity; and to the gratification of revenge, is given the ſame colouring as to the pardon of an injury or alleviating diſtreſs!

This ſtudied confuſion of ideas may in ſome connections be productive of wit; it is always "*ſuch ſtuff as* "Conundrums *are made of*," but it is directly oppoſite to the genius of true philoſophy!*

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* If my ideas of a conundrum be accurate, it conſiſts in an attempt to make two things appear cloſely to reſemble each other, which are the moſt oppoſite in their natures. This is done by directing the attention to ſome middle term, which may in one ſenſe or other be applicable to each. For example, if it be aſked why is a perſon in the upper part of a houſe committing theft, *like a man of the ſtricteſt virtue?* The anſwer is, becauſe he is *above*, doing a bad action. The word *above* being in certain ſenſes applicable to each ſubject, we are ſurpriſed and amuſed at the unexpected points of reſemblance. Thus again if it be aſked, In what does a perſon, who attempts to kill another in a fit of anger, reſemble the *man who protects his life?* The anſwer will be, both actions are *conformable to paſſion*, excite *agreeable*

NOTE *F.*

After "the paſſions and affections could not have been excited." Page 40.

PERHAPS there is no branch of philoſophy more difficult than that of diſtinguiſhing between real and apparent qualities in objects. Since all that we know of qualities is derived from the impreſſion made upon us, a previous queſtion preſents itſelf, whether our ſuſceptibility of impreſſions be always accurate, or perfectly correſpondent with the real nature of the object? Until this point be ſettled, our ideas of qualities muſt be vague and indeterminate. Lord Kaims has in one inſtance made the attempt; but his obſervations are ſo unſatisfactory, and his mode of reaſoning ſo inconcluſive, that I feel myſelf much relieved in not being obliged to imitate his example.

In a Chapter where he treats of *Emotions and Paſſions as pleaſant and painful, agreeable and diſagreeable*, he attempts to prove that agreeable and diſagreeable are qua-

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agreeable ſenſations, and are therefore GOOD! The firſt conundrum it is allowed to be better than the ſecond; but this will only prove that there are degrees of excellence in this kind of writing, as well as in every other; and that they are much better adapted to ſubjects of amuſement, than to philoſophy.

lities in the object perceived, pleaſant and unpleaſant are deſcriptive of the emotions we feel; the former are perceived as adhering to the object, the latter are felt as exiſting in us.—At firſt view theſe diſtinctions appear ſpecious, but upon critical examination apprehenſions may be juſtly entertained, whether they be not inſtances of that inaccuracy which he conſiders "not at all venial in "the ſcience of Ethics."

"Viewing a garden," ſays he, "I perceive it to be "beautiful or agreeable; and I conſider the beauty or "agreeableneſs as belonging to the object, or as one of "its qualities. When I turn my attention from the gar-"den to what paſſes in my mind, I am conſcious of a "pleaſant emotion, of which the garden is the cauſe; the "pleaſure here is felt as a quality, not of the garden, but "of the emotion produced by it. I give another exam-"ple. A rotten carcaſe is diſagreeable, and raiſes in the "ſpectator a painful emotion: the diſagreeableneſs is a "quality of the object; the pain is a quality of the emo-"tion produced by it." (Elements of Criticiſm, Vol. 1. Chap. 11. Part 11.)

With deference to ſo reſpectable an authority, this diſtinction does not appear to be juſt. *Agreeable*, according to its etymology, manifeſtly relates to the effects produced upon us, as much as the word *pleaſant*. The difference is in *degree*, not in *nature*. Agreeable expreſſes ſomething that appears ſuitable or correſpondent with our natures, diſpoſitions, and taſtes: ſomething that perfectly agrees with us; exciting the idea of comfort, and inſpiring *contentment* and *ſatisfaction*. What is *pleaſant* goes farther. It excites a ſenſation within us, more nearly approach-

approaching to an *emotion*. That agreeableneſs cannot be allowed to exiſt in the ſubject itſelf is plain from the diverſity of opinions concerning it, without the poſſibility of diſcovering a ſtandard by which to mark a deviation from the law of nature. Were it reſident in objects, the effects muſt be uniform and abſolute in every one whoſe powers of perception are not diſordered. But this is not the caſe. Numberleſs cauſes conſpire to change our ideas of the qualities of objects, and may render ſome objects agreeable or diſagreeable, pleaſant or unpleaſant to the ſame perſon at different times. To give a familiar inſtance. Sweet things are moſt agreeable to children; but when they become adults the taſte is changed. It is poſſible that the ſmoke of tobacco, and the taſte of porter may become agreeable to the *man*, who deteſted them when a *child*. Can we ſay therefore, that there is an inherent agreeableneſs in tobacco that pleaſes the adult, and an inherent diſagreeableneſs that diſguſts the infant? Or to admit his Lordſhip's example of a *garden*. It is acknowledged that the idea of a garden excites pleaſant ſenſations in moſt perſons. Plenty of the delicate luxuries of nature, beauty, verdure, variegated flowers, &c. elegant retirement from the noiſe and buſtle of the world, crowd in upon the imagination. But are we agreed in every circumſtance reſpecting a garden? Was not the ſtiffeſt formality once deemed an eſſential beauty? Has not this taſte given way to irregular clumps and cluſters? Are not theſe of late become the ſubject of ridicule, and a ſtyle more correſpondent with the wild beauties of nature preferred? And when theſe have been enjoyed for ſome time, a future race may poſſibly obſerve that the diſtinc-

tion between a *garden* and a *field* is not ſufficiently marked: and may again place their ideas of beauty in that formal regularity, which is at preſent ſo much deſpiſed.

NOTE G.

After "Either taſte or addreſs, &c." Page 68.

DR. WATTS does not ſeem to have expreſſed himſelf with ſufficient accuracy, when he obſerves, that "If any "object appear pleaſing and fit to do us good, it raiſes "the love of complacency." Theſe two expreſſions are not ſynonymous. Many things may be pleaſing to us, from which we apprehend miſchief; and in theſe we cannot take complacency.

Again he ſays, "Complacency dwells upon its object "with delight: We gaze upon a figure, we liſten to mu- "ſic, we dwell long in a fine garden, we dwell in the "company of our friends." All theſe inſtances contain attributes calculated to inſpire complacency, as *ingenuity* and *taſte* may be manifeſted in the three firſt, and *worth* moral or mental, may be poſſeſſed by the laſt. Yet it may be juſtly doubted whether preciſion of language will permit us to apply the word Complacency to theſe caſes, unleſs there be ſome kind or degree of *appropriation*. We may approve, we may enjoy great pleaſure and delight in inanimate objects, when we view them as belonging to ſtrangers. But it has never been ſaid of a connoiſſeur, that he took *complacency* in the *Apollo de Belvedere*,

Belvedere, or in the *Venus de Medicis*, in *Stowe Gardens*, or the *Leaſowes of Shenſtone*, however he may have been *delighted* by theſe objects. Some circumſtances of approximation, however ſlight, appear neceſſary, to enable even ſuch objects to inſpire complacency. If we take complacency in garments, or flowers, or gardens, it is when they belong either to ourſelves or to our friend; or when they manifeſt our own taſte or ſkill, or that of another for whom we are intereſted. Nor will the moſt perfect concert excite complacency in the audience at large, though it may in the compoſers, performers, directors, or any of their particular acquaintances.

NOTE *H.*

After "Pride." Page 71.

THE above definition and deſcriptions of Pride, are founded upon the various acceptations of that word in common language, and ſupported by the authority of our beſt Writers. But Mr. Hume, in defiance of both, has given a very different definition of pride, which I believe to be totally his own, and ought of conſequence to poſſeſs great internal merit to juſtify its boldneſs in oppoſing thoſe ideas, which have hitherto been received *univerſally*. Let us examine it.

He defines pride to be a "certain ſatisfaction in our-"ſelves on account of ſome accompliſhment or poſſeſſion "which we enjoy." Again. "The object of pride is "*ſelf*, the cauſe, *ſome excellence*." Again. "Our *me-*

" *rit* raiſes pride, and it is eſſential to pride to turn our " view on ourſelves with complacency and ſatisfaction." (See Diſſertation on the Paſſions, *paſſim*.)

As Mr. Hume has made no diſtinction between real and ſuppoſed merit, he neceſſarily directs our thoughts to abſolute merit; nor can there, according to this ſtatement, be any place for a *vicious* pride, or an *ill-founded* confidence in our own ſuperiority. This is excluded by his definition from the character of pride.

Our Philoſopher has alſo advanced in another place, that " Self-ſatisfaction, in ſome degree at leaſt, is an ad- " vantage which equally attends the FOOL and the " WISE." (On Qualities neceſſary to ourſelves. § 6.) Now what is the *cauſe* of this ſelf-ſatisfaction in the *fool?* According to the above poſition it muſt be *merit*. And in the *wiſe man?* *Merit*. Thus the wiſe man and the fool are made to reſemble each other ſo cloſely in the moſt intereſting of all deſirable qualities, *merit*, and *ſelf-ſatisfaction*, that there is no material difference between them. What there is will probably be to the advantage of the *fool*. As he will be much more liable to be *pleaſed with himſelf*, our Author's hypotheſis leads us to ſuſpect that he may poſſeſs the moſt *merit*.

Should it be alleged that the above ſtatement is a miſrepreſentation; I would anſwer that ſuch an allegation can alone be ſupported by explanations which will militate againſt the ſentiments ſo repeatedly and aſſiduouſly advanced. Recourſe muſt be had to a diſtinction between *real* and *ſuppoſed* merit. This will demonſtrate that there are two *ſpecies* of pride included in the definition; and that theſe are as oppoſite to each other as light and darkneſs, knowledge and ignorance; and conſequently that it

is

is not only very *unphiloſophical* to compriſe the moſt oppoſite qualities under the ſame genus; but very *ungenerous* to confound the good principle with the evil one, by giving indiſcriminately the ſame appellations to both.

NOTE *I.*

After "the ambitious paſſions is a familiar expreſſion." Page 79.

DR. REID places deſires among the *animal* principles; but he diſtinguiſhes them "from the appetites by this, "that there is not a ſenſation proper to each, and always "accompanying it; and that they are not periodical but "conſtant, not being ſatiated with their object for a time "as the appetites are." He adds, "the deſires I have in "view are chiefly theſe three, the deſire of power, the "deſire of eſteem, and the deſire of knowledge."

This is not the place to inquire whether the deſires here ſpecified deſerve to be ranked among the animal principles; but as the above deſcription of a particular claſs of deſires appears to oppoſe the ſentiments we have advanced, it demands a few obſervations.

We may firſt remark that the diſtinction made between appetites and deſires is inaccurate, as the appetites are doubtleſs one claſs of deſires; nor is there a ſenſual appetite totally ſeparate from the mental affections and deſires; if there were, the groſſeſt appetites may be indulged without culpability.

2dly.

2dly. The doctrine itſelf is very obſcurely expreſſed. It may import, that deſires have no uneaſy ſenſation attending them; or that one ſenſation is common to them all. But neither of theſe poſitions can be admitted. If the Doctor means that deſires are not uneaſy ſenſations, and adduces thoſe ſpecified as proofs, we may obſerve that they are here conſidered in their mildeſt ſtate, and we are taught to imagine from the deſcription given of them, that this was their permanent character: whereas it is well known that the deſire of power is frequently as rampant as the ſtrongeſt appetites, degenerating into inſatiable ambition; that the deſire of eſteem may become ſo exceſſive as to ſtir up painful emulation, and ſtill more painful envy; and that the deſire of knowledge is frequently ſo reſtleſs as to induce the poſſeſſor to forego his eaſe, and encounter dangers and difficulties innumerable in order to gratify it.

But although in their mildeſt ſtate they may not equal the appetites, they are attended with a degree of uneaſineſs which impels to active endeavours after the deſired objects. If no uneaſy ſenſation accompanied either, there could be no motive to counteract the love of eaſe and indolence, ſo natural to man. The proſpect of ſucceſs may indeed inſpire the pleaſure of hope, and the benefits promiſed by each purſuit may be ſo powerfully anticipated by the imagination, that the pleaſing ſenſations from theſe adventitious cauſes ſhall greatly preponderate; but if no uneaſy ſenſation were excited by the compariſon of our actual ſituation with that we may poſſibly attain, our endeavours after the attainment could never have been excited.

The

The Profeſſor's ſubſequent obſervations perfectly correſpond with theſe remarks. He ſays that "the purſuits "of power, of fame, and of knowledge, require a "ſelf-command no leſs than virtue does:" which is an acknowledgment that they are not always ſo pacific as was repreſented.* And when he obſerves that "the deſire of "eſteem and of knowledge are highly uſeful to ſociety as "well as power, and at the ſame time are *leſs dangerous* "in *their exceſſes*," he tacitly allows that they are not totally exempt.

In ſupport of another argument he aſſerts, that "innu- "merable inſtances occur in life, of men who ſacrifice "eaſe, pleaſure, and every thing elſe to the luſt of pow- "er, of fame, or even of knowledge." A demonſtration this that the ſenſations they ſometimes excite, are not only uneaſy but ungovernable.

3dly. If by the expreſſion, "there is not a ſenſation "proper to each," we are to underſtand that one particular ſenſation is common to them all, the propoſition is ſtill more extravagant. Our ſenſations in every ſpecies of deſire are as different as the objects deſired. Nor is there a greater difference between hunger and thirſt, than there is between the deſire of wealth and the deſire of power. The deſire of knowledge is alſo diſtinct from, and ſuperior to both.

NOTE

* This expreſſion is alſo inaccurate, ſince it is the province of virtue to correct theſe as well as every other deſire, when they are in danger of becoming inordinate.

NOTE K.

After "feelings of humanity." Page 84.

DR. REID remarks, that "it ſeems to be falſe religion "alone, that is able to check the tear of compaſſion" "We are told," he adds, "that in Portugal and Spain, "a man condemned to be burned as an obſtinate heretic, "meets with no compaſſion even from the multitude;" obſerving that "they are taught to look upon him as the "enemy of God, and doomed to hell-fire. But ſhould "not this very circumſtance move compaſſion? Surely "it would if they were not taught that in this caſe, it is a "crime to ſhew compaſſion, or even to feel it." (See Eſſay on Active Powers, Page 156.)

In addition to the motive aſſigned, we may mention the influence of cuſtom in rendering the heart inſenſible to the ſufferings of theſe devoted objects. I was once paſſing through *Moorfields* with a young Lady aged about nine or ten years, born and educated in Portugal, but in the *Proteſtant* Faith; and obſerving a large concourſe of people aſſembled around a pile of faggots on fire, I expreſſed a curioſity to know the cauſe. She very compoſedly anſwered, I ſuppoſe that it is nothing more than *that they are going to burn a Jew.* Fortunately it was no other than roaſting an ox, upon ſome joyful occaſion. What rendered this ſingularity the more ſtriking, were the natural mildneſs and compaſſion of the young perſon's diſpoſition.

Another

Another inſtance of the influence of perverted principles, occurs to my remembrance in the conduct of a pious Calviniſtic Mother, towards a moſt excellent and dutiful Son; who from a principle of conſcience, in oppoſition to his intereſt, renounced the Calviniſtic ſyſtem. She told him that "ſhe found it her duty, however ſe-"vere the ſtruggle, to alienate her affections from him, "now he had rendered himſelf an enemy to God, by "embracing ſuch erroneous ſentiments." My Friend added, that ſhe was completely ſucceſsful in theſe pious endeavours; and that the duty ſhe enjoined upon herſelf, was ſcrupulouſly performed during the remainder of her days.

NOTE *L.*

After "paſt, preſent, and future." Page 86.

IT is ſingular, with what preciſion common language marks the difference between to wiſh and to deſire, according to our power to obtain the object of our wiſhes, or influence over the means. Thus we never ſay to any one, I *deſire* you to be well; but I *wiſh* you well, becauſe generally ſpeaking we have no influence over another's health; but a ſick man not only *wiſhes* but *deſires* to be well, becauſe he poſſeſſes the power of applying the means; and if he rejects the means, we conclude that he does *not deſire* to be well. If we are ſolicitous that ſome kind office ſhould be performed by any one, we may either *wiſh* or *deſire*, according to our claims upon his aid.

As

As we may ſometimes *deſire* where we cannot *command*, thus we may *wiſh*, where it would be preſumptuous to *deſire:* and ſometimes we manifeſt our deſires by expreſſing our wiſhes, from a principle of delicacy, leaving it to the party, from whom we expect the kind office, to increaſe the obligation by conforming to our wiſh, rather than complying with our deſires. Theſe diſtinctions being founded in nature are common to every language.

Note *M*.

After "which check our progreſs." Page 96.

This ſeems to be the genuine ſenſe of the word *Humility*. But its verb, and participles are not equally confined in their ſignification. They expreſs ſtates of debaſement, in which the ſpirits are peculiarly depreſſed, and the mind deeply chagrined and mortified; but to which the term *humility* has never yet been applied. There are ſituations, in which perſons may feel themſelves very much *humbled;* and they may be expoſed to many *humiliating* circumſtances, without their being poſſeſſed of the diſpoſition denoted by *humility*. Such expreſſions never relate to the prevailing habit of the mind, but to certain incidents which check pride, vanity, ambition, emulation; or deprive us of the reputation we had enjoyed. They all relate to ſome degree of elevation to which the mind had in vain aſpired, and felt mortified at the diſappointment; or to ſome particular ſtate from which

which the ſubject has fallen, and in conſequence of which he ſuffers a *degradation*. He may thus be in a ſtate of *humiliation*, without being in a ſtate of *humility*. This word refers alone to mental excellence, either intellectual or moral; concerning which the ſubject himſelf entertains painful apprehenſions that he is or ſhall remain deficient. The adjective *humble* has the ſame ſignification. When we ſay of a perſon that he has a *humble* mind, we mean that he is modeſt, unaſſuming, diffident of himſelf. Theſe diſtinctions are very obvious, and though they may indicate the caprices of language, they are nevertheleſs highly important; for they ſerve to diſcriminate things which differ very eſſentially in their natures. The *humble* mind is neither mean nor abject, which may be the caſe with the *proud*, who by being detected in his baſeneſs, or diſappointed in his vain preſumptuous hopes, may be *humbled to the duſt*. To the man who is clothed with humility, may poſſibly belong all thoſe excellencies which Mr. Hume has aſcribed to *pride*. He may in reality poſſeſs more merit than he dares to imagine. The diſpoſition is inſpired by the contemplation of excellencies which he loves, and which he almoſt deſpairs to obtain. How different is this from the *humiliation* any one may ſuffer from diſappointed ambition, from a perception of involuntary blemiſhes and accidental defects, from the mortification which ſelf-love may experience, by being defective in beauty, elegance, or wealth, or laden with corporeal infirmities! all of which Mr. Hume has arbitrarily choſen to comprehend under *Humility*. For example. "If beauty or deformity belong to our own face, "ſhape, or perſon, this pleaſure or uneaſineſs is convert-"ed into *pride* or *humility*.—*Pride* and *humility* have the "qualities

" qualities of our mind and *body*, that is, of ſelf, for " their natural and more immediate cauſes.—*Bodily* pain " and *ſickneſs* are in themſelves proper cauſes of *humility*. " Concerning all other bodily accompliſhments, we may " obſerve in general, that whatever in ourſelves is either " uſeful, beautiful, or ſurpriſing, is an object of pride, " and the contrary of *humility*."

Mr. Hume muſt have known that whimſical deviations from etymology, conſtitute an eſſential part of the idioms of a language; which render it not only ſo difficult to be acquired, but occaſion ludicrous effects in the attempt. Would he not have been the firſt to ſmile at the miſtakes of a foreigner, who ſhould ſuppoſe that all perſons labouring every day at their particular occupations, were equally *Day-labourers?*—that to poſſeſs an elegant or lively fancy, was to be *very fanciful?*—that a man was *inſane*, becauſe he had *ill health?*—and that every *child of nature*, was a *natural child?*—But are theſe blunders more inconſiſtent with the idioms of our language, which cuſtom has univerſally eſtabliſhed, than the aſſertion that bodily pain or ſickneſs are in themſelves proper cauſes of humility? and to place " the *Epilepſy*," " the *Itch*," " the *King's-Evil*," in the catalogue? (See *Diſſertation on the Paſſions*, paſſim.)

It is eaſy to collect from the above paſſages, and from the amiable character he has given of pride, as remarked in a preceding note, that Mr. Hume " delighted to *exalt* " the *proud*, and give *diſgrace* to the *humble*." Had it been his province to tranſlate the Bible, how would he have rendered the following paſſages?

Every one proud in heart, is an abomination to the Lord.

Lord. An high look and a proud heart is ſin. He that is of a proud heart ſtirreth up ſtrife. Pride was not made for man, &c. &c. &c.

Before honour is humility. By humility and the fear of the Lord, are riches, honour, and life. God giveth grace to the humble, &c. &c. &c.

It is not intended by theſe quotations, to confute his notions *by divine authority;* but by one, which no Writer can refuſe, that of *common phraſeology.* They indicate what were the ideas univerſally annexed to the terms Pride and Humility at the period when this book was tranſlated; and which continue preciſely the ſame every time ſuch paſſages are read either in public or private. To the univerſal uſage of expreſſions every author muſt conform, who means to be intelligible. Nor is the miſrepreſentation of facts more injurious to the credit of an hiſtorian, than the perverſion of language to that of a philoſopher.*

* The ſingularity of Mr. Hume in his definitions of both theſe words, will appear ſtill more aſſuming, when we conſider that it oppoſes the phraſeology not only of the *Engliſh* language, but of moſt perhaps *all* the *European* languages; which employ an appropriate word to diſtinguiſh that amiable conſciouſneſs or apprehenſion of inferiority in mental excellence, from other painful imperfections; and that word is perfectly ſynonymous to the explanation we have given of *humility.*

NOTE *N.*

After "appeared inſupportable." Page 102.

THE Author once attended a priſoner of ſome diſtinction in one of the priſons of the metropolis, ill of a typhus fever; whoſe apartments were gloomy in the extreme, and ſurrounded with horrors: yet this priſoner aſſured him afterwards, that upon his releaſe, he quitted them with a degree of reluctance. Cuſtom had reconciled him to the twilight admitted through the thick barred grate; to the ſpots and patches of his plaſtered walls, to the hardneſs of his bed, and even to confinement. He had his books, was viſited by his friends, and was greatly amuſed and intereſted in the anecdotes of the place.

An Officer of the municipality at Leyden alſo informed the Author of an inſtance, which marks yet more ſtrongly the force of habit. A poor woman, who had for ſome miſdemeanour been ſentenced to confinement for a certain number of years, upon the expiration of the term, immediately applied to him for re-admiſſion. She urged that all her worldly comforts were fled; and her only wiſh was to be indulged in thoſe imparted by habit. She moreover threatened, that, if this could not be granted as a *favour*, ſhe would commit ſome offence that ſhould give her a *title* to be re-inſtated in the accuſtomed lodgings.

NOTE *O.*

After "may poſſibly follow *Fear*, *Terror*, *Conſternation*, *Dread*." Page 103.

As theſe diſtinctions may appear too refined to ſome of my Readers, it will be proper to ſhew that they actually exiſt; and that there are ſituations, in which a diſcrimination is both obvious and neceſſary. Take the following inſtances.

When a young and inexperienced ſoldier is firſt ordered to march to battle, his legs will tremble under him, and the preſaging colour of death will be in his face, notwithſtanding his ſtrongeſt reſolutions, aided by the power of drums and trumpets and the apparent gaiety of his aſſociates. Theſe mark his *fear*. Should he during the engagement meet with a ſingle foe, and be provoked to ſingle combat, from which he cannot poſſibly or honourably eſcape, the emotion of *terror* will render him the more tremendous. If the army to which he belongs ſhould experience a total defeat; the province whoſe ſafety depended upon its ſucceſs will be thrown into the utmoſt *conſternation;* becauſe this commencement of evil may be productive of horrors, which the livelieſt imagination cannot fully repreſent: and it was the apprehenſion of a poſſible defeat with its conſequences that had inſpired their minds with *dread*, long before the engagement took place.

Theſe ideas are in themſelves very diſtinct, and al-

though ſome of the terms uſed to expreſs them may be uſed indiſcriminately, where nice preciſion is not ſo requiſite, yet the arrangement given them evidently ſhews the appropriate place of each. Thus we may ſay that the young ſoldier dreads to go into battle as he is marching forwards; but ſtrictly ſpeaking, this dread may have been indulged immediately after he had enliſted, when the object of *Fear* was remote; it will be increaſed into that paſſion as he approaches the enemy.

NOTE *P.*

After "though a degree of hope is ſtill indulged." Page 105.

THE embarraſſed and fluctuating ſtate of the mind under the influence of doubt, has ſeduced Mr. Hume into a ſingular hypotheſis; which not only oppoſes the univerſal opinion of mankind, but confounds the future with the preſent and the paſt, by conſidering grief as the baſis of fear. Could he eſtabliſh this principle, it would follow that the mind is firſt oppreſſed with grief concerning a particular object, and then torn with fear and anxiety concerning its arrival: for he makes grief to be the parent of fear, inſtead of conſidering the accompliſhment of fearful apprehenſions as a cauſe of grief.

"Suppoſe," ſays he, "that the object concerning "which we are doubtful, produces either deſire or aver-"ſion; it is evident, that according as the mind turns it-"ſelf to one ſide or the other, it muſt feel a momentary "impreſſion of joy or ſorrow. An object, whoſe exiſ-

"tence

" tence we deſire, gives ſatisfaction, when we think of " thoſe cauſes which produce it; and for the ſame reaſon, " excites grief, or uneaſineſs from the oppoſite conſidera- " tion. So that as the underſtanding, in probable queſ- " tions, is divided between the contrary points of view, " the heart muſt in the ſame manner be divided between " oppoſite emotions.—According as the probability in- " clines to good or evil, the paſſion of grief or joy predo- " minates in the compoſition; and theſe paſſions being in- " termingled by means of the contrary views of the ima- " gination, produce by the union, the paſſions of hope " and fear. Again:

" The paſſions of fear and hope may ariſe, when the " chances are equal on both ſides, and no ſuperiority can " be diſcovered in one above the other. Nay, in this ſitu- " ation the paſſions are rather the ſtrongeſt; as the mind " has then the leaſt foundation to reſt upon, and is toſt " with the greateſt uncertainty. *Throw in a ſuperior de-* " *gree of probability to the ſide of grief, you immediately* " *ſee that paſſion diffuſe itſelf over the compoſition and* " *tincture it into fear.* Increaſe the probability, by that " means the grief, the fear prevails ſtill more and more; " till at laſt it runs inſenſibly, as the joy continually dimi- " niſhes into pure grief. After you have brought it to this " ſituation, diminiſh the grief, by a contrary operation to " that which increaſed it, to wit, by diminiſhing the pro- " bability on the melancholy ſide; and you will ſee the " paſſion cheer every moment, till it changes inſenſibly " into hope; which again runs by ſlow degrees into joy, " as you increaſe the part of the compoſition by the in- " creaſe of the probability." He adds, " Are not theſe as " plain proofs that the paſſions of fear and hope are mix-

" tures of grief and joy, as in optics it is a proof, that a " coloured ray of the ſun, paſſing through a priſm, is a " compoſition of two others, when, as you diminiſh or in- " creaſe the quantity of either, you find it prevail propor- " tionably more or leſs in the compoſition." (See Diſſertation on the Paſſions, Sect. I.)

The miſtake which runs through the whole of this laboured argument, manifeſtly ariſes from Mr. Hume's not having ſufficiently attended to the complication which exiſts in an uncertain and embarraſſed ſtate of mind. The object both of hope and fear, or the ſtate of our knowledge reſpecting it muſt, according to his own hypotheſis, be future, otherwiſe no uncertainty concerning it could have place. It cannot therefore in itſelf be the cauſe either of *grief* or *joy*, but, as we uſually expreſs the particular ſtate of mind, of *hope* or *fear*. When Mr. Hume obſerves, that " an object whoſe exiſtence we deſire gives ſa- " tisfaction, when we think of thoſe cauſes which produce " it," his own ideas are manifeſtly entangled in the inaccuracy of the ſtatement. It cannot be the object whoſe exiſtence we deſire that gives the *ſatisfaction* he refers to; it is the incidental cauſes which give it; the object itſelf will be the ſubject of our *hopes* and *fears*, as long as its exiſtence continues an uncertainty. When we advert to the *probabilities* of its exiſtence, the mind may derive both *hope* and *joy* from the predominant influence of theſe probabilities upon us, and when *improbabilities* gain an aſcendant influence, our *fear* will prevail, and this will be accompanied with a certain degree of *grief* at the *diſappointment* of the hopes we had indulged. Thus by being agitated by the "*pro* and *con*" of probabilities and

and improbabilities, we feel a pleaſing expectation at one moment, and a painful reverſe at another. Here are of conſequence two temporary ſenſations, alternately excited reſpecting this deſired object; but they are immediately excited by the detached evidences on the ſide of an happy or unhappy iſſue. Without hope we ſhould ſink into the extreme of fear; without fear, our joy would be complete: and when the grand reſult ſhall be known, theſe temporary ſenſations will ceaſe, and the mind will be under the influence of unmixed joy or grief according to the event. The joy and grief accompanying hope and fear therefore, retain their own characteriſtic natures without any tranſmutation having taken place. After we have indulged hope, by contemplating the promiſing ſide of the queſtion, we are grieved and chagrined at the diſappointment of theſe hopes, as oft as improbabilities alarm our fears. On the contrary, when probabilities appear ſtrongly in favour of what we ardently deſire; we *rejoice* that our hopes are encouraged.

Thus the paſſions of fear and hope are not mixtures of grief and joy, in the ſame manner as a coloured ray of the ſun paſſing through a priſm is a compoſition of two others; but they are all diſtinct paſſions, and have their own diſtinct cauſes of excitement. Hope and fear reſpect the grand iſſue; grief and joy, the encouragements or diſcouragements which may alternately preſent themſelves reſpecting it.

NOTE *Q*.

After "our underſtandings cannot fully reach and comprehend." Page 149.

FROM Mr. Grove it was natural to expect preciſion: and although this is manifeſt in moſt parts of his Treatiſe on the Paſſions, yet in his deſcription of admiration, he has not only deviated from the beſt authorities, but alſo from himſelf.

That admiration is not excited by *novelty* alone is plain, becauſe there are many novelties which no one can admire; ſuch as are indifferent, inſipid, or diſpleaſing. That it cannot be ſynonymous with *ſurpriſe*, is plain, becauſe were we to tell any one that we were ſurpriſed at his excellencies, he would probably be ſurpriſed at our ill manners. Nor is it the ſame with *wonder*; for when a lover admires the charms of his miſtreſs, we cannot ſuppoſe this to be *wondering* that ſhe poſſeſſes them.

But that the term Admiration cannot be confined to the impreſſions which ſimple novelty is able to make, is obvious from the remarks of Mr. Grove and the more pertinent phraſeology employed in other parts of his works. He acknowledges that *greatneſs* or *excellency* is the moſt general and moſt proper object of admiration. But neither of theſe are neceſſarily novel. He further obſerves that "*admiration* according to the different character of "its object is called *eſteem* or *contempt*." But his definition confines our ideas to the ſimple character of novelty, nor

nor can admiration be applied to oppoſite characters, without a deſtruction of the ſimplicity he aſcribes to it, and I may add without exciting a degree of ſurpriſe at the verſatility of its nature. He has alſo remarked, that even *littleneſs* may excite admiration; but he allows that the works of nature or art, which are of an unuſual *ſmallneſs*, are admired, not ſo much for their ſmallneſs, as for the *greatneſs of the wiſdom and ſkill* conſpicuous in them. For we can behold a particle of mere undiverſified matter, ſays he, though incomparably ſmaller, without ſuch wonder. In another paſſage, ſpeaking of the advantages of ſleep, he ſays "we ſhall diſcern one reaſon more to "*admire the wiſdom* of the Creator, in appointing ſo "great a portion of our time for ſleep."

Thus it appears that Mr. Grove feels the neceſſity of oppoſing his own definition, and alſo the peculiar propriety of applying the term to indubitable marks of excellency.

The extreme confuſion and contrarieties which run through the chapter from whence the above extracts are made, proceed from his conſidering admiration as ſynonymous with ſurpriſe, and they fully indicate the great importance of affixing diſtinct ideas to each expreſſion. Every author admits that the terms to admire, admiration, admirable, may always be applied to ſome kind of excellency without the ſhadow of an impropriety; and the above obſervations manifeſt that they cannot at all times be uſed ſynonymouſly with either *ſurpriſe* or *wonder*. This circumſtance fully indicates their proper place in the accurate arrangement of our ideas.

NOTE

NOTE *S.*

After "or which has a preponderancy of excellence." Page 226.

WITHOUT entering deeply into this delicate ſubject, the following queries are propoſed to thoſe who are more diſpoſed. Since the Female Sex complain with apparent anguiſh of heart, that men have taken the lead in directing the wheels of government, in the eſtabliſhment of the arts, and proſecution of the ſciences, by *uſurpation*, how came they to be ſuch general and extenſive uſurpers, without poſſeſſing a ſuperiority of correſpondent qualifications?—Can any other example be produced of predilections being rendered ſo univerſal and ſo permanent, by circumſtances merely incidental?—Excepting we have recourſe to the conſtitution of nature, who can explain the reaſon why each ſex ſhould regard the qualities in the oppoſite ſex moſt ſimilar to its own, with ſuch marks of diſguſt or contempt; and delight in qualities directly oppoſite? This is contrary to all the laws of the ſocial affections in every other inſtance; for ſimilarity of diſpoſitions and manners is conſidered, in every other caſe, as the foundation of love, and the cement of affection and friendſhip.

May we not ſafely aſſert that there is, generally ſpeaking, an original diverſity in *taſtes* and *diſpoſitions*; liable however to ſome exceptions? If this be admitted, a correſpondent

reſpondent diverſity of *purſuits* will naturally follow. We may alſo ſubjoin that theſe taſtes and diſpoſitions are in moſt inſtances, remarkably correſpondent with the corporeal powers of obtaining or accompliſhing their objects.

NOTE *T*.

After "by a cautious manner of communicating the tidings." Page 285.

HISTORIANS preſent us with many inſtances of fatal effects from the exceſs of joy; but it plainly appears from their narratives, that the ſubjects were at the inſtant preceding under the preſſure of extreme anguiſh of mind.

Pliny informs us that Chilo, the Lacedemonian, died upon hearing that his ſon had gained a prize in the Olympic Games. "Cum victore filio Olympiæ expiraſſet "gaudio." We may conſider the exceſs of joy in this caſe, as an indication of his previous ſolicitude concerning the iſſue. (Plin. Maj. LIB. VII. SECT. 7.) But the following inſtances are more expreſs.

Valerius Maximus tells us that Sophocles the tragic Writer, in a conteſt of honour, died in conſequence of a deciſion being pronounced in his favour. "Sophocles "ultimæ jam ſenectutis, cum in certamine tragædiam "dixiſſet, ancipiti ſententiarum eventu diu ſolicitus, ali-"quando tamen unâ ſententiâ victor, cauſam mortis gau-"dium habuit." (Val. Max. LIB. IX. CAP. 12.)

Aulius Gellius mentions a remarkable inſtance of what may

may be termed, accumulated joy, in Diagoras, whoſe three ſons were crowned in the ſame day as victors; the one as a pugiliſt, the other as a wreſtler, and the third in both capacities. "Diagoras, tres filios habuit, unum "pugilem, alterum lutorem, tertium Pancraſtiaſten; eoſ- "que omnes videt vincere coronarique eodem Olympiæ "die; et cum coronis ſuis in caput patris poſitis ſuavia- "rentur; cumque populus gratulabundus flores undique "in eum jaceret, ibi in ſtadio, inſpectante populo, in oſ- "culis, atque in manibus filiorum animam efflavit." (Aul. Gell. noct. Attic. Lib. III. Cap. 15.)

Livy alſo mentions the inſtance of an aged Matron, who, while ſhe was in the depth of diſtreſs, from the tidings of her ſon's having been ſlain in battle, died in his arms in the exceſs of joy upon his ſafe return. (Liv. Lib. XXII. Cap. 7.)

Not to enumerate more inſtances; we are told by the Italian hiſtorian *Guicciardini*, that Leo the Tenth died of a fever, occaſioned by the agitation of his ſpirits, on his receiving the joyful news of the capture of Milan, concerning which he had entertained much anxiety. (Iſtoria de Guicciardini, Lib. XIV.)

In all theſe inſtances the previous ſtate of mind, with its pathological effects upon the body, rendered the impulſe of joy the ſtronger, and contributed to render it fatal.

NOTE *U.*

After "will contribute to explain the reſt." Page 297.

DR. Haygarth, in his late Publication on *the Imagination as a Cauſe, and as a Cure of the Diſorders of the Body*, has preſented us with many curious and intereſting facts relative to its influence; to which I beg leave to refer the Reader. Such inconteſtible proofs of the power of the imagination in medical caſes, may vindicate ſome of the ſtrenuous advocates for *Animal Magnetiſm* from the charge of intentional fraud brought againſt them by the totally incredulous; while they demonſtrate the abſurdity of all their theories.

I have in the text attributed the power of the imagination to produce certain changes in the corporeal ſyſtem, to the Paſſions or ſtrong Affections which in ſuch caſes always accompany it; and the experiments made by the Doctor and his medical friends abundantly corroborate the ſentiment. In ſome of the patients the ſalutary influence of *hope*, and afterwards of *joy*, was evidently very great: in others, the mind was obviouſly in a ſtate of *ſurpriſe* and *aſtoniſhment*, at the myſterious powers ſuppoſed to be ſeated in the inſtruments; in others, it was agitated by alternate *hopes* and *fears*; and in others, it was under the ſtrong impreſſions of *terror*. The directions given to the *Tractors* ſerved to point out as it were the influence of this prediſpoſition of mind to the parts particularly affected, by a law not more inexplicable, though more uncommon than

than the operation of the will in producing voluntary motion. Nor is the proceſs diſſimilar to that of conveying the electric fluid to various parts of the body, as practiſed in medical electricity. Since every paſſion is frequently excited by the imagination alone, without any real or juſt cauſe, and ſince theſe paſſions are in their appearances and effects perfectly the ſame as thoſe produced by realities, the medical influence of the imagination is obviouſly reduced to the ſame principle. The remaining difficulties therefore attending the ſubject are not greater than thoſe which belong to the influence of the paſſions in general. When it ſhall be explained in what manner each paſſion inſtantaneouſly produces its own ſpecific change, whether it be of an exhilarating, irritating, depreſſive, or languid nature, we ſhall be able to explain the medical Power of the imagination which is able to excite paſſions and affections from *ideal* cauſes.

Note *W.*

After "where the ſole object is to eſtabliſh indiſputable facts." Page 298.

The Section to which this Note refers is an abridged tranſlation of ſome parts of the Author's Inaugural Diſſertation, *De Animi pathamatum vi, et modo agendi in inducendis et curandis Morbis;* publiſhed at Leyden in the year 1767. In which the Author's profeſſed object was *to theorize;* and by adducing numerous proofs of the influence of the paſſions both in inducing and removing diſorders, to demonſtrate the fallacy of the Boerhaavian ſyſtem, which

which attributes the proximate cauſes of diſeaſes to certain changes in the fluids. He attempted in that Diſſertation to explain the *modus operandi* of the paſſions and affections upon principles equally adapted to the influence of every other cauſe of morbid or ſalutary change. It was his intention to have conſidered the ſubject more amply; and to have preſented it to the world in another form: but in the earlier part of life he was deprived of the requiſite leiſure; and in ſubſequent years the gradual rejection of the Boerhaavian doctrine, and the very learned diſſertation of Dr. Falconer on the ſame ſubject, to which the *Fothergillian* Medal was adjudged, conſpired to render the execution of his deſign the leſs neceſſary. The Reader will find in the Doctor's Treatiſe, numerous inſtances given illuſtrative of the doctrine and principles I have advanced, and ſuch authorities quoted as will remove every doubt.

See alſo Sir George Baker's Obſervations, in the Medical Tranſactions. T. III. XI.

NOTE *X.*

After "The other compounds partake of mixed effects." Page 307.

THESE Obſervations on the influence of the paſſions and affections upon thought and language, united with thoſe repeatedly advanced on the power of ſympathy, point out to us the reaſon of an axiom univerſally admitted, that the orator muſt *feel* his ſubject to inſure his power over

over the feelings of others. As the warm feelings of a mind duly cultivated will always ſuggeſt a train of ideas and expreſſions correſpondent with its peculiar ſtate; thus is ſome degree of feeling highly neceſſary for a ſucceſsful imitation. If the rhetorician or orator be totally deſtitute of ſenſibility, there will be ſuch an artifice in his ſtyle and manner as can alone deceive thoſe who are ignorant that artifice exiſts. It is however acknowledged, that by conſtant practice, or in other words, by being *hackneyed* in their profeſſion, both language and manner may become the reſult of habit, and may be employed with effect when the feelings which gave them their original energy are obtunded. Veteran actors have been known to imitate various emotions in a juſt and forcible manner, long after they had loſt their ſenſibility. The retained Counſellor has been known to imitate that pathos in a bad cauſe, which a good cauſe alone could have at firſt inſpired: and the corrupt Senator may in his degenerate ſtate counterfeit all that zeal and energy, which was genuine at the commencement of his political career. But ſo true is nature to itſelf that it abſolutely demands the paſſions and emotions to be perfectly repreſented. Defect diffuſes a langour, exceſs produces diſguſt. The eloquence dictated by an unfeeling heart, miſtakes bombaſt for ſublimity, rant for ſtrong feelings, the cant and whine of a mendicant for the pathetic. It confounds or miſapplies every trope and figure which it has collected from ſyſtems of rhetoric. It is loquacious where it ought to be conciſe; amuſes itſelf with drawing of pictures and gathering of flowers, when it ſhould have been borne down with a torrent of rapid thought and diction. In a word,

it

it preſents us with every indication that the author has been only employing his head, and playing with his imagination; without making any attempts to warm his own heart. It is therefore impoſſible that he ſhould ſucceed in warming the hearts of others. He may excite the admiration of ſome, the contempt of others, but the genuine feelings of none.

Falſe eloquence, like the priſmatic glaſs,
Its gaudy colours ſpreads on every place:
The face of Nature we no more ſurvey;
All glares alike without diſtinction gay.

POPE.

FINIS.

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